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NOTE TO READER 
This is the first draft of a book manuscript. As such, it 
is not a final book, but rather a work-in-progress. 
Because it addresses such pressing issues, at such a 
critical time of crises, I have decided to share this first 
draft with readers. I am eager to receive your 
comments and feedback. I apologize for typographical 
errors, stylistic infelicities, and substantive errors—all 
mine. Please send me your thoughts and comments, 
preferably by way of comments on the website that 
hosts this first draft, “Critique & Praxis 13/13.” I thank 
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PREFACE 
We live in dark times. Extreme-right populist movements are on 
the rise once again. Xenophobic sentiment is mounting in many quarters 
around the world. Strong-men political leaders are gaining power on the 
back of a global war on terror and years of neoliberal economic reform. 
As I write, the democratic process and inclusive politics in the United 
States—as faulty as they are—teeter on the verge of collapse, and it is no 
longer unimaginable that the country may be headed toward 
authoritarianism. Many even worry, not without reason, about the risk of 
fascism. The question on many people’s minds today is: What is to be 
done to prevent slipping into chaos and tyranny? Or, even more 
pointedly: What can I do, personally, to stop this dangerous descent? 
Others before us faced similar dilemmas—and their fates are 
what worry many of us even more. France and Germany in the 1920s 
and ’30s. Chile in the 1970s. Russia and Turkey at the turn of the 
century. Democratic processes, it turns out—especially faulty democratic 
regimes that desperately need reform—are fragile, especially when they 
are confronted by authoritarian leaders bent on fomenting political chaos 
in order to consolidate political power. 
History reveals a number of conventional responses to these 
democratic crises: bolster parliament as a bulwark against an 
encroaching executive; build a more independent judiciary; enforce the 
rule of law; produce more and better facts to counter the propaganda; 
invigorate the public sphere; spark a grassroots counter-movement; or 
just get more people to the polls. And all of these are, undoubtedly, 
worthwhile undertakings in such critical times. 
But for many critical thinkers, these remedies feel like band-aids 
and stand on fragile footing. They rest, for the most part, on illusions that 
may well have contributed to the crises we find ourselves in today. The 
rule of law, for instance, is far more malleable than its proponents 
imagine and can easily be distorted in the hands of autocratic leaders, as 
happened under the Third Reich or in post 9/11 America. (Recall the 
Bush torture memos that immunized unconscionable practices like 
waterboarding, stress positions, and inhumane deprivations.) Facts 
also—particularly social facts—are far more malleable than we would 
like to admit. Many legal facts, for instance, depend on contested notions 
of materiality, proximity, or intent that are more influenced by relations 
of power than by objective measurement. Truth, it turns out, is not 
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immune to politics; there is no wall, but instead a tight relation between 
truth, knowledge, and power. 
Now, dressings are of course useful to stop the bleeding. A more 
independent judiciary, a legislative check, honest law enforcement can 
have positive effects in critical times like these, and are surely more 
desirable than raw authoritarianism. They are necessary correctives in 
these times. But they are not solutions—and, in all likelihood, they 
postpone the reckoning, particularly when a right-wing populist wave 
engulfs parliament and packs the judiciary as well. These remedies are 
not bulwarks against encroaching right populism, but just temporary 
measures and are easily appropriated by the right. They are no more than 
stopgap measures in an ongoing political struggle. 
Contrary to liberal tenets, there are no neutral principles or 
universal charters of civil and political rights that will protect us against 
a downward spiral to authoritarianism. There is no institutional fix, no 
permanent or lasting legal protection against tyranny. The rule of law 
will not save us—it is plied instead in the hands of brilliant lawyers to 
the will of their handlers, as we witnessed so starkly under the 
presidency of George W. Bush. As a result, putting in place these 
temporary remedies will not suffice.  
The reason is that our political condition does not achieve the 
kind of equilibrium characterized by liberal political theory. Our political 
condition is, instead, a constant never-ending struggle to shape 
distributions of resources. It is an unending political competition, one 
that never reaches a stable equilibrium, but rather churns endlessly, 
dramatically, and often violently, redistributing wealth, security, 
influence, liberty, well-being—and, yes, life itself. 
This is a central insight of critical theory, and it remains as sound 
today as it was one hundred years ago: our political condition is an 
unremitting struggle over values, ideals, and material existence. It is a 
constant battle to realize contested visions and ambitions for life and 
social existence. We are inevitably steeped in these ongoing political 
struggles. They cannot be avoided through institutional or legal fixes.  
Another central insight of critical theory is that these struggles 
are fought, and often won, on the basis of illusions: by getting people to 
believe so deeply in the truth of social facts that they are then willing to 
sacrifice their lives for their beliefs. In recent decades, with the collapse 
of communism and the rise of neoliberalism, the illusion of free markets 
has done most of the work. But today, increasingly, the specter of 
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immigrant invasion, of loss of white identity, and of the Islamification of 
the West are now converting many more people to extreme-right populist 
movements.  
In times past, critical theory would have had a ready-made 
answer to these troubled times. In the late nineteenth and most of the 
twentieth centuries, Marxist thinkers dominated the critical Left. 
Traditional critical theory was tethered to class struggle and historical 
materialism. Critical practice—what became known as praxis—was 
oriented toward revolution. To be sure, there were internecine conflicts 
and rivalries over tactics. The heated debate between Rosa Luxembourg 
and Lenin on the question of what was to be done is a good illustration.1 
But the broad outline of the path forward was well defined: class 
struggle, international solidarity, and revolutionary social transformation. 
This vision of praxis shaped the first generation of the Frankfurt School 
and represented a common horizon for the critical Left in the early to 
mid-twentieth century.  
But with peasant and anti-colonial insurrections in the East and 
South at mid-century, and in the wake of the repression following May 
1968, many critical voices began to fracture the consensus of traditional 
critical theory. The decline of syndicalism and of more radical factions 
of the international labor movement gradually transformed and pacified 
labor movements during the second half of the twentieth century The 
events in the 1950s and 60s, especially in Hungary and the East Bloc, 
began to unveil some of the illusions of traditional critical theory itself; 
as did the streets of 1968 where the vitality of the student and worker 
movements slammed against the rigidity of leftist parties, especially 
Western communist parties still beholden to the Soviet Union. At that 
point, the grip of Marx’s philosophy of history began to loosen. And 
once that glue dissolved, the critical prescriptions got muddied. Since 
that time, critical praxis has lacked its earlier coherence—leaving many 
critical thinkers today somewhat disarmed in the face of renewed right-
wing populism. 
There is today no longer an intelligible critical response to the 
question “What is to be done?” Apart from a dwindling core, few critical 
theorists would explicitly advocate the answers that most on the critical 
Left would have imagined in the early or mid-twentieth century. Today, 
right-wing populist movements have cannibalized segments of the 
proletarian base of the former Left, turning old-style class warfare into 
anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and ethno-racist conflict. The cleavage is no 
longer between the workers and the bourgeoisie, but between a populist 
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white class versus minorities and immigrants, or children of immigrants, 
predominantly of color. In the United States, it is between destitute 
whites and impoverished blacks and Latinos. The problems this raises 
are acute. 
The questions are pressing—but critical theory no longer 
provides a straightforward answer. To the contrary, in recent decades, 
critical theory has been mired in internecine struggles of influence 
among its different branches—Marxist, Lacanian, Foucaultian, 
deconstructive, feminist, post-colonial, queer—or worse, in tribal politics 
and gossip around its illuminati. These internal wars of influence and 
political games have prevented critics from building on the core of 
critique and taking on the challenge of elaborating a contemporary 
critical theory of practice—a critical praxis for our critical times. 
It is time, then, to rejuvenate critical theory and critical praxis for 
the twenty-first century. In these pages, I will set forth a new vision for 
critical theory and praxis, and answer the specific question of what is to 
be done today, here, and now. In brief, I will propose that we understand 
critical theory, at its core, as a pure theory of illusions that calls for a 
pure theory of values and entails a pure theory of tactics. Let me 
prefigure the argument as succinctly as possible. 
Critical theory is the constant endless unveiling of illusions in 
order to demonstrate the distributional consequences of our belief 
systems, material conditions, and political economies. It traces the 
effects in reality of our beliefs and material practices, recognizing that, 
as it unveils illusions, it creates new ones that will need to be unpacked 
next. It is relentless in this way—this is its anti-foundational basis. It 
engages in a form of recursive unmasking—an infinite regress—that 
endlessly exposes the distributional effects of belief systems and material 
conditions. It entails, in this sense, a pure theory of illusions. 
In the same way in which reconstructed critical theory, 
understood as a pure theory of illusions, liberates us from unfounded 
positivist foundations, it also frees us from the foundational constraints 
of traditional critical utopias. There is no unique form of political 
economy that will satisfy a critical utopian vision. All political economic 
regimes are regulated in unique ways and produce material distributions 
that are the direct effect of the specific rules and regulations of that 
particular regime, not of the abstract regime type. A state-controlled 
economy can distribute to its apparatschik, just as a privately-owned 
corporation can distribute to its workers: it is not the type, but the 
detailed mechanisms and regulations of the specific regime that shape 
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the social order. All that we can judge, as critical theorists, is how close a 
specific regime approximates the values and ideals that the critical 
tradition shares. In this sense, critical theory calls for judgment about the 
values that a political economic regime instantiates through its material 
outcomes and distributions, not for a particular political economy. Hand-
in-hand with a pure theory of illusions, reconstructed critical theory must 
be agnostic about the form of political economic regime, but adamant 
about its values. It entails, in this sense, a pure theory of values. 
In terms of praxis, then, reconstructed critical theory calls for 
entirely situated, contextualized analyses of how to push specific, really-
existing, situated political economic regimes—whether capitalist, 
socialist, or communist—in the proper direction. Each historical, 
temporal, and geopolitical situation will differ, calling for different 
tactics—with nothing off the table. This is an inherently combative 
enterprise because critical theorists are necessarily opposing and 
confronting the values and material projects of others. Politics is a 
constant battle over values, and we are all inevitably in a state of 
competition to realize our ideals. In such a contested space, it is only 
possible to develop tactics in a situated and contextualized way. Since 
there is no war to be won, but an endless series of battles, critical theory 
must focus on tactics. These are not portable or generalizable. What 
might have been appropriate in 1930s Germany was completely different 
than what worked in 1940s India. In the latter context, non-violent 
resistance may have been appropriate; in the former it would have been 
useless. Battle tactics cannot be universalized. In this sense, 
reconstructed critical theory calls for a pure theory of tactics.  
The upshot is that there is no single or abstract answer to the 
question “What is to be done?” In the same way in which reconstructed 
critical theory overcomes unfounded positivist foundations, the question 
“What is to be done?” does not have a unique or correct answer in the 
abstract. The answer is not a vanguard party, a leaderless movement, 
non-violent resistance, or any general mode of uprising, in the abstract. 
There is no one right way to proceed in general terms. We immediately 
go off track when we seek one generalizable answer to the question. 
Instead, the question must be answered differently for each situation, 
specified and contextualized in space and time. There must be a GPS-, 
time-, and date-stamp to every answer.  
In this book, I propose one such time, place, and date stamped 
answer to the question: “What is to be done in the United States on 
September 1, 2018?” That is the only style of question that is worth a 
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critical response. I hope that others will answer the question with their 
own time, place, and date stamp wherever they are now—and I will 
facilitate a forum to post those answers. Critical theory cannot simply 
understand our crises and unveil our illusions. It cannot content itself 
with reflection or contemplation as a form of practice. It must articulate 
tactics and praxis.   
Critical times call for radical revaluation. Earlier similar epochs 
were foundational moments for critical theory and praxis. The 1920s, 
especially in the Weimar Republic, gave rise to a whole generation of 
critical theorists—many of whom would emigrate in exile around the 
world and spawn a critical diaspora.2 The 1960s, with its global student 
uprisings and government repression, stimulated another wave of critical 
theory and praxis, giving way to a formidable decade of critical thought 
during the 1970s. Our critical times today demand an equal response 
from contemporary critical theorists. That is what I propose here: a new 
vision for critical theory and critical praxis for the twenty-first century. 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt  
September 1, 2018 
New York City  
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INTRODUCTION: A TIME FOR PRAXIS 
We have inherited a rich tradition of critical theories that has 
served us well to identify and analyze our contemporary crises. So much 
so that the terms “crisis and critique”—Krise und Kritik—have become 
today homologues. With regard to critical praxis, however, we are in a 
slightly different situation. The trajectory of critical praxis, although 
influenced by similar historical forces as that of critical theory, landed us 
in a somewhat different place. As a result, many contemporary critical 
theorists are disarmed today before the most fundamental and critical 
question of these critical times: “What is to be done?” 
This predicament is the product of centuries or millennia of 
privileging philosophical inquiry, contemplation, and reason over what 
the Greeks referred to as πρᾶξις—praxis, or practice, the ethical and 
political form of being. The former, theoria, involved predominantly 
understanding and comprehension—in essence, knowing—and it was 
oriented towards wisdom. The latter, praxis, revolved around activity, 
action, performance—in essence, doing—and it was oriented towards 
proper behavior in ethical and political life.3 
For the ancients, these were two different modes of engaging the 
world—two among others, poesis being another—and these two 
categories have shaped human experience ever since. The early Christian 
writers drew on them in their struggle to square contemplative faith with 
acts of charity. Medieval scholars pursued the debates and refined an 
idea of the practical application of theoretical knowledge. With 
Enlightenment philosophy, from Descartes through Kant to the German 
Idealists, the privilege of reason tilted the field further toward the mind 
and away from praxis.4 
Many critical thinkers during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries struggled to correct the imbalance—Marx, the first among 
them, as so strikingly encapsulated in his Theses on Feuerbach.5 The 
second thesis: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to 
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question.” 
The eighth: “Social life is essentially practical.” And, of course, the 
eleventh.  
But Marx was by no means alone in his ambition to elevate 
praxis. Many critical thinkers followed in his footsteps. Hannah Arendt 
privilegeed the vita activa before turning, in her later years, to the 
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contemplative realm in The Life of the Mind. Michel Foucault extricated 
critical theory from the dominant Socratic way—gnōthi seauton, “know 
thyself”—and took the path less travelled: practices of the self, 
techniques of the self, or what he called “care of self.”  
The tension played out in different ways and under different 
rubrics, from the invisible hand that undermined collective action to 
debates over “dirty hands.” But every time that we, critical theorists, 
came close to praxis—from antiquity to the present—it seems we found 
a way to divert the conversation back to the contemplative realm. 
Socrates got close in the first Alcibiades and the Statesman. 
There, he confronted young men who wanted to live the life of praxis, 
rather than contemplation. But quickly Socrates made them realize they 
did not know much about justice or governing others, and what they 
needed first was to gain knowledge. So he convinced them to know 
themselves first. Politics is a skill. It requires techne. Like being the 
captain of a ship, or shepherd of a flock, there is skill and knowledge to 
be had. It requires wisdom first. Knowledge. Contemplation. And that 
then pushed everything back to philosophy. It pushed the inquiry back to 
the Republic and definitions of justice, and the just person. And Socrates 
never got back to the original question: how to act politically. 
Foucault got close in The Hermeneutics of the Subject and his 
final volumes of The History of Sexuality. We had spent too much time 
on Socrates’ “know-thyself,” Foucault argued there. There was a whole 
other tradition of practice that we had ignored. Foucault too returned to 
the first Alcibiades as a way to explore those practices. He interpreted 
the Socratic dialogue as a move toward practices of the self, toward care 
of self, rather than simply knowledge of self. But he then pivoted to the 
permanent practices of the self in the Stoics and Epicureans; and from 
there on, the analysis was almost exclusively trained on practices of the 
self. The dimension of subjectivity would dominate the analysis at the 
expense of the government of others. 
Truth-telling, parrhesia, and the courage of truth are of course 
essential elements to engage politics. Speaking out and denouncing 
injustice is central. Emile Zola’s J’accuse is a classical example—for 
which Zola was convicted of libel and had to flee France. Foucault too 
staked out important political positions in manifestos, editorials and 
signed statements on many occasions. But notice the model: the 
influential intellectual, even as a specific intellectual, taking a stance 
against the state, at personal risk to be sure, often alone or in a small 
collective, standing against authority. That may be important. It may be 
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necessary. But surely, it cannot exhaust praxis. Yet, it seemed to, 
practically always.  
 Most recently, I was reading my friend and colleague Axel 
Honneth’s new book, The Idea of Socialism—an engaged intervention 
seeking to rehabilitate socialism and breathe new life into it. A deeply 
committed engagement. A real crie de coeur. Then I hit this passage: 
I make no attempt to draw connections to current 
political constellations and possibilities for action. I 
will not be dealing with the strategic question of 
how socialism could influence current political 
events, but solely how the original intention of 
socialism could be reformulated so as to make it 
once again a source of political-ethical 
orientations.6 
No attempt to discuss “possibilities for action”: that is our 
predicament. Somehow, praxis invariably takes a second seat to theory. 
Practice, practical knowledge, clinical activities become the handmaid of 
theoretical knowledge—whether in philosophy, physics, law, 
engineering, or critical theory. To the point where, today, in our own 
field, we laud critical theories, but cannot even properly identify critical 
praxis. 
No more. This has to end. It is time to take stock and begin to 
chart new directions for critical praxis. In times like these, there is a 
burning need for a new vision and renewed critical praxis. What does or 
should political action look like from a critical perspective today, 
especially when the underlying theoretical structure of the dialectical 
imagination has become so fractured? 
This is the most important question for critical theory in the 
twenty-first century. It is the task that I have set for this book: to counter 
centuries of contemplative complacency and return critical praxis to its 
central place in the order of things. In doing so, this book will strive to 
address what is, today, the most pressing question of all: What is to be 
done?7 
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PART I: THEORIA — RECONSTRUCTING CRITICAL 
THEORY 
Critical theory foundered in the mid-twentieth century on the 
shoals of positivism. Since then, a succession of anti-foundational 
challenges to traditional critical theory fragmented the landscape of 
critical theory. 
This part offers a way forward to reconstruct critical theory by 
means of what I call “counter-critical theory”: it is a critical method that 
indexes the original impulse of critical theory, but liberates it from its 
positivist foundations, in order to allow for a more open-ended and 
permanent reexamination of how power circulates and recirculates in 
society. It calls for the constant and unending unveiling of illusions, to 
expose how belief systems and material conditions distribute resources 
in society, attuned to the fact that the very unveiling will produce new 
illusions that themselves need to be unmasked and exposed.  
Counter-critical theory is a pure theory of illusions and calls for 
an ongoing and unrelenting theoretical stance of resignification, 
reinterpretation, and reevaluation. 
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Chapter 1: Our Theoretical Quandary 
We face many of the threats that earlier critics stared down. Like 
Walter Benjamin, Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and others in the 
1920s and 30s, we too face a troubling conjuncture of world-historic 
crises that are challenging our own understanding of both our present 
and possible futures. But something important has changed. The unity of 
critical theory has fractured.8 Critical theory finds itself today in an 
uncomfortable predicament. It was not always this way. 
In the late nineteenth and for most of the twentieth century, those 
advocating for a more equitable society—those on the critical Left—
were mostly influenced by Marxist ideology and the category of class 
struggle. Class struggle defined the historical narrative, identified the 
central political problematic, and provided the basic solution. For a 
century or more after Marx wrote The Communist Manifesto, the critical 
Left was under the spell of class struggle. 
Whether you agreed or not with Marx about the centrality of 
class conflict—and I would argue that today, most critical theorists no 
longer do, or at least not within the classically Marxist framework of 
workers versus the bourgeoisie—what is plain is that the dominance of 
the category of class struggle produced a far more coherent and unified 
vision on the critical Left of what was to be done. The struggle was to 
take the form of a social revolution—either through a vanguard party or 
through more democratic processes. The first approach was captured 
well by Lenin, the second by Rosa Luxembourg. Lenin, in his April 
Theses, argued for a second truly proletarian revolution to succeed the 
first bourgeois revolution of February 1917. Lenin’s Theses were highly 
controversial among Marxists at the time because of their vanguardism, 
and there were, naturally, sharp differences in strategy and tactics.  
But on one thing everyone agreed: social revolution. The 
question of political action—or what was referred to, at the time, as 
praxis—predominantly passed through a workers’ revolution that would 
bring about complete social transformation. It would translate, depending 
on the context, into internationalism, syndicalism, anti-imperialism, or 
anti-colonialism. It extended to agricultural workers, or what were 
referred to as “peasants,” and colonial subjects. But regardless, there was 
a coherence and straightforward answer to the question of what was to be 
done: a people’s revolution against capitalism. This revolution was 
grounded on a Marxist philosophy of history, and it was inevitable. 
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The interwar period serves as a good illustration. The political 
situation was at least as confounding as today, with the rise of fascism. 
But back then, critical praxis was far more coherent and unified, even 
among the most intellectual of intellectuals. So, for instance, when 
Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht were planning the launch of a new 
journal, Krise und Kritik, in 1930, the critical scaffolding was firmly 
embedded in a Marxist register—as you will see.9 
I.  
“A new journal is at issue, and indeed the only one 
to have overcome my firmly rooted conviction 
that I could never again get involved in anything 
like it […] and it will be called Krise und Kritik.” 
— Walter Benjamin, letter to Gershom Scholem, 
October 1930.10 
“The journal is political. By that is meant that its 
critical activity is consciously anchored in the 
critical situation of present society—that of class 
struggle.” 
— Krise und Kritik Memorandum, c. 1930.11 
In January 1930, the crises were equally troubling, but the critical 
framework was far more unified and cohesive. When Walter Benjamin 
and Bertolt Brecht planned the launch of their new journal, Krise und 
Kritik, along with the writer Bernard von Brentano and the drama critic 
Herbert Ihering, the critical framework was firmly Marxist. They all 
agreed on what was needed: scientific expertise by critical intellectuals 
to demonstrate the validity of the dialectical materialist method, the 
foundational role of class struggle, and their implications for 
understanding the crisis—and even perhaps contributing to it. They 
understood, or at least Benjamin did clearly, that the economic and 
political crises had begun to produce, or in Benjamin’s own words, 
“must produce manifestations of crisis in the superstructure.”12 The 
disagreements surrounding critical theory were far less dramatic. To be 
sure, Brecht was perhaps too crude or vulgar theoretically for Theodor 
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, or Friedrich Pollock, and troublingly 
supportive of Stalin; the Institute members were perhaps too bourgeois 
still for Brecht; and Benjamin was a source of concern for all as he 
navigated between them.13 But everyone was working in the same 
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register of class struggle, dialectical materialism, and a certain kind of 
positivism. 
Benjamin’s plans for Krise und Kritik were starkly positivist and 
foundationalist. The role of the intellectual, Benjamin declared in 
conversation with Brecht, was not to lead the proletariat, but rather to 
fulfill “a subordinate function” of proving the validity of the dialectical 
materialist method—essentially, of providing scientific research to 
solidly establish the proper and necessary sociological positions.14 The 
journal was intended, Benjamin maintained, to publish the scientific 
expertise of scholars, to engage not in journalism but in academic 
research. The program that Benjamin and Brecht set was clear: “The 
journal’s field of activity is the present crisis in all areas of ideology, and 
it is the task of the journal to register this crisis or to bring it about, and 
this by means of criticism.”15  
“Interventionist thinking” was the order of the day. 
“Inconsequential thought” was to be avoided.16 Krise und Kritik—also 
for a short time called Kritische Blätter (literally Critical Pages but more 
metaphorically Critical Notebooks or Critical Papers)—was to be a 
journal that would permit “an active, interventionist role, with tangible 
consequences, as opposed to [the] usual ineffectual arbitrariness.”17 
Benjamin clearly expressed what he had in mind for Krise und Kritik: 
The journal was planned as an organ in which 
experts from the bourgeois camp were to undertake 
to depict the crisis in science and art. This was 
meant to demonstrate to the bourgeois intelligentsia 
that the methods of dialectical materialism are 
dictated to it by its own most necessary 
characteristics—necessities of intellectual 
production, research, and existence. The journal 
was meant to contribute to the propaganda of 
dialectical materialism by applying it to questions 
that the bourgeois intelligentsia is forced to 
acknowledge as those most particularly 
characteristic of itself.18  
The project was thus deeply positivistic, in a scientific Marxist 
sense. Critique would lay the foundation for revolutionary political 
change. As Brecht wrote, in the context of that projected journal, the 
concept of Kritik was “to be understood in the sense that politics is its 
continuation by other means.”19 It should not come as a surprise that 
Erdmut Wizisla, who published the extensive materials recording the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
20 
planned publication of Krise and Kritik, compared, as “near 
equivalents,” the intended method of Benjamin and Brecht with the 
logical positivism of the Vienna School.20 
Ultimately, this positivist ambition foiled the project. Benjamin 
felt that the first three articles received were not in fact expert science. 
They had not lived up to the ambition of the journal and could not “claim 
to have been written by an expert authority.”21 The German translation of 
the article by Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov, a Russian Marxist who 
had died in 1918, titled “Idealist and Materialist World Views,” for 
instance, was decades old and outdated. If it could have claimed expert 
authority, Benjamin wrote, that would have been twenty-five years 
earlier.22 Benjamin withdrew from the project at the end of February 
1931, followed by Ihering, then the financial collapse of Rowohlt and the 
emergency press restrictions of July 1931—which finally ended the 
project.23 
The terms Krise and Kritik would be taken up again and again, 
inverted, resignified, but for the most part, they remained associated with 
a deeply Marxist and post-Marxist tradition until the 1960s at least. The 
1988 English translation of Koselleck’s 1959 book, Kritik und Krise, did 
not get past the period of Rousseau and Raynal and so did not directly 
engage the twentieth century, though it was written explicitly for a post-
war “state of permanent crisis.”24 Koselleck of course had no reason to 
elaborate on Benjamin and Brecht’s interventionist thinking or their 
planned journal, Krise und Kritik—focusing instead on the way in which 
the Kantian conception of critique had so influenced the utopianism that 
would, apparently and recurrently, lead to terror—but his work 
forwarded in different ways their earlier project. 
II.  
Today, by contrast, the critical framework has been fractured by 
anti-foundationalist interventions that have fissured the cohesion of the 
Marxist scaffold. 25  In the 1960s, radically different conceptions of 
power, of desire, of subjectivity challenged post-Marxist thought from 
within the critical framework. Gilles Deleuze, in his 1962 monograph, 
Nietzsche et la philosophie, turned Nietzsche into the critical 
philosopher, the founder, the inventor, in Deleuze’s words, of “une 
philosophie critique,” in the process displacing even Kant, who, 
according to Deleuze, missed the target and did not do “real critique.”26 
Deleuze located in an anti-foundationalist Nietzsche the pure form of 
critique, the very essence, the core: namely, the questioning of the value 
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of values.27 The critical element, Deleuze wrote—italicizing the word 
“critique” in “l’élément critique”—is precisely “the creative element of 
meaning and of values.”28 Michel Foucault as well, and many after him, 
drew from Nietzsche the model of a truly critical approach. Nietzsche’s 
work, in Foucault’s words, “seems to me to be the best, the most 
effective, the most pertinent of the models that one can draw upon” to do 
genealogical work.29 These critical interventions would violently upend 
the traditional link between critique, power, and the Marxist and post-
Marxist tradition.30 
In the aftermath of May ’68 and the repression of the student 
uprisings and anti-Vietnam War movements, critical theorists then, 
again, refashioned their conceptual tools to better grasp the circulation of 
power and the troubled times in which they found themselves. It was a 
time of intellectual ferment. The decade of the 1970s was particularly 
fruitful for critical theory, but it sent critical theory in many different 
directions. Some critics returned to foundations and enriched the earlier 
generation of critical theory. Louis Althusser supplemented his scientific 
interpretation of Marx with concepts of ideology and ideological state 
apparatuses, in his Notes Towards an Investigation published in 1970. 
Hannah Arendt returned to notions of civil disobedience, violence, and 
revolution, to reconsider the active political life in her 1972 collection of 
essays, Crises of the Republic. Jürgen Habermas reworked legitimation 
theory to offer a new diagnosis of crisis tendencies specific to advanced 
capitalism in Legitimation Crisis published in 1973. Other critics 
challenged foundations and charted new directions for critique. Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari upended notions of desire and reconceived 
the will to power, turning the Oedipal myth into a bourgeois conspiracy, 
in their Anti-Oedipus published in 1973. Michel Foucault 
reconceptualized relations of power, this time on the matrix of civil war, 
in his lectures on Penal Theories and Institutions in 1972, on The 
Punitive Society in 1973, and then in his book, Discipline and Punish 
published in 1975. 
A series of other critical interventions erupted at the same time, 
including Frederic Jameson’s Marxism and Form (1971), Jean 
Baudrillard’s The Mirror of Production (1973), Hayden White’s 
Metahistory (1973), Silvia Federici’s Wages Against Housework (1975), 
Cornelius Castoriadis’ The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975), Perry 
Anderson’s Considerations on Western Marxism (1976), Luce Irigaray’s 
This Sex which is Not One (1977), Mario Tronti’s On the Autonomy of 
the Political (1977), Stuart Hall’s Policing the Crisis (1978), Nicos 
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Poulantzas’ The State, Power, Socialism (1978), Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978), among others. The critical production from the 
1970s was truly remarkable—stimulated by a period of global political 
upheaval—but it substantially fractured the coherence of Marxist 
thought. 
In the decades that followed, new critical theorists augmented 
and, at times, rebelled against these various frameworks, and in the 
process developed new critical tools and concepts to address their own 
critical times. Some turned to the concept of the Anthropocene to capture 
humankind’s effect on the earth and to historicize the phenomenon of 
global climate change 31 —with some even extending this into the 
domains of surveillance and digital technologies.32 Others turned to the 
framework of neoliberalism and biopolitics to capture the globalization 
of a new political economy of profiteering, financialization, and 
consumerism.33 Others looked for new definitions of populism in order 
to capture the rise of right-wing political developments in Hungary, 
Poland, or the Philippines, the election of Donald Trump, Brexit, or the 
electoral turn-out of the Front National in France and of right-wing 
candidates in the Netherlands, Austria, and elsewhere. Still others crafted 
new concepts of precarity, necropolitics, racialized assemblages, 
intersectionality, critical anthropology, decolonizing, and other 
theoretical frameworks to make sense of our present.34 
These new or retooled critical concepts often invigorated critical 
theory, but they also at times splintered critical theory, at least from the 
perspective of traditional Frankfurt School writings. And since that time, 
the intellectual framework has remained fractured, and critical theory 
caught in debates over influence and intellectual genealogies—with 
some returning to Kant, others turning to deliberative democratic 
thought, or even Rawls, and still others drawing on Nietzsche or Freud. 
Subsequent generations of the Frankfurt School gravitated first toward 
Kantian liberalism, then toward Hegelian recognition, then back to 
Kant—leaving students of critical theory somewhat bewildered and also 
démuni before the crises that would come, in waves, with neoliberalism, 
then neoliberal penality, then neoliberal warfare, and on and on. 
The different epistemological sensibilities fragmented the critical 
project. The contrast, even with the more literary and aesthetic thinkers 
like Benjamin, was deep. In his notes from the time of Krise und Kritik 
in 1930, under the telling header “Some Remarks on Theoretical 
Foundations,” Benjamin underscored his “thesis,” in his own words, that 
“true validity,” “fruitful validity,” “genuine validity” is only “guaranteed 
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by the closest possible connection to social reality,” because, he said, 
“Truth cannot be established by digression, by the collection and 
addition of all that’s thinkable, above all by arbitrary flight from its 
consequences. Rather must it repeatedly be confronted with reality at 
every stage and point.” 35  The contrast with the anti-foundational 
approaches of the 1960s could hardly have been greater. 
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Chapter 2: The Problem of Truth 
The central rub—what really brought contemporary critical 
theory to its knees—was the problem of truth. For the Frankfurt School, 
and for those who believed in class struggle, there was always ultimately 
a notion of genuine interests, of real class interests, that grounded 
ideology critique. But with the anti-foundationalist challenges, the rug 
was pulled from under that consensus. 
Many critical thinkers tried to soften the tension—and I would 
include myself here, regretfully.36 But none of those efforts could truly 
overcome, in the end, the breach that anti-foundationalist critical theories 
introduced into the debate. Critical theory was born of an Enlightenment 
drive to separate truth from falsity—of the critical impulse to seek the 
limits of reason and perform the work of discrimination at the root of the 
Greek term, krinein, that is at the base of both critique and crisis.37 
Criticism, as Koselleck demonstrated, was fundamentally “the art of 
arriving at proper insights and conclusions via rational thought.”38 The 
anti-foundational critique went to the heart of that. And to date, the 
critical tradition has not been able to reconcile the chasm. 
I. 
“This great myth needs to be dispelled. It is this 
myth which Nietzsche began to demolish by 
showing that, behind all knowledge, behind all 
attainment of knowledge, what is involved is a 
struggle for power. Political power is not absent 
from knowledge, it is woven together with it.” 
— Michel Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” 
(1973)39 
It is crucial here to get a full sense of the chasm. The tension 
between the traditional critical framework and its anti-foundational 
challenges is illustrated best by the confrontation between the method of 
ideology critique and that of regimes of truth. The conflict, at heart, 
always came down to questions of knowledge, truth, and falsity. 
At one end, the critique of ideology constituted itself as a 
particular form of knowledge that rested on a specific epistemological 
conception tied to the facticity of class interests. Ideology critique was a 
cognitive enterprise that produced a kind of knowledge intended to lead 
to enlightenment and emancipation.40 
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At the other end, Foucault’s theory of knowledge-power, of 
savoir-pouvoir,41 amounted to a radical critique of knowledge. It aimed 
to unmask precisely that “great Western myth,” the illusion that it is 
possible to sever knowledge from power or achieve objectivity.42 That 
myth, Foucault declared, had to be, in his words, “liquidé”—liquidated, a 
far more forceful expression than “dispelled” as in the official English 
translation. Foucault’s was a searing critique of the possibility of 
powerless knowledge. 
To be more concrete, in the early 1970s, Foucault directly 
challenged the idea of class interests and proposed, instead, that social 
relations be modeled on the matrix of civil war. That matrix would call 
for a constant reexamination of how power circulates through society, 
always questioning the categories through which we even analyze power, 
always reexamining the ways in which power and subjectivity are 
transformed. As he explained in December 1972, a month before 
launching into his lectures on The Punitive Society, his project was to 
study power relations on the basis of “the most criticized of all wars: not 
Hobbes, nor Clausewitz, nor class struggle, but civil war.”43 At the time, 
and focusing on early nineteenth-century France, what he developed—in 
contrast to those other three approaches—was the idea of a generalized 
civil war involving the production of a “criminal-social enemy” that 
facilitated a disciplinary form of power permeating society and 
transforming the entire time of life and subjectivity into a productive 
force.44 Foucault’s matrix of civil war did not rest on a binary or stable 
structure, but sought instead to upend our conventional ways of thinking 
about knowledge in a realm he himself characterized as power-
knowledge.45 
It was precisely this tension that motivated Steven Lukes’s 
radical theory of power, and his defense of the idea of false 
consciousness,46 in which Lukes emphasized that “there is truth to be 
attained,” a “correct view that is not itself imposed by power.”47 Lukes 
argued that on Foucault’s view, by contrast, there can be no normative 
judgment because there is power all the way down: for Foucault, Lukes 
wrote, “there can be no liberation from power, either within a given 
context or across contexts; and there is no way of judging between ways 
of life, since each imposes its own ‘regime of truth’ . . .”48 
In an earlier essay, challenging Lukes, I tried to reconcile these 
differences, but in hindsight I realize that I did not do justice to the 
fundamental tension between the Frankfurt School’s epistemology and 
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Foucault’s critique of knowledge.49 I should not have dismissed the 
inexorable chasm so quickly. 
This is evident if we return to the passages in which Foucault 
explicitly engaged the question of ideology and proposed certain 
revisions to (what he understood as) the concept of ideology. The 
passages occur at the end of Foucault’s Rio lectures from May 1973, 
Truth and Juridical Forms—and so the context is important. As we all 
know well, Foucault frequently used the concept of ideology as a foil to 
his own thought.50 He often insisted that our ways of thinking about 
madness, delinquency, and sexuality were not mere ideological 
fabrications; that his own project was not to demonstrate that these 
categories were no more than “ideological products that must be 
dissipated in the light of reason.” 51  Foucault maintained that these 
categories—the mad, the delinquent, the abnormal—were the product of 
a whole series of practices and discourses that gave birth to something 
that did not exist beforehand and ultimately still does not exist—a 
complicated idea—but has a real presence (and does not fit within the 
rubric of ideology).52 The categories, Foucault emphasized, could not 
fully be captured by the notion of ideologies.53 And so, in Truth and 
Juridical Forms, Foucault explored various ways in which different legal 
forms—for instance, the practice of testing the accused or the evidence 
(what he refers to as épreuve), of inquiring into the facts (what he calls 
enquête), or of examining witnesses, oneself, or one’s conscience (what 
he calls examen)—function as ways of producing truth in resolving 
disputes, as forms of veridiction through jurisdiction. The Rio lectures 
thus represent a frontal assault on the idea or the possibility of objective 
knowledge.  
At the conclusion of the Rio lectures, Foucault discusses the 
theory of alienated labor—the claim, which he attributes to Hegel and 
Marx, that “man’s concrete essence is labor.” 54  Foucault does not 
provide a pin cite, but we could point to the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, where Marx defines what is quintessentially 
human, as opposed to animal, as precisely laboring freely and 
productively.55 Foucault critiques the claim that man’s essence is labor, 
arguing first that this is by no means true (“labor is absolutely not man’s 
concrete essence,” Foucault declares),56 but second that we come to 
believe in its truth by means of certain practices that are intimately 
connected to capitalist relations of production themselves. These are the 
practices, Foucault argues, that shape the body, that render bodies docile. 
Foucault refers to them in Rio as “infrapower”: “a set of political 
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techniques, techniques of power … by which people’s bodies and their 
time would become labor power and labor time so as to be effectively 
used and thereby transformed into [surplus value]”; 57  a “web of 
microscopic, capillary political power … at the level of man’s very 
existence …”; “the whole set of little powers, of little institutions 
situated at the lowest level,” in contrast to the state or even to a notion of 
class.58 Marx’s theory of capital accumulation, on Foucault’s reading, 
depends on these disciplinary techniques (which are themselves 
intimately connected with capitalist production) to shape bodies and 
render workers docile. 
Foucault develops this insight two years later in Discipline and 
Punish where, specifically citing Marx’s Capital (Vol. I, Chap. XIII), he 
argues that the economic revolutions that made possible the 
accumulation of capital during the nineteenth century cannot be 
separated from the production of these docile bodies—or what he refers 
to as “the methods for administering the accumulation of men.”59 These 
methods are the disciplinary techniques at the heart of Discipline and 
Punish, which replaced “the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of 
power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, 
calculated technology of subjection.” 60  On Foucault’s view, these 
methods were as important to capitalist production and the exploitation 
of surplus value as the modes of production.61 And, drawing on Georg 
Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer’s Punishment and Social Structure 
(1939)—published under the auspices of the Frankfurt School—Foucault 
transforms traditional Marxist political economy into a “political 
economy of the body,” effectively into “a history of bodies” that focuses 
on the “political investment of the body” and the “political technology of 
the body.” 62  These disciplinary forms—themselves embedded in 
relations of production—rendered docile the modern body, 
simultaneously making possible factory workers and the idea that free 
labor is man’s essence. As he would say in Psychiatric Power, “we can 
say that disciplinary power, and this is no doubt its fundamental 
property, fabricates subjected bodies; it pins the subject-function exactly 
to the body. It fabricates and distributes subjected bodies; it is 
individualizing [only in that] the individual is nothing other than the 
subjected body.”63 
Foucault could not have been clearer—or more challenging to 
ideology critique: the idea that “man’s concrete essence is labor” is itself 
fabricated, alongside these docile bodies, by disciplinary techniques that 
are embedded in relations of production and that themselves make those 
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relations of production possible. These techniques also bring about 
feelings of alienation because they deprive us of the rich, substantive 
meaning that our lives could have. These techniques of power give rise 
to knowledges—such as the idea that labor is “the essence of man,” but 
more broadly the idea of man as an object of science. In Rio, Foucault 
specifically proposes that this infrapower “gave rise to a series of 
knowledges—a knowledge of the individual, of normalization, a 
corrective knowledge—that proliferated in these institutions of 
infrapower, causing the so-called human sciences, and man as an object 
of science, to appear.”64 This rehearses the argument at the end of Les 
mots et les choses (1966)—the image of man written in sand, 
disappearing under the waves. 
As Foucault explains: “If what I have said is true, it cannot be 
said that these forms of knowledge [savoirs] and these forms of power, 
operating over and above productive relations, merely express those 
relations or enable them to be reproduced.” 65  The reason is that 
ideologies themselves are made possible by relations of production that 
are themselves made possible by knowledge-power; there is no priority 
to relations of production that would privilege or place first production 
as the driving force of history. Ideas are necessary to enable political 
economy. The relations of production are themselves shaped by 
conceptions of the self that enable docile bodies to man the factories. 
These are interlocking: relations of production/knowledge/relations of 
power. Foucault writes: 
In order for the relations of production that 
characterize capitalist societies to exist, there must 
be, in addition to a certain number of economic 
determinations, those power relations and forms of 
operation of knowledge. Power and knowledge are 
thus deeply rooted—they are not just superimposed 
on the relations of production but, rather, are very 
deeply rooted in what constitutes them.66 
From a regimes-of-truth perspective, then, it is not possible to 
speak of interests that are, in some sense, foundational. Instead, stated 
interests and conceptions of self are shaped by relations of power and are 
historically situated; they are interwoven with and make possible the 
modes of economic production within which they find themselves; they 
are not exterior, in any way, to relations of production. It is possible to 
show how they are born and maintained and evolve, and to what effect. 
And, despite all that, they have real force and staying power. They 
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cannot just be lifted, like a veil. They have real effects—des effets de 
vérité. They are real. They cannot simply or easily be proven wrong. 
They are not susceptible to demonstrations of falsity. And it may take a 
whole series of complex techniques of power and knowledges, deeply 
embedded in relations of production, for other beliefs to form. 
In both critical approaches, to be sure, there is a form of 
enlightenment—but enlightenment by different means. On the first view, 
access to truth, to true facts—and thereby emancipation from illusions—
is achieved by acquiring the right social theory.67 On the second view, 
there is no access to powerless knowledge; there can be at best an 
unveiling of current forms of oppression or relations of power, achieved 
through the denaturalization of dominant ideas. On this second view, we 
do not achieve an end-state, but reach another place from which we will 
again need to emancipate ourselves. We do not escape relations of 
power; we never do. We are always embedded in them. We may make 
progress, perhaps on the basis of an aesthetics of existence, but at best 
we bring about a new condition that will itself need to be reassessed and 
reexamined, so that we can understand how power recirculates. When we 
shed illusions, when regimes of truth shift, we are merely at another 
place where power relations are thickly at play, may be problematic, may 
become entrenched—and where we will need to revalue how we are 
governing and being governed. 
II. 
The anti-foundational critique jabbed at the heart of traditional 
critical theory, and to date, the critical tradition has not been able to 
recover. 
The effects are especially acute today. The critical tradition, 
mired in tribal politics and internecine struggles for influence among its 
different offshoots—Deleuzian, Lacanian, post-colonial, queer, 
Foucauldian, feminist, Derridean, to name a few—has struggled to 
elaborate a coherent contemporary critical theory. With class struggle no 
longer a unifying theme, and the prospect of a proletarian uprising faded, 
especially in the absence today of robust self-consciousness among 
workers or students, the core of traditional critical theory evaporated. 
At this point, the critical question becomes: What should critical 
theory sound like in these fragmented theoretical times? What does 
critical theory look like when the underlying theoretical structure of the 
dialectical imagination is so fractured?  
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Chapter 3: Reconstructing Critical Theory 
The chasm between traditional critical theory and its anti-
foundational challenges cannot be resolved, it must be overcome. And it 
can be overcome, I propose, through what I would call “counter-critical 
theory.” 
The notion of counter-critical theory is not anti-critical theory, 
but a form of contemporary critical thought that goes beyond traditional 
critical theory. It operates what I call a counter-move that rests on the 
importance of thinking in terms of “counter” rather than “anti”. The 
conceptual particle “counter” in “counter-critical theory” indexes the 
opposition to the foundationalism and positivism of early critical theory, 
and simultaneously overcomes the opposition from which it is born, in 
order to generate a fully autonomous critical approach. It overcomes the 
opposition, not in the Kantian or Hegelian sense of a synthesis that 
resolves the opposition between thesis and antithesis (not least because 
the conceptual particle “counter” functions very differently than the 
particle “anti”), but rather as a form of contestation that becomes so 
potent as to liberate itself from the oppositional relationship entirely and 
to transform itself into a free-standing idea, principle, or even method. 
Counter-critical theory becomes something greater than just a constant 
resistance to traditional critical foundationalism; it turns into something 
independent, overcoming its mere oppositional character. It becomes 
self-sufficient—no longer dependent on its relationship to earlier critical 
theory. 
Counter-critical theory becomes autonomous, in this way, when it 
becomes a pure theory of illusions—a pure theory of relations of power 
in flux such that every critical unmasking forces us to reexamine the 
resulting redistribution of power relations. At that point, it can continue 
to index, but need not concern itself with or argue against the 
foundations. At that point, the original anti-foundationalist insight no 
longer needs to refer back to the object challenged. At that point, 
counter-critical theory develops fully into its own independent form of 
thinking. This is an ambitious project perhaps, but realizable, I believe. 
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I. 
“It is necessary to institute a counter-city or a 
counterpower in the face of legitimate power that 
has become the mere property of those who 
exercise it or the expression of governmental or 
administrative routine.”68 
— Étienne Balibar, “Resistance, Insurrection, 
Insubordination,” in Equaliberty: Political Essays 
(2013) 
A similar conceptual movement at times runs through Etienne 
Balibar’s writings, as evidenced in this epigraph, and in Foucault’s 
writings and method as well. A good illustration is from Foucault’s 
inaugural lesson to the 1981 Louvain lectures on Wrong-Doing, Truth-
Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice. At the close of that inaugural 
lesson, Foucault offers, as the overarching framework of his intervention, 
the notion of a counter-positivism which, he explains, “is not the 
opposite of positivism, but rather its counterpoint.”69 The full passage is 
as follows: 
We often speak of the recent domination of science 
or of the technical uniformity of the modern world. 
Let’s say that this is the question of “positivism” in 
the Comtian sense, or perhaps it would be better to 
associate the name of Saint-Simon to this theme. In 
order to situate my analysis, I would like to evoke 
here a counter-positivism that is not the opposite of 
positivism but rather its counterpoint. It would be 
characterized by astonishment before the very 
ancient multiplication and proliferation of truth-
telling, and the dispersal of regimes of veridiction in 
societies such as ours.70 
This notion of a “counter-positivism” provides the key to the 
Louvain lectures. The notion conveys more than merely an opposition to 
positivism, since Foucault is admitting that he is embracing something 
akin to a positivistic view of a history of shifting truth-telling forms. 
There is, in fact, a history in the lectures—or a genealogy. Foucault 
traces a series of truth-telling forms. This is a history of regimes of 
truth—more specifically, of regimes of veridiction and of speaking truth, 
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which fit neatly into the broader arc of his research and lectures at the 
Collège de France. 
In effect, Foucault’s method, at Louvain and at the Collège, is not 
anti-positivist, but instead a “counterpoint,” deploying positivistic 
sensibilities against narrow positivism. And the central point is that 
Foucault’s counter-positivist method culminates in a philosophical 
intervention that is independent of both positivism and of anti-
positivism, that does not depend on either, and that no longer merely 
responds to the opposition—but becomes its own autonomous method: a 
pure philosophical method, a way of seeing the world. In fact, it is 
perhaps the most important compass to decipher the Louvain lectures—
which is why, incidentally, the passage ended up on the quatrième de 
couverture, where it remains in the French edition as the most significant 
words of those lectures. It is the point of perfection. 
In a similar way, we can imagine a counter-critical theory—
distinct from this counter-positivism—that is not anti-critical, but instead 
overcomes the foundationalism of critical theory. It indexes traditional 
critical theory insofar as it holds on to its core insight. At its core, critical 
theory has always been a theory of illusions: the world we find ourselves 
in, rife with inequalities, injustice, and prejudice, is made tolerable by 
means of a series of illusions—the myths of individual responsibility and 
merit, the illusions of liberalism and free markets, the fantasy of upward 
social mobility, and so on. These fantasies are what make our unequal 
world tolerable to too many of us. And they are what critical theory 
unmasks, unveils, reveals. But not to give way to a truth underlying 
those illusions. Not to reveal real interests, or genuine class interests. The 
illusions instead give way to another set of ambitions that eventually we 
will need to unmask again. In this sense, counter-critical thought 
becomes a pure theory of illusions. 
II. 
“The terrorist and the policeman both come from 
the same basket. Revolution, legality—counter 
moves in the same game; forms of idleness at 
bottom identical. He plays his little game—so do 
you propagandists. But I don’t play…” 
— The Professor in Joseph Conrad’s The Secret 
Agent (1907). 
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The idea of counter-critique is precisely to get beyond the 
ordinary play of “countermoves in the same game,” in the Professor’s 
words. Of overcoming the opposition from which it is born and generate 
a fully autonomous conceptual form. Again, not in the Kantian or 
Hegelian sense (not the least of which, because the particle “contre-” 
functions differently than the particle “anti-”), but rather as an original 
counterpoint that itself becomes so powerful as to liberate itself from the 
oppositional relationship and transform itself into a free-standing 
concept, intervention, or even mode of governmentality. 
Such a counter-critique would have to become greater than 
simply resistance to the foundationalism of critical theory. In order for it 
to achieve its full potential, it would need to liberate itself from its 
originary opposition and transform itself into an autonomous, self-
referential, fully articulated form of critique. This alone could guarantee 
that the “contre-” move would develop into its own independent mode of 
critical theory. 
A model for this can be found in Joseph Conrad’s novel, The 
Secret Agent. The character of the Professor in that novel had strapped 
on him, at all times, a flask of explosives and carried a small detonator in 
his hand—ready to blow himself and everyone around him to bits. By 
means of these devices, he claimed to have gotten past the conventional 
opposition between revolutionaries and the police. He claimed to have 
overcome the mere “game” of moves and countermoves, and reached a 
higher—and more threatening—stage. He claimed to have transformed 
his reactivity into a pure force. Into perfection. 
You will recall that it was the figure of the Professor, more so 
than Conrad’s other characters, who inspired later anarchists and some 
terrorists, prominently among them the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski. 
Conrad, who always labeled his characters for us, referred to the 
Professor as “the perfect anarchist.”71 And what exactly, you may ask, 
was the ambition of this “perfect anarchist”? “What is it you are after 
yourself?” his comrade Ossipon asked him with indignation. “’A perfect 
detonator,” Conrad writes, in a response he describes as “the peremptory 
answer.”72  
One can infer from Conrad’s novel that the Professor himself had 
begun as an anarchist caught in the counter-moves that he himself 
disparaged—caught in the play, in the game, in the parry. One can 
assume that the Professor was originally part of that dance, or that judo 
of countermoves. But the implication is clear: The Professor had gone 
beyond the mere tit-for-tat and had achieved instead a more perfect form 
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of anarchism. What made this the most perfect or peremptory anarchist 
state was precisely getting beyond the contre- move to another level—a 
level that was autonomous of the opposition itself, and in that way, 
absolute. It was a pure state, independent from the back and forth 
between the revolutionaries and the police.  
Because of the explosives he strapped on himself at all times, the 
Professor remarked, “They know… I shall never be arrested. The game 
isn’t good enough for any policeman of them all. To deal with a man like 
me you require sheer, naked, inglorious heroism.”73 The Professor may 
have sounded almost delirious, and self-aggrandizing for sure, but the 
Professor had achieved something unique: He had gotten beyond the 
ordinary relation of opposition.  
The Professor ultimately has the last scene of The Secret Agent. 
After the counter-intelligence and counter-espionage is all over—after 
Winnie Verloc’s story has reached, in Conrad’s words, “its anarchistic 
end of utter desolation, madness, and despair,”74 after her brother’s 
accidental explosion at Greenwich Station, her own murder of her 
husband, and her suicide—it is the Professor who closes the book, “the 
incorruptible Professor” as Conrad adds. Conrad closes: 
“He was a force. His thoughts caressed the images 
of ruin and destruction. He walked frail, 
insignificant, shabby, miserable—and terrible in the 
simplicity of his idea calling madness and despair to 
the regeneration of the world. Nobody looked at 
him. He passed on unsuspected and deadly, like a 
pest in the street of full men.”75 
The Professor had become sheer force, ruin and destruction. He 
had overcome his opposition to the system to become something as 
deadly as the pest. He had achieved the full effect of the contre- move. 
Not a very attractive overcoming here, but we do not always have total 
control over the consequences of our conceptual moves. 
In a parallel way, Foucault’s counter-positivism in the Louvain 
lectures becomes a full-fledged method, fully detached from any dispute 
with positivism. 
The contre- move—by which I mean, to be clear, the movement 
of thought and practice, the action that is captured by adding the prefix 
contre- or counter- to another concept—is itself a conceptual factory. Its 
generative power is remarkable. It is not so much a concept itself, but 
instead the creator, the producer of concepts. The contre- move produces 
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rich, constructed mental representations. It practically defines the 
distinction between concept and notion: nothing here is intuitive and 
immediate, as are notions; on the contrary, the contre- move is complex, 
constructed, and stabilized over time. It is intellectual work product. It is 
the infrastructure to myriad new concepts. In fact, if one looks in the 
Oxford English Dictionary, for instance, the entry for “counter” becomes 
a litany, a catalogue, an enumeration of counter-concepts: “Counter-
address; counter-advise; counter-affirm; counter-ambush; counter-
avouch; counter-beat; counter-bid; counter-bore,”76 and I am still only at 
the beginning of the B’s. Each term with its own early etymological use 
and history. 
Foucault made use of the contre- move extensively—in fact, one 
could argue that it was one of his most productive devices, a veritable 
conceptual-production technique. Nietzsche did too, referring for 
instance to “art” as the “countermovement” against nihilism; and 
Nietzsche coincidentally adds, in Twilight of the Idols, that “in art, man 
takes delight in himself as perfection.”77 
In conversation with Étienne Balibar, during his seminar on 
Foucault at Columbia University in the Fall of 2015, we began to 
identify and catalogue the occurrences of the contre- move in Foucault’s 
work: the concept of “contre-pouvoir” in his debate with Maoists78; the 
concept of “counter-history” in “Society Must Be Defended” 79 ; the 
concept of “counter-conduct” in Security, Territory, Population, or in the 
same lectures, the concepts of “counter-society”: “[I]n some of these 
communities there was a counter-society aspect, a carnival aspect, 
overturning social relations and hierarchy”80; or the concept of “counter-
justice” again in his debate with Maoists,81 of the “counter-weight” to 
governmentality in the Birth of Biopolitics, 82  of the idea of 
psychoanalysis as a “counter-science” in The Order of Things. 83 
Throughout his writings, his lectures, his interviews, Foucault constantly 
returned to the prefix contre- to create concepts, to fashion new and 
autonomous ideas.  
It is of central importance in reading and understanding Étienne 
Balibar’s writings as well. There are, in his Equaliberty essays and many 
other brilliant writings, multiple deployments of the contre- move: 
Balibar speaks of “counter-racism,” 84  and of counter-populism—as 
Michel Fehrer discusses in his public concepts entry; there is the 
“counter-city” and the “counterpower.” 85  Then, there is also this 
important contre- move, which may fall on the darker side of the ledger: 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
37 
 The crisis of the national-social state correlative to 
globalization and the re-proletarianization that 
constitutes both its result and one of its objects from 
the side of the dominant classes (of financial 
capitalism) gives rise to a whole series of national 
or international political initiatives that relate to 
what could be called a preventative 
counterrevolution, even more than 
neoimperialism.86 
There is also the contre- move that counters the counter-
revolution with a “counter-counterrevolution,” setting things somewhat 
more straight for the resisters and the disobedients: 
The whole question is whether a policy of this kind, 
more or less deliberate but perfectly observable in 
its effects, which combines financial, military, and 
humanitarian aspects and which I believe can be 
characterized as preventive counterrevolution, 
elicits a revolutionary response, or, if you like, a 
counter-counterrevolution, according to the schema 
of “going to extremes” that was largely shared 
among Marxist and Leninist representations of the 
socialist transition after the experience of the 
insurrections of the nineteenth century.87 
In his culminating seminar in the Fall of 2015, Étienne Balibar 
proposed that Foucault had developed a “counter-politics”—in contrast 
to “le politique,” the a-political, or even the un-political. Following that, 
at a conference at the University of Paris—Créteil on “Assujetissement et 
subjectivation” on June 1, 2016, Balibar developed his contre- move 
further, suggesting that the central element of truth-telling in Foucault’s 
work—of parrhesia, of veridiction and all its associated forms of 
diction—is a form of “contre-diction” and “contre-conduite,” effectively 
placing the element of the contre- move at the very center of Foucault’s 
thought. Balibar pointed us in particular to the quatrième de page of both 
Volumes 2 and 3 of the History of Sexuality, which reproduce the 
following quote by René Char: 
« L’histoire des hommes est la longue succession 
des synonymes d’un même vocable. Y contredire est 
un devoir. »  
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To contre-dict is a duty: for Balibar, this notion of parrhesiastic 
contradiction has within it the seeds of a counter-democratic principle, 
not in Pierre Rosanvallon’s sense, but as was exercised by certain 
parrhesiasts such as Socrates or Diogenes. This reflects an element of the 
counter-majoritarian in Foucault’s work. And by means of the contre- 
move, Foucault’s intervention and turn to parrhesia becomes an 
autonomous, independent theory based on a “contradiction” that is 
indexed but that we barely see. 
In an essay titled “In praise of counter-conduct,” Arnold 
Davidson underscores how so many of the forms of resistance that we 
admire in Foucault’s writings take us back to the concept of “counter-
conduct”: 
In a series of remarkable formulas concerning 
freedom, Foucault speaks of the ‘insubordination of 
freedom’, the ‘rebelliousness of the will and the 
intransitivity of freedom’, the ‘art of voluntary 
inservitude’ and of ‘deliberative indocility’ 
(Foucault, 2001b: 1056; 1990: 39). All of these 
phrases belong to the semantic field of counter-
conduct and make evident the double ethical and 
political scope of this counter-conduct.88 
One can hear, in Davidson’s essay, a kind of admiration for the 
concept of counter-conduct. But it is important to emphasize that the 
contre- move is not always or necessarily progressive. As with concepts 
such as solidarity89 or internal frontiers,90 there is an equivocal nature to 
counter-concepts. They too can go a bit all over the place—and be 
deployed against the interests of a progressive agenda. This is reflected 
in what Robespierre referred to as the “counter-revolutionary;”91 or, 
depending on your political interpretation, what Pierre Rosanvallon 
referred to as “Counter-Democracy.” I am here again in Balibar’s 
Equaliberty – or rather, in his footnotes – always inescapably in 
Balibar’s work. 
Many of us bear an almost romantic attachment to the counter- 
practice itself. It feels so intimately linked to notions of disobedience, 
resistance, and countering power. But it is important not to get carried 
away. 
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III. 
Let me set forth as systematically as possible this notion of 
counter-critique. There is a particularity to the contre- move that 
distinguishes it from other political devices or mechanisms. It does not 
function like a dialectic. It is not an opposition that leads to a synthesis, 
but instead to a stage of “perfection,” in Conrad’s terms, that (1) merely 
indexes its former counter-partner, and (2) becomes a fully independent 
concept, all to itself, that does not incorporate its opposition and is no 
longer a reaction against anything. This is very different than the way 
that concepts generally work. It is markedly different, for instance, from 
the Nietzschean idea that concepts are the cumulative effect of dead 
metaphors; or that only when its history is forgotten can something 
become a concept. 
It may be useful, then, to delineate three dimensions of the 
contre- move. 
The first dimension distinguishes it from the more classic or 
simple opposition associated with the prefix “anti-”. Adding the prefix 
anti- serves only to defeat or eradicate its object, directly. For instance, 
anti-terrorism aims to eliminate terrorism by stamping it out, in contrast 
to counter-terrorism that uses the logic and strategies of terrorism to 
undermine it. The contre- move is more internal: it engages in a play, a 
movement, a dance with its object, using the force of the object against 
itself, in order to get beyond that game. It uses the energy of the object, 
and the internal logic of the object, to defeat it. It starts in a game with 
the object—as in chess, or fencing, or martial arts—but then transcends 
it. 
There is, in this sense, some proximity between the contre- move 
and the term “against”—as in Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method, or in 
my book Against Prediction (2007). “Against” is closer to counter- than 
to anti- insofar as it attempts to develop a new method in the 
oppositional work rather than simply defeat its object. 
In any event, the contre- move is different than the anti- move.92 
Returning to the example of security, specifically of counter-insurgency: 
Counterinsurgency uses the internal logic of Maoist insurgency to defeat 
the insurrection. It adopts and accepts the logic, in fact it fully embraces 
the logic; but it tries to do it better, to reappropriate it, to redeploy it even 
more aggressively. It does not rest on the idea that there would be two 
opposing views that are contrary to each other in a dialectical 
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confrontation. Instead, it burrows into the logic and deploys it against its 
opponent. 
The contre- move differs as well from the Socratic dialectic (the 
testing of an opposing view), the Kantian model of dialectics (thesis-
antithesis-synthesis), and the Hegelian method (abstract-negative-
concrete). It differs, in its very foundation, from an Adornian negative 
dialectics. It differs as well from Marx’s dialectical materialism—which 
rests on a notion of direct opposition, as expressed in his Capital: 
My dialectic method is not only different from the 
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the 
life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of 
thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he 
even transforms into an independent subject, is the 
demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is 
only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. 
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else 
than the material world reflected by the human 
mind, and translated into forms of thought.93 
To be sure, there is of course a family resemblance between all 
these forms of opposition. Foucault was keenly aware of this and in fact 
suggested as much in an interview discussing what he called 
“countereffects,” where he added: “I dare not use the word dialectics—
but this comes rather close to it.”94 The contre- move “comes rather 
close” to a dialectic, but is not the same thing. It also comes close to the 
anti- move, but again differs. One can hear that as well in Foucault’s 
writing, with passages for instance in Security, Territory, Population that 
read as follows: “the first element of anti-pastoral or pastoral counter-
conduct is asceticism.”95 Here and elsewhere, Foucault is struggling to 
pin down the conceptual move, using the term “anti-pastoral struggles” 
interchangeably with “pastoral counter-conducts,” but trying to correct 
and replace the first with the second.96  
A second dimension concerns the internal logic of the contre- 
move. It is almost an imminent form of critique: The object that is being 
opposed is taken as such, it already exists fully, and the contre- move 
effectively goes into the object to oppose it. Notice how the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the term: “Done, directed, or acting against, 
in opposition to, as a rejoinder or reply to another thing of the same kind 
already made or in existence.”97  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
41 
Arnold Davidson points directly to this notion of immanence in 
his essay “In praise of counter-conduct,” where Davidson writes that, as 
in the interiority of the relationship between points of resistance and 
relations of power: 
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault also 
emphasizes the nonexteriority, the immanent 
relation, of conduct and counter-conduct. The 
fundamental elements of the counter-conduct 
analysed by Foucault are not absolutely external to 
the conduct imposed by Christian pastoral power. 
Conduct and counter-conduct share a series of 
elements that can be utilized and reutilized, 
reimplanted, reinserted, taken up in the direction of 
reinforcing a certain mode of conduct or of creating 
and recreating a type of counter-conduct”98 
There is, Davidson explains, a “tactical immanence” of counter-
conduct to conduct. Counter conduct is not “simply a passive underside, 
a merely negative or reactive phenomenon, a kind of disappointing after-
effect.” 99  In the words of Foucault, counter-conducts are not “les 
phénomènes en creux.”100 There is a “productivity of counter-conduct 
which goes beyond the purely negative act of disobedience.”101 It is in 
this sense that, for Davidson, “the notion of counter-conduct adds an 
explicitly ethical component to the notion of resistance.” 102  As a 
methodological matter, the “counter-” element of “counter-conduct” 
works in a similar way as “resistance” to power: as something internal, 
that does not reach beyond, that is not a gap or absence. Foucault talks 
about counter-conduct that is “used against and to short-circuit, as it 
were, the pastorate.”103 Notice the use of the term “against” and the idea 
of short-circuiting. The short-circuit is tied to the internal dimension of 
the contre- move. It uses the circuit, the flow of electricity against itself. 
Davidson comes back to this in regard to homosexuality: 
Foucault describes these relations with the same 
expression, court-circuit, that he had used to 
describe religious counter-conduct: ‘these relations 
create a short-circuit, and introduce love where 
there should be law, rule, habit.’104 
A third dimension, and perhaps most important, is the ultimate 
emancipation of the contre- move, which goes beyond its oppositional 
object, is liberated from it, becomes autonomous. At that point, it is no 
longer “counter-.” It is more like the Professor in Conrad’s The Secret 
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Agent: outside the game, outside the dance, beyond the counter-moves in 
the same game. But it always indexes the original opposing object. The 
Professor is perhaps the “perfect anarchist,” but he is still an anarchist.   
When the counter- move works, it gives rise to something that is 
neither the opposite, nor even the dance partner, but instead is perfectly 
autonomous and self-sufficient—a concept that functions all on its own. 
Counter-conduct is no longer conduct that resists something, but conduct 
that has become its own form, a pure form of force, or disobedience, or 
of resistance. 
IV. 
Let me offer a more tangible or concrete illustration: the example 
of jujutsu, a form of judo. (I must emphasize up front that I am not an 
enthusiast of martial arts; but I do believe the illustration is instructive 
here). As I see it, jujutsu is the perfect illustration of the contre- move. 
“Ju” stands for pliable or yielding to another. “Jutsu” means 
techne or art. Together, the term signifies the art of yielding to the 
other’s force. “The word jujutsu may be translated freely as ‘the art of 
gaining victory by yielding or pliancy.’”105 
The central idea of jujutsu is to use someone’s own force against 
them. Rather than confront the other with one’s force, the idea is to turn 
the force of the opponent into your own weapon and use it against them. 
In other words, to turn one’s opponent’s energy against them, rather than 
trying to oppose that energy directly. In an article from 1887, “Jujutsu 
and the origins of Judo,” the authors explain: “its main principle being 
not to match strength with strength, but to gain victory by yielding to 
strength.” And the first principle of the art: “Not to resist an opponent, 
but to gain victory by pliancy.”106 
I would identify this as that first moment of the contre- move: to 
parry, to block, to ward off by a corresponding move. But what I would 
suggest is that, forms of jujutsu as judo transcend that parry. The 
philosophy of jujutsu is that of the counter-move: to use the force of the 
attack and transform it into something else, something that is neither an 
attack nor a block. 
When the counter-move can exist on its own, without responding 
to its counter, always perhaps indexing it, but fully unmoored, detached, 
independent, above its counter, doing what it does without responding to 
its counter, countering without reference to its counter—that, I take it, is 
the final productive moment of contre. 
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V. 
The darkest illustration of the contre- move—one that, 
paradoxically, demonstrates well its fullest potential—lies right before 
our own eyes: the American Counterrevolution. As I demonstrate in my 
book, The Counterrevolution: How Our Government Went to War 
Against Its Own Citizens (2018), a new form of governmentality 
characterized by counterinsurgency strategies has come to dominate our 
government. Developed as a counter-move to insurgencies that drew 
extensively on Maoist theories of insurrection, this new form of 
governmentality has liberated itself from its oppositional object and 
become a form of governing despite the absence of any domestic 
insurgency. It has become an autonomous form of government.107 
Since 9/11, the United States has undergone a dramatic 
transformation in the way it carries itself abroad and governs itself at 
home. Long in the making—at least since the colonial wars abroad and 
the domestic turmoil of the 1960s—this historic transformation has come 
about in three waves. First, militarily: in Vietnam and now in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. military strategy shifted importantly from a 
conventional model of large-scale battlefield warfare to unconventional 
forms of counterinsurgency warfare. Second, in foreign affairs: as the 
counterinsurgency paradigm took hold militarily, U.S. foreign policy 
began to mirror the core principles of unconventional warfare—total 
information awareness, targeted eradication of the radical minority, and 
psychological pacification of the masses. Third, at home: with the 
increased militarization of police forces, irrational fear of Muslims, and 
over-enforcement of anti-terrorism laws, the United States has begun to 
domesticate the counterinsurgency and to apply it to its own population. 
The result has been radical: the emergence of a domestic 
counterinsurgency model of government, imposed on American soil, in 
the absence of any domestic insurgency. The counterinsurgency has 
liberated itself from its oppositional object to become a new and radical 
form of government. It is a counter-insurgency without an insurgency, an 
autonomous form of unconventional warfare unmoored from reality. 
This illustrates perfectly the contre- move: born in an opposition, 
it soon exceeds it. Neither inherently good nor bad, it can take us in 
multiple directions. It is not thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis. It is not anti-. 
There is no inherent necessity to these logical steps. Not with counter 
also. Counter can fail. But when it succeeds, it tends to be a powerful 
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device, born of contestation. It has worked powerfully on the other side. 
It is time to reappropriate it. 
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Chapter 4: A Pure Theory of Illusions 
The core of critical theory—at least, of a reconstructed critical 
theory—is the endless, recurring unveiling of illusions, in order to 
denaturalize the present and expose the distributional consequences of 
those illusions. The task of critical theory is to demonstrate how the 
myths that we believe so deeply distribute resources and power in 
society—knowing that, as we unveil one set of illusions and allow others 
to take their place, we will need immediately, once again, to unpack the 
next set of myths. This constant unveiling and demonstration of its 
distributional effects is an infinite regress. 
Reconstructed critical theory is, in this sense, a pure theory of 
illusions. It is about tracing, over and over, endlessly, the real effects—
les effets de réalité—of our belief systems. And performing this 
unveiling means, at all times, challenging interpretations and offering 
new ones. It means engaging in an endless form of reinterpretation, fully 
cognizant of the fact that there is no end to interpretation. It is 
interpretations all the way down. Or as others might say, it is turtles all 
the way down. The task is to ceaselessly explore how the next set of 
interpretations produce a new social order and trigger distributional 
consequences. 
I. 
Nietzsche set us on this path, but we must now go beyond 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche, with Marx and Freud, represented a break in the 
nineteenth century. A new way of thinking. A new way of interpreting 
the world—a new hermeneutic. An interpretation of a world made up of 
interpretations. A world of infinite regress of interpretations, going down 
vertically. In his essay “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” Foucault identified in 
Nietzsche’s writings this modern hermeneutic: a different style or system 
of interpretation with its own devices, techniques, strategies, methods. It 
was a hermeneutic in which interpretation always precedes the sign. 
Interpretations do not escape interpretation, but rather fold back on them. 
Signs are deceptive; and all that we are left with is an endless series of 
meaning-making. 
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud constituted, at least on Foucault’s 
reading, a nineteenth century episteme that had to be understood by 
opposition to the epistemological system of resemblance and similitude 
that marked the 16th century. Foucault inscribes his interpretation of 
Nietzsche in the framework of his writing, at the time, of Les mots et les 
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choses. His reading is fully inscribed in that period and its central 
philosophical work. Nietzsche becomes a crystalized object, an insect 
caught in amber; but one that has implications for the present—at the 
time, the debates with semiologists: Nietzsche’s hermeneutic, Foucault 
claims, is a dead enemy of semiology, which itself puts in place “the 
reign of terror of the sign.”108 
“Interpretation finds itself with the obligation to interpret itself to 
infinity,” Foucault wrote, “always to resume…  Interpretation must 
always interpret itself.”109 
What does that mean, you may ask? It is a world in which we 
never get to the original meaning or first source. Take for instance the 
question “Why do we punish?”, a question that my friend and colleague 
Didier Fassin asks in his lectures on The Will to Punish. Well, we can 
offer an interpretation: you are familiar with them, so to get beneath the 
obvious first answers—deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation—no, we punish to maintain a social order, one that is 
characterized by white supremacy and capitalist consumption. So we 
punish to control the poor by imposing small fines and attaching their 
wages, if they have any—or adding their fines to their water bills, in La 
Grange and those small towns in Georgia. But where does that come 
from? Well, perhaps from earlier forms of social ordering, such as the 
debt prisons and the relation between debtors and creditors, as Didier 
Fassin discusses. And that? Well, it might trace back earlier to forms of 
indentured service, of owing work for one’s freedom… and so on, and so 
on… But one never gets to the original meaning. And in the end, we do 
not know anymore why we punish: we just punish. Or as Nietzsche said 
so eloquently in The Genealogy of Morals in 1887: “Today it is 
impossible to say for certain why people are really punished: all concepts 
in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; 
only that which has no history is definable.”110 
There is, then, no first origin. There is no omega, as my friend 
and colleague Jesús Velasco would say. The interpretations do not end. 
This is a way of thinking, Foucault wrote, that these nineteenth century 
thinkers inaugurated: 
“There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, 
for after all everything is already interpretation, 
each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to 
interpretation but an interpretation of other signs. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
47 
There is never, if you like, an interpretandum that is 
not already interpretans, so that it is as much a 
relationship of violence as of elucidation that is 
established in interpretation. Indeed interpretation 
does not clarify a matter to be interpreted, which 
offers itself passively; it can only seize, and 
violently, an already-present interpretation, which it 
must overthrow, upset, shatter with the blows of a 
hammer.”111 
Doing philosophy with the blows of a hammer—yes, indeed, 
there is violence in these interpretations. The violence of a will to power. 
As Nietzsche reminded us, again in his Genealogy, meanings and 
interpretations “are only signs that a will to power has become master of 
something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a 
function,” the character of a meaning.112 
To properly address our political situation today, then, and get 
beyond it, we need to return to these insights. This is what Foucault did: 
“In Nietzsche, one finds a type of discourse”—Foucault writes—“that 
undertakes a historical analysis of the formation of the subject itself, a 
historical analysis of the birth of a certain type of knowledge—without 
ever granting the preexistence of a subject of knowledge.”113 
But we must go further. 
To move forward, from a counter-critical perspective, we need 
not simply to understand, but to deploy the infinite regress of 
interpretations—knowing that even we do not preexist the meanings that 
we impose on the world, that our subjectivity is shaped by those infinite 
interpretations, that the struggle, in the end, is a struggle over life and 
death, a struggle over our subjectivity, a battle over the imposition of 
those interpretations. We need to deploy that infinity of interpretations. 
II. 
 “After Buddha was dead, people showed his 
shadow for centuries in a cave,—a tremendous, 
gruesome shadow. God is dead: but given the 
ways of men, there may still be caves for 
thousands of years in which his shadow will still 
be shown.—And we—we still have to vanquish 
his shadow, too.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
48 
— Nietzsche, Gay Science, III, § 108. 
Counter-critical theory calls for these constant and better 
interpretations. The political struggle today demands trenchant and 
forceful resignifications, along with an unbending commitment to resist 
the shadows from the past. 
A world made up of interpretations, an infinite regress of 
interpretations, all the way down: if that is where we find ourselves, then 
we must continue to struggle through resignification. If we live in a 
world in which we never get to the original meaning or first source, 
where there is no omega, then interpreting is what we must do, always. 
This represents a way of thinking, Foucault reminds us, that Nietzsche 
inaugurated, doing critique with the blows of a hammer.114 There is force 
to that method. 
But again, we need to go even further. And we must test our new 
interpretations as we would sound out our beliefs and faiths, as we would 
test our past idols. Yes, we are at the twilight of old idols.115 But even 
more importantly now, we are at the dawn of new ones that we will need 
to interrogate immediately and ruthlessly. 
Today, more than ever, we need to go counter with our critical 
theory Both in the sense of counter-play, offering better and more 
compelling interpretations, and in the sense of exceeding the ideologies 
we counter, of achieve a higher playing field. This is what happens 
when, for instance, counterpositivism becomes a philosophical method 
that no longer refers back to positivism. When the Counterreformation 
becomes something greater than a response to the Protestant reformation, 
but instead a new form of governmentality. When jujutsu becomes an art 
form. When the American Counterrevolution becomes a form of 
governmentality in the absence of any insurgency or revolution. When, 
in Joseph Conrad’s book, the Professor becomes himself the “perfect 
anarchist” who has gotten past the play of the game of counter-moves. 
Or when, in our case, counter-critical theory becomes a pure theory of 
illusions—autonomous, and no longer tied to the rejection of traditional 
critical theory. It may also offer us a model for resistance. 
In the end, counter-critical theory must bring us to the heart of 
revolt and disobedience as well. It may be possible to develop a theory of 
the counter-move as a decisive form of critical practice. This may be the 
counter-Counterrevolution that Étienne Balibar had in mind in 
Equaliberty. But here too we will need to be less suggestive and develop 
it in detail. We will need to develop a new critical practice for the 
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twenty-first century.116 But first, we need to address a common vision—
what we used to call a utopia. Practices can only be sharpened in light of 
a vision of the future. Let’s turn there next. 
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PART II: UTOPIA — REIMAGINING A CRITICAL 
HORIZON 
For most of its history, the critical tradition has been wedded to a 
communalist utopian vision closely tied either to the withering of the 
state (for Marxists and libertarian deconstructionists) or to a solidaristic 
state (for socialists). In the same way in which a reconstructed critical 
theory of pure illusions liberates us from unfounded positivist 
foundations and dogmatic first principles, a renewed critical utopia must 
also be freed from these foundational constraints. 
What a reconstructed critical theory reveals and teaches us is that 
illusions—the illusion of free markets or its inverse, the myths 
surrounding state-controlled economies—ground our utopian visions. 
They too have distributional impacts and effects of reality. But they too 
are illusions. And once we recognize this, it is no longer possible ex ante 
to determine which political economic regime most fairly distributes 
wealth and resources. 
All political economic regimes are regulated and distribute 
wealth and resources, how they do so is the central question, and the 
answer will depend on the specific organizing rules and principles in 
operation—not on whether they are based on private property, communal 
ownership, or nationalized economies. The fact is, state-controlled 
enterprises that distribute to centralized party members may be less 
desirable than privately-owned corporations that distribute primarily to 
their workers. 
Accordingly, a critical utopia must not aim at a specific regime 
type. What must guide a critical vision of the future is how well the 
really-existing regime achieves or approximates the values it holds 
dear—the values that serve to judge distributional outcomes. In other 
words, a pure theory of illusions calls for a focus on values. We cannot 
agree on a utopian type of political economy, we can only ever strive to 
promote certain critical values, namely equity, compassion, and respect. 
In this sense, critical theory needs to reconstruct its critical horizon on 
the basis of a pure theory of values. 
This is particularly significant today because it means that 
reconstructed critical theory can operate—and should operate—within 
any political economic regime. Naturally, it must operate under the 
dominant conditions of neoliberalism. But it must be equally vocal 
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within the context of state-controlled economies, communist countries, 
and Leftist regimes. It must remain the source of robust critique 
regardless of the political economic regime in place in any specific 
locality.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
53 
Chapter 5: Our Utopian Predicament 
I have written previously about the illusion of free markets—
about the misleading idea that “less regulated” political economies are 
more efficient or optimal, or that there could even exist a “less 
regulated” or an “unregulated” market.117 As I demonstrated in The 
Illusion of Free Markets, all political economies are fully regulated, and 
the regulatory mechanisms produce distributions of wealth and 
resources. The purportedly “free market” does that primarily through a 
complex enforcement mechanism involving private property; but it is 
just as “regulated” as state-controlled economies. 
The upshot of that earlier work is that the type of political 
economic regime does not determine distributional equity. It is the 
minutiae of the second-order rules and regulations that do so. A 
nationalized, state-controlled economy can distribute wealth in a 
hideously unequal manner, by for instance privileging a central party 
apparatschik. On the other hand, a privately-owned corporation can 
distribute most of its wealth to its workers, or to charity, if the owners 
are so inclined. We’ve seen cases of that in the United States, for 
instance, with Chobani or Ben & Jerry’s. And vice versa. State-owned 
enterprises could distribute to the public or workers, and private 
corporations could distribute primarily to shareholders and executive 
officers, as they tend to do. 
The fact is, capital does not have an inherent distributional tilt. 
Capital—as accumulated wealth or machinery or human potential—
exists at both extremes of nationalized and private economies. Capital 
itself does not dictate distributions. It is only greedy capitalists who 
deploy capital in selfish ways. It is only the advanced capitalist 
tradition—tied to certain values—that has produced increasing 
disparities between workers and executives. None of this is natural or 
inevitable. It rests instead on myths, in the sense that illusions about the 
“free market” naturalize what we say about these different regimes—
namely, that capitalism has proven to be more efficient, or that 
capitalism necessarily entails inequality. Every political economy is 
regulated, regulated in a particular way, and all we can do is judge the 
distributional outcomes that result from its operating rules and 
mechanisms. 
The result is that we, critical theorists, cannot say ex ante that one 
type of political economic regime—centralized, nationalized, 
communist, socialist, syndicalized, guilded, unionized, private, or 
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anarchist—is more favorable to our ideals than another. We cannot 
promote, in the abstract, a socialist state or a communalist regime. We 
can only judge the distributional outcomes of already-existing political 
economies, and we can only judge them based on our values, values that 
are associated with certain traditions, in this case, critical Left values. 
This represents a foundational break from traditional critical 
theory, which oriented its praxis around a specific utopian vision 
generally involving a particular political economy. To embrace a pure 
theory of illusions, in other words, creates a genuine conflict with earlier 
critical utopias. It triggers an authentic dilemma. The history, again, is 
telling and reveals a structural transformation of critical utopias. 
I.  
For most of its history, critical theory was oriented toward a 
communalist utopia.118 To be sure, there are still critical voices today 
calling for traditional Marxist utopias—for a communist horizon or a 
communist hypothesis.119 But the prospect of a traditional proletarian 
future has faded, especially in the absence of a robust self-consciousness 
among workers or students. Etienne Balibar is surely right that such 
futures may still be possible; as he suggests, “civic and democratic 
insurrections, with a central communist component against ultra-
individualism, also involving an ‘intellectual and moral reform’ of the 
common sense itself (as Gramsci explained), are probably not 
destructible.”120 And Balibar might still want to call those possible 
futures “revolution.” “Call ‘revolution’ the indestructible? I would 
suggest that possibility,” Balibar adds.121 But any such future would 
probably be better understood through other rubrics than traditional 
Marxist revolution—for instance, through the different modalities of 
uprisings, riots, revolts, disobedience, and so on. And it is not clear 
whether or how traditional critical theory would guide us through these 
modalities.122 Words matter, of course. As Koselleck reminds us, “In 
politics, words and their usage are more important than any other 
weapon.”123  But if that is true, we are indeed in a radically anti-
foundationalist place. Truth is, critical theory is in disarray when it 
comes to utopias and visions for the future. 
The reasons for this trace in large part to a disenchantment with 
the conventional Marxist philosophy of history and an exhaustion with 
the notion of a social revolution, which were at the heart of nineteenth 
century critical utopias. In an earlier time, dialectical materialism 
remained more central to critical theory, either as an animating force (for 
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instance, in much of the critical thought and writings on insurgency even 
in the 1970s), or as a foil and point of resistance, reconceptualization, or 
augmentation (for instance, in Foucault’s and Deleuze’s writings through 
the mid-1970s). But the geopolitical changes at the turn of the twenty-
first century, the dissipation of segments of the left-leaning working 
class—with the rise of alt-right and far-right groups that have 
cannibalized the white working class base of the communist parties—
and the exhaustion of meta-histories have dramatically eroded the hold 
of ambitious philosophies of history. The result is that today, even the 
writings of first-generation Frankfurt School authors feel out-of-touch 
with present critical sensibilities. 
The reasons also trace, in part, to the transformation of the 
concept of “revolution” that was embedded in more traditional critical 
theory. Reinhart Koselleck and Hannah Arendt famously traced the 
emergence of the modern concept of revolution to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. By contrast to ancient conceptions tied to the 
etymology of revolving cycles—of the cyclical returning to the point of 
origin, of the astronomical cycle of the stars, or of the ancient 
philosophical progression of constitutions (from monarchy to its dark 
twin tyranny, to aristocracy and then oligarchy, and finally democracy 
and ultimately ochlocracy, or mass rule)—the “modern” concept of 
revolution signified a watershed transformation or a binary break, a 
singular moment represented by the collective concept of “Revolution,” 
in capital and in the singular. What characterized this conception of 
revolution was the passage from the idea of a political to a social 
revolution: the idea that a revolution is about social change, about “the 
social emancipation of all men, [about] transforming the social 
structure.”124 
Toward the latter half of the twentieth century, this modern 
concept of revolution seemed to collapse under the weight of its own 
exigency, leading to other late-modern concepts of uprising, insurgency, 
and insurrection. The transformation was brought about, in part, by the 
anticipated failure of the revolution, which nourished a certain 
expectation or fear of miscarriage—what Etienne Balibar refers to as an 
“accumulation of factors which make the failure of revolutions their only 
possible outcome, therefore depriving them of their historical meaning 
and their political effectivity.”125 The transformation was due, in part 
also, to the recurring idea that revolutions lead only to terror—or, in 
Simona Forti’s words, that revolution “hosts in its genetic code the mark 
of terror and totalitarianism”126—a thesis notoriously made famous by 
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François Furet and other mid-century historians. It was partly due, as 
well, to the omnipresent fear that the prospect of revolution brings about 
a more powerful preemptive counterrevolution; and to the fact that words 
and things have become so intertwined that it is practically impossible to 
talk about revolution without merely interpreting it—hoisted, as we are, 
by our own discursive and disciplinary practices in a time when 
knowledge and gewalt (power, violence, action) have become so 
reflexively imbricated. 
These historical transformations pushed critical theory and praxis 
from their origins in Marxist class struggle, through the disruption of 
Maoist-inspired forms of insurrection, to more contemporary models of 
assemblies, occupations, strikes, and hashtag social movements that have 
a completely different texture and offer a different vision of the future. 
The move from Marx to Maoist insurrection and ultimately to these 
forms of uprising and occupation has laid a new foundation for critical 
utopias. It was driven by forces that will have a lasting impact on our 
present. Two in particular. 
A.  The Hold of History 
The first was the loosening grip of the philosophy of history. This 
was a gradual process, first in Mao’s thought, but more so in the later 
receptions of his writings starting in the 1960s and 70s. Mao started with 
a strongly Marxist philosophy of history, no doubt; but it slowly 
dissipated from his writings, and even more so, out of their reception. 
Today even insurrectional writings that are still inspired by Maoist 
thought have a far less determinist historical tone. 
Mao’s early writings—or, at least, the official English 
translations of his early writings produced by the Foreign Languages 
Press of the Chinese government in the late 1960s—were heavily 
influenced by a Marxist philosophy of history. His Report on an 
Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (March 1927) firmly 
embraced dialectical materialism, trumpeting the coming revolution in 
resolute terms—echoing the Marxist inevitability of social revolution.127 
Similarly, Mao’s more philosophical writings from the period, for 
instance his essay On Contradiction (1937), represented a vigorous 
appropriation of Marxist dialectical materialism by contrast to what Mao 
called the metaphysical or vulgar evolutionist world view—what we 
might refer to today as the liberal progressive view of history. But even 
early on, Mao’s emphasis on internal contradiction as the driving force 
of history, of social science, of physics, in sum of everything, already felt 
less historical than Marx, particularly than the Marx of The Eighteenth 
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Brumaire of Louis Napoléon. There was already in Mao an almost 
mechanical feel to the notion of contradiction, as it passed from the 
human to the natural realm and back. Drawing on Lenin, Mao illustrated 
“the universality of contradiction” in the following terms: 
In mathematics: + and - . Differential and integral. 
In mechanics: action and reaction. 
In physics: positive and negative electricity. 
In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of 
atoms. 
In social science: the class struggle 
In war, offence and defence, advance and retreat, 
victory and defeat are all mutually contradictory 
phenomena. One cannot exist without the other.128  
This reflected a mechanical dimension to Mao’s philosophy of 
contradiction that, at least on my reading, sounded more in natural 
science than in history. The problem may well be in the translation; but 
the imposition of a natural science framework and rhetoric on history 
and human affairs foreshadowed an eventual loosening of the grip of 
history. 
By the time of the Cultural Revolution, the urgency of the laws of 
history had dissipated. Already in 1957, right after the uprisings in 
Hungary, Mao began to acknowledge that the classical Marxist teachings 
and doctrines were no longer as compelling as they were before. “It 
seems as if Marxism, once all the rage, is currently not so much in 
fashion.”129 And by 1964, certainly, there had been a loosening of the 
bind of history. Class struggle remained key, but the call to churn society 
through the Cultural Revolution was presented more as a productive 
pragmatic idea than as historical necessity. The universality, the 
absolute, the mechanical was now muted, and instead, there was more of 
a practical sense to politics. Almost a recommendation now, rather than a 
command of nature:  
You intellectuals sit every day in your government 
offices, eating well, dressing well, and not even 
doing any walking. That’s why you fall ill. 
Clothing, food, housing and exercise are the four 
great factors causing disease. If, from enjoying 
good living conditions, you change to somewhat 
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worse conditions, if you go down to participate in 
the class struggle, if you go into the midst of the 
‘four clean-ups’ and the ‘five antis’, and undergo a 
spell of toughening, then you intellectuals will have 
a new look about you.130 
Notice how the tone had changed, the relation to history, the form 
of argument. The grip of history had loosened. There was now a certain 
pragmatism and softening to the discourse and to the argumentation 
(once again, at least in the translation). There was cajoling and reasoning 
that sounded of a different nature. 
The loosening of the grip of history became even more 
accentuated with the Western European reception of Mao in the 1960s 
and 70s. When Maoism became a form of Dadaism, for instance, with 
the Mao-Dadaism of the 1970s in Italy and the publication of the review 
A/traverso, which pursued “a ‘poetic of transformation’ and invented a 
language called Mao-Dadaism, whose starting point was the idea that 
Mao’s declarations, if read under the right light, are pure Dadaism”131; or 
when Jean-Luc Godard portrayed Maoism in La Chinoise (1967) as a 
form of summer training camp for youngsters in love and in 
depression—at that point, the siren call of determinist history was hard to 
hear. 
Of course, the reception of Mao by young critical leftists in the 
1960s and 70s—as well as by more mature philosophers and activists, 
such as Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre—was entirely 
situational—as I will discuss shortly. They needed an alternative to 
Soviet communism, and the only demonstrable alternative on offer was 
Maoism. Mao became a mirror on which they projected their ideas and 
desires—and internecine conflicts. (One can get a good sense of this 
rereading the debate between two young Maoists, Benny Lévy and 
André Glucksmann, and Michel Foucault that took place in June 1971, 
“On Popular Justice: A Debate with Maoists”). 
But by the time we get to the twenty-first century, even the most 
Maoist-inspired insurrectional writings have lost their Marxist history. 
This is evident, for instance, in the Maoist-inspired book of the Invisible 
Committee, The Coming Insurrection (2007). The grip of the philosophy 
of history has been loosened. Rather than a determinist future, the 
situation is described as a doomsday scenario. Dialectical materialism 
and theories of contradiction have been replaced by the powder keg: 
things are about to explode, the pressure is too great. The insurrection is 
coming because everyone is sick, depressed, pushed to the limit. We are 
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in a state, the Invisible Committee tells us, of “the most extreme 
alienations—from our selves, from others, from worlds.”132 Political 
representation is over. “The lid on the social kettle is shut triple-tight, 
and the pressure inside continues to build.”133 There is no theory of 
institutional change here, but instead a movement from institutions to the 
personal, to the subjective. “Organizations are obstacles to organizing 
ourselves,” the Committee writes.134 Instead of  forming organizations, 
there is a turn inward to transform the self. There is little hope for social 
change, and no use for traditional political means. “There will be no 
social solution to the present situation,” the Committee states.135 Instead 
of politics, if anything, there is a negation of politics. Instead of history, 
there is a ticking time bomb.  
B.  The Soviet Conjuncture 
The second factor is more conjunctural. The movement away 
from traditional Marxism and the reception of Maoist thought in the 
West and South in the 1960s was influenced by the historical 
conjuncture of, on the one hand, European communist parties that were 
captured by the Soviet Union, with a Stalinist shadow, and, on the other 
hand, the absence of an attractive socialist alternative. Young militants 
projected onto Maoism their hope for a substitute to Soviet communism. 
This was true across the political Left—from the more hard-core Leninist 
or Jacobin or Bolshevik politics of someone like Alain Badiou and his 
Union des communists français marxistes-léninistes at one end, to the 
more aesthetic, libidinal, and subjective politics of the Vive la revolution! 
group in France at the other. In this regard, incidentally, the reception of 
Mao in the West and South has to be understood through the lens of 
orientalism and of the projection of Western leftist desires onto China.136 
From lengthy conversations with Daniel Defert and François 
Ewald, who were both Maoists in the late 60s and early 70s, it is clear 
that they turned to Maoism primarily as an alternative, as a way to avoid 
both the Stalinism of the PCF and the dogmatism and top-down 
hierarchies of the French socialist party.137 Maoism had on offer—or at 
least, it was perceived by these young militants as offering—an opening 
to a new left politics and a new form of insurrection. A fresh alternative. 
For some, a more creative and aesthetic politics. For others, a more 
dynamic and engaged politics. And still for some others, a more extreme 
insurrectional politics. But a new horizon all around.  
There is a passage from Simone de Beauvoir’s memoir from the 
period, All Said and Done, that captures perfectly this dynamic: 
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Despite several reservations—especially, my lack of 
blind faith in Mao’s China—I sympathize with the 
Maoists. They present themselves as revolutionary 
socialists, in opposition to the Soviet Union’s 
revisionism and the new bureaucracy created by the 
Trotskyists; I share their rejection of these 
approaches. I am not so naïve as to believe that they 
will bring about the revolution in the near future, 
and I find the “triumphalism” displayed by some of 
them puerile. But whereas the entirety of the 
traditional Left accepts the system, defining 
themselves as a force for renewal or the respectful 
opposition, the Maoists embody a genuinely radical 
form of contestation. In a country that has become 
sclerotic, lethargic, and resigned, they stir things up 
and arouse public opinion. They try to focus “fresh 
forces” in the proletariat—youth, women, 
foreigners, workers in the small provincial factories 
who are much less under the influence and control 
of the unions than those in the great industrial 
centers. They encourage action of a new kind—
wildcat strikes and sequestrations—and sometimes 
they foment it from within… I shall never regret 
whatever I may have done to help them. I should 
rather try to help the young in their struggle, than to 
be the passive witness of a despair that has led some 
of them to the most hideous suicide.138 
C.  A Restructuring of the Landscape 
These two forces brought about a structural transformation in the 
landscape of critical utopias over the course of the twentieth century. The 
influence of Maoism on European militants during the late 1960s and 
1970s represented a rejection of a more classical, unified, or coherent 
Marxist vision of proletarian revolution led by an organized, 
industrialized working class, guided by an intellectual vanguard, and 
determined by history. 
The Maoist shift represented in part the replacement of the 
proletarian working class with agricultural workers or “peasants,” one 
important dimension. It would mirror other anti-colonial voices that 
opposed the universalism of the proletariat worker. Frantz Fanon too, 
and other post-colonialist thinkers, challenged the Euro-centric notion of 
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the proletariat.139 As Fadi Bardawil notes, “In opposition to the colonized 
militants dabbling in ‘abstract’ slogans of power to the proletariat, Fanon 
elevate[d] the ‘wretched of the earth,’ who are not assimilated to the 
colonial world and whose bodies bear its brunt, to the role of the primary 
revolutionary agent.”140 
But an equally important shift was from a unitary notion of 
revolution (with a capital R and in the singular, as Koselleck 
emphasized) involving a tidal wave of one class rising up against 
another, to the idea of micro-insurrections by minority insurgents that 
would culminate in a massive movement of the people. It thus entailed 
far more insurrectional strategies at the micro level, insurgent tactics, and 
game-theoretic strategizing—which inspired the movements of May ’68, 
the groupuscules and anarchist cells of the 1970s and 80s, and the more 
strategic activism of the last decades of the twentieth. 
The evolution produced a fundamental shift in the map of 
revolutionary visions. At first, for Marx and still for the first-generation 
of the Frankfurt School, the driving force of history was class struggle, 
imagined as a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In 
other words, it was a struggle between two classes, two entities, two 
enemies. By contrast, for Mao, the struggle involved three parties: the 
active insurgents, the active counterinsurgents (early on, the 
Kuomintang), and the peasant masses. The central Maoist strategy was 
for the small minority of active insurgents to gain the allegiance of the 
masses in order to seize power from the counterrevolutionary minority. 
(To a certain extent, Marxist Leninism got closer to this tripartite 
mapping, but it was still far more binary than Maoist insurgency theory). 
Mao’s discourse was all about embracing the peasant masses—about 
striving to win over their hearts and minds. This was evident not only 
during the original insurgency leading to his victory against Chiang Kai-
shek in 1949, but even as late as the end of the Cultural Revolution in 
1968. One can still hear it when, in confronting the Red Guards—the 
young radical high school and university students empowered under the 
Cultural Revolution—Mao told them that their mission had been 
precisely to embrace all segments of society, to serve the people.141 
In the following decades, the map of the political struggle was 
essentially similar to Mao’s—in the sense that there was a demarcation 
between the small minority of activists, the police state, and the general 
population; however, it often felt that the more radical activists viewed 
themselves as an embattled minority with little interest and even some 
disdain for the masses. The discourse of uprising became that of a 
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pitched battle against the counterrevolutionary forces of the state (as was 
the case against the Kuomintang), but at a distance from the majority of 
the population—masses that did not seem movable or winnable. The 
general population had become the consumerist, neoliberal bulk of 
individuals, more objects of disdain than a popular force to be won over. 
The resulting vision was very different. It did not start with a 
union of workers uniting to take power and end with the withering of the 
state, but instead, it started with a small cell of activists disrupting and 
causing havoc, or an assembly prefiguring a new democratic form, 
without much of an end-game. Although Mao insisted on the idea of 
winning the hearts and minds of the masses, it is not at all clear that later 
cellular uprisings hoped any more to bring the masses to their side. There 
was a far more separatist element to critical activism, a desire to live 
apart, in a commune, away from others. Critical visions embraced 
cellular, secessionist futures. 
The shift from Marx to Mao and to later insurrectional visions 
can be characterized as a transformation from the Marxist theory of 
binary class struggle that leads to revolutionary upheaval and a 
communalist condition as a necessary product of dialectical materialism, 
to a paradigm of tripartite warfare in which a small minority of 
insurgents win over the masses through insurgent theory and practices, to 
a micro-strategic insurrectional notion of an embattled minority in 
violent struggle against a police state, with little hope of gaining the 
allegiance of the neoliberal masses. The critical utopias had morphed, 
and fragmented.  
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Chapter 6: The Political Condition 
The fragmentation of critical utopias reflected a deeper problem 
within critical theory, namely its failure to come to terms with the anti-
foundational challenge. By their very nature, the post-‘68 forms of 
critique, of a post-structuralist or deconstructive nature, did not mobilize 
a critical utopia. Foucault developed an aesthetics of existence. Deleuze 
and Guattari gestured toward vitalist desires. Derrida was even more 
elusive, frequently deconstructing his own critical horizons. But few 
critical theorists were able to reconcile these newer forms of postmodern 
critique with a positive political vision. 
Few critical theorists could come to terms with the idea that there 
might not be a foundational utopia, a fixed object on the horizon—that 
there may be no singular type of political economic arrangement that 
guarantees equitable distributions, no single communalist regime that 
could ensure equity and a just society, no one utopic social organization 
on the critical horizon. This is, after all, destabilizing. It is hard to accept 
the idea that, just as there is no institutional fix or charter of rights that 
would guarantee liberal democracy, there is no institutional or structural 
way to ensure a utopic future. It is difficult to concede that an equitable 
social outcome must depend on reconfiguring the specific minutia of 
rules and principles that are instantiated in whatever political economic 
arrangements already exist. It is practically unbearable, especially among 
those who aspire to equity and just distribution. The fact that a 
proletarian revolution could so easily lead to a terribly unjust society, as 
could a state-controlled economy or the absence of the state; the fact that 
the style, the type, the form of economic and political organization is 
hardly relevant to the justness of the outcomes—that what matters are 
the values that regulate the production and distributions—these are all 
difficult to imagine from within the critical tradition. 
Few critics were willing to acknowledge the unbearable core of 
critical theory—namely, that there is no end to the political struggle, or 
that, given the endless political contest, the political struggle must 
ground our critical utopias. In effect, that struggle is our political 
condition and our political horizon—a constant unending struggle that 
never reaches a stable equilibrium, but endlessly redistributes wealth, 
well-being, freedom, and life itself, through the organization and 
reorganization of political economies.  
 Our political condition is that endless combat, in which some 
seek solidarity, others self-interest, and yet others openly pursue 
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supremacy and domination. Our condition is a relentless contest over 
resources, possessions, ideals and identity, over existence itself. Not a 
war, nor a civil war as Foucault suggested. The notion of a war has an 
end in sight—our political condition of endless struggle does not. The 
concept of civil war is too binary. We face instead endless battles in 
which alliances are fluid and shifting.142 This is precisely what makes it 
so difficult and painful to admit. 
Political economies are constructed, deconstructed, reconstructed, 
and constantly shifting as we pursue survival in times of scarcity and 
social competition. Our political condition is not merely a Hobbesian 
state of brutal, solitary, and short-lived existence in a natural condition of 
war of all against all that comes to an end in the mutual submission to 
sovereign authority. Neither fear of loss or even of death, nor hope, nor 
reason, not even pragmatism propels us out of this predicament or puts 
an end to the endless power struggles. No, the political condition rather 
provides the weapons, the vehicles, new strategies and tactics, new 
venues, and jurisdictions, and the space and time of combat. Not just 
through parliamentary debate rules and executive orders, not only in 
electoral campaigns or in the drawing of district lines, but in the very 
minutiae of locating a polling place, granting or not a protest permit, 
enforcing orderly conduct, infiltrating a political movement, 
prosecuting—always inevitably selectively prosecuting—an individual 
or organization or demographic. 
Over the centuries, we rarely have had the strength or courage or 
perhaps the stamina to confront our political condition. Most often, 
instead, we have found ways to mask our predicament by means of 
creative, but fanciful, illusions: liberalism and the rule of law, the myth 
of natural order, the imaginary of a general democratic will, the illusion 
of free markets or of economic equilibria, or even the fantasy of really-
existing socialism. Our desperate desire for security and stability has 
blinded us, over centuries, to our inescapable political condition—to the 
constancy of the recurring battles, the succession of confrontations and 
competitions, the instability of it all, even within established leftist 
regimes. We wish, we fantasize our way out of our political 
predicament—only to find ourselves engulfed in it, again and again, and 
again. 
Throughout history, political thinkers have merely played with 
shadows trying to avoid the depth of our political condition. Even the 
most aware perhaps, like Niccolo Machiavelli, earnestly believed they 
could propose a set of tools, a bag of tricks to tame political 
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providence—to domesticate fortuna. Thomas Hobbes imagined the 
towering sovereign as a means to steady the strife and enable civil 
society—terrorized, as Hobbes was, by the fear of war and death. 
Hobbes let us fantasize an end to the war of all against all, even if 
temporary, and the possibility of a civil condition. John Locke hungered 
for a parliamentary solution to appease the sovereign’s authoritarian 
impulses. Montesquieu made up checks and balances. Marx, a commune 
of like-minded workers and the withering of the state. Rawls, procedural 
mechanisms to ensure justice. And after the Holocaust, perhaps one of 
the most brutal forms of politics—openly exterminative, supremacist, 
eugenic politics—Western thinkers timidly placed their hope in liberal 
legal mechanisms, legal process theory, human and civil rights, as 
safeguard against the recurrence of fascism first, and later, especially 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, of communism. Some would even 
fancy the expansion of liberal democracy as the end of history—in 
effect, an end to politics, to our endless condition of political struggle. 
But these political pipe dreams have done nothing more than 
exacerbate the hold of illusions and obfuscate the true lines of battle. 
They have diverted attention from our inescapable political condition: 
That there is no institutional fix or structural redesign or practical trick 
that will stem the conflict or avoid political upheaval, let alone guarantee 
political stability. Truth is, any form of purported political stability is 
itself a moment of brutal consolidation at the expense of others whose 
interests we are not even acknowledging. It is always at the expense of 
others. And there is no way to put in place a system of rights or of 
agencies, or of laws, of judges or ombudsmen, or even of men and 
women, that will protect against political contest and resulting harms—
small or large, from mere corruption to expropriation, to genocide. There 
is no procedural mechanism, no judicial review that can, independently, 
ensure justice. Nor are there any laws of economics, or politics, or 
human nature that push history forward—or backwards. There is, in 
effect, no teleology, and no possibility even of a determinist philosophy 
of history. 
Our political fate and our present circumstances are, and always 
will be determined by what we struggle for. –By who we are. The 
individuals creating or operating or manipulating the institutions, what 
they are made of—those individuals and their values—will shape our 
political condition. It is what we do—each one of us, in terms of the 
justice and equity, and liberty that each one of us fights for—that does 
and will transform our political condition. Ultimately, our political 
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circumstances depend on our actions: when we protest, whether we vote, 
what we endorse, where we contribute, what we say, how we act, where 
we fight. Institutions are no safeguard. Rights are not self-enforcing. 
Political parties go astray. It is what we are made of and what we fight 
for—each and every one of us, individually, collectively, and severally—
that shape our human condition and social and political relations. 
In the end, there is no place for any of us to hide. No refuge. No 
private sphere. No shelter. There is no intimate realm to retreat to. No 
personal domain that will protect us. No way to avoid it: We make our 
political condition at every moment in pursuit of our values. In every 
little thing we do. That is our political predicament. Invariably and at all 
times, each one of us is both the author and subject of our political 
condition. Every microscopic choice, every decision, even the most 
minute, will have consequences for the world we live in. This is the 
utterly excruciating reality of existence—from the smallest gesture to the 
greatest, we shape our social relations and human condition: Whether we 
mindlessly ignore the homeless panhandler on the street or deliberately 
pull the execution switch, what newspaper we buy and book we read, 
whether we retire and cede the ground or blog or hack—entire political 
economies are built on those choices, a world is shaped by each one. 
Each and every one, minute or profound—these shape our human 
condition. 
This is why—although it may sound entirely counterintuitive—
work on ourselves, transformations of our selves in the narrowest sense, 
must necessarily accompany political action and the quest for justice. 
There is here no tension between ethics and politics. There is no priority 
of one over the other—there is no passage from one to the other. The two 
are inextricably linked insofar as our every choice, our every action is 
the foundation of our political condition. To act or not to act, and how to 
act, or not, is an ethical choice that is entirely political as well. There is 
no natural equilibrium in politics—and there never will be. Each moment 
is produced by infinite actions and inactions of each and every one of us. 
There is nothing but a constant struggle over resources, wealth, 
reputation, force, influence, values and ideals—constant power struggles. 
Those who understand this, for the most part, try to dissimulate it 
in order to gain the upper hand. The art in politics is to put up a façade, a 
veneer of civility and normality. To make it seem as though politics is 
not battle. To calm and appease, at the very same time that we strategize 
and engage. “The presidency is bigger than any of us,” we are told. “We 
must all work hard to ensure a successful transition,” since “one 
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presidential administration must follow the other.”143 Those are the arts, 
the techne of politics, intended to sooth and distract, and simultaneously 
to lead or rather mislead the subject and citizen. To make them believe 
that they need not always preoccupy themselves with politics, or truly 
get their hands dirty, or get too involved, or protest too vehemently. That 
they should contain themselves, play by the rules, or let their elected 
representatives take care of matters. That politics is not warfare. That 
things are under control. 
“Enjoy your family and private life,” “go shopping again,” 
“pursue your personal projects and ambitions,” we are told—and all will 
work out for the best. Nothing could be further from the truth! No, things 
will not work out for the best, instead others will decide how to 
restructure laws and taxes, and redistribute wealth, and benefit 
themselves. “The pursuit of self-interest will lead to the common 
good”—that is perhaps the greatest illusion of all. A farce, if it were not 
so tragic. A strategy that will merely allow others to determine the 
“common good.” Or allow others to claim, reassuringly, that our political 
condition is under control, or well regulated, or controlled by norms. But 
it is not. It is not under control, except insofar as it is entirely controlled. 
It is shaped by our every action and inaction. 
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Chapter 7: The Illusion of Liberalism 
With the collapse of the Marxist utopia, the main resistance to 
recognizing our political condition today comes not from the critical 
Left, but from the center and center Left—from liberals. The liberal 
view—the liberal utopia, in essence—is the very antithesis to this vision 
of endless struggle.* It is a political imaginary of neutral laws, of “rules 
of the game,” that supposedly allow citizens to pursue their personal 
interests without interfering with others. There is no battle, on this view, 
there is simply a regimented game with rules that allows us all to pursue 
our ambitions independently and autonomously. There is no imposition 
of values on others on this view, and no need for that. 
The liberal view is, today, the most seductive alternative to 
critical theory, at least in the United States. It represents the greatest 
challenge. It is not so much the fragmentation of critical utopias, but 
rather the promise of a ceasefire that undermines critical theory: on the 
left liberal view, there is no need for an endless struggle over values, 
since, with the rule of law, everyone can pursue their vision of society 
without encroaching on others. We do not need to impose our values on 
others; we can keep our values personal, pursue them respectfully by 
following the rules of the game, and ultimately everyone will be able to 
achieve their ideals in their lives. All we need to do, on this view, is 
enforce the rules of the game. 
The power of the liberal view is the result, in part, of the 
fragmentation of critical theory. As the Marxist foundation began to 
erode—as the concept of class struggle and the vision of proletarian 
                                                
* Naturally, I am using the term “liberal” here in its political theoretic 
meaning—not in its journalistic usage of liberal versus conservative. Liberalism 
here should be understood as the belief that the political collectivity should not 
impose its own vision of what ideals or values individuals should seek and pursue 
in life, but rather establish and enforce rules that allow individuals to freely pursue 
their own ideals and interests without getting in the way of each other. The 
political collectivity, then, merely sets up the rules of society—the rules of the 
game—in order to allow political subjects to pursue their own interests unimpeded 
by others. This is the traditional Millian view that privileges the rules, or rights and 
obligations, of citizens over any particular vision of the good life; it involves, what 
Michael Sandel and others call, “the priority of the right over the good.” This 
translates, in the legal liberal register, into the idea that a liberal regime is governed 
by the rule of law, and not the rule of men: that neutral rules, not self-interested 
arbiters, decide and adjudicate between conflicting claims of justice. 
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revolution began to eclipse—traditional critical theory reoriented 
towards Left liberalism. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, embraced 
communicative ethics and deliberative processes that placed him more in 
conversation with John Rawls than with the critical Left. Gradually, the 
later generations of the Frankfurt School gravitated toward Kant and 
liberal theory. Today, many inheritors of the Frankfurt School are 
essentially liberals. Regardless, the result is that the single greatest 
challenge to critical theory today is Left liberalism: the idea that we 
should conform to the rule of law as a way to avoid political strife.  
I. 
The liberal view, however, rests on a profound illusion because 
there is simply no way to set up rules of the game that do not already 
have inscribed in them values and ideals. All legal frameworks—all 
systems of laws, all codifications, all laws, all rules of the game—
necessarily instantiate a political structure that imposes a vision of the 
good society and the good life on the subjects of law. This occurs, first 
and foremost, in contemporary advanced capitalist societies, through the 
legal definition of property and the resulting system of private property 
rights. The fact is, the supposedly neutral rules of the game are founded 
on definitions of property that necessarily and inevitably impose a vision 
of the good on all subjects of law. 
Now, as a historical matter, liberalism did not have to be 
coterminous with the heightened, almost absolute, protection of 
individual private property rights that effectively shapes the kind of 
society we live in. The rules of the game, for instance, could have been 
designed to cap individual possession at a certain point, prohibit 
inequality from going beyond a certain ratio, require universal rights to 
shelter, employment, or food. Or, they could and more often were 
designed to allow unlimited accumulation of private property and wealth, 
to allow unlimited inequality as between the wealthiest and the poorest 
in society, to require no mandatory assistance to the most destitute. 
These are simply different ways of writing the rules of the game, but 
they entail entirely different visions of the good society, and they 
facilitate or impede individuals’ specific vision of the good life. They 
tranche the question. These rules determine what is and is not possible in 
terms of the individual pursuit of a good life. They interfere—physically, 
concretely—with an individual’s pursuit of happiness. In this sense, the 
rules of the game shape the vision of the good society and enable or 
disable individuals from pursuing their vision of the good. They thus 
survive and function, in fact, on a deep illusion. 
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Today, it is that illusion of liberal legalism, more than the 
fragmentation of critical theory, though in part reinforced by it, that 
threatens critical theory and obfuscates the critical horizon. So it is that 
illusion we need most to unveil—especially since proponents of 
liberalism will deny that the rules of the game are so determinative or 
that they impose a particular vision of the good. 
To be sure, it would be naïve to suggest that liberalism does not 
embrace any values, or that it does not promote any vision of the good 
life. Most liberal theorists will concede it does. It embraces a love of 
liberty, which is in its root etymology. It also incorporates, at its very 
core, an ideal of tolerance that is reflected in the notion that people 
should be free to pursue their own conception of the good so long as it 
does not harm others. It reflects a discomfort with state authority, and 
certainly a great distaste for authoritarianism. It privileges individual 
preferences over collective ones. It is not, and does not claim to be, 
entirely neutral; but liberal theory does suggest that, within those bounds, 
it is possible to set up rules of the game that allow individuals to pursue 
their own self-interest without fundamentally imposing any specific 
vision of the good life on others—that the rules of the game are not 
rigged to a particular vision of the good. 
This, then, would functionally put an end to the endless political 
struggles we find ourselves in: a Left liberal legal rights regime, on this 
view, would mostly solve the political quandary we find ourselves in, 
halt the slippage to authoritarianism, and offer the most viable utopic 
vision. No need for endless political struggle, just for the implementation 
and enforcement of the rule of law. And many people in the advanced 
capitalist West believe this. Most of our contemporaries believe in the 
rule of law, and believe there is some neutrality to the rule of law. 
Now, if we lived in an arbitrary authoritarian dictatorship, I too 
would argue for the advantages of rules and laws—I would clutch any 
straw. But insofar as we are surrounded, instead, by excessive faith in the 
neutrality of the rule of law, that, I take it, is what we must interrogate. 
Why? Because it is the illusion of liberal legalism that renders too many 
of us docile subjects and prevents us from seeing that we are engaged in 
political battle all the time. It is what encourages individuals to put 
politics aside, to not get involved, to let others decide their fate. It is 
what renders so many of us “immature” in the Kantian sense in “What Is 
Enlightenment?”: servile to others. 
The liberal illusion alone is not what stifles political action 
entirely. There is also desperation, depression, a growing sense of 
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futility, and the problems of collective action. For many, there is a 
feeling that nothing would change anyways. There is a sense of 
powerlessness. Indeed, there are many other forces dampening political 
engagement. But all of them are facilitated by the overarching sense that 
there are rules of the game that need to be followed and that can be 
neutral. That is an illusion. 
II. 
The notion of the rule of law was born in antiquity, especially 
during the Roman republic, but found its most solid footing during the 
emergence of modern political theory with Thomas Hobbes—a most 
illiberal progenitor of liberalism in other respects. On the question and 
definition of law, paradoxically, Hobbes was the most important 
precursor to contemporary legal liberalism. Hobbes articulated, in his 
famous Leviathan of 1651, a modern positivist conception of laws and 
justice that laid the foundation for legal liberalism. 
For Hobbes, laws are what allow individuals to pursue their own 
interests without getting into each other’s way. Laws, Hobbes wrote, are 
like “hedges”: they are not intended to stop us from pursuing our ends, 
but rather to help us achieve those ends without going astray, without 
knocking into others, without harming others. They are not intended to 
shackle us, but rather to make us free. They are not intended to “bind the 
People from all Voluntary actions,” but instead “to direct and keep them 
in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous 
desires, rashness, or indiscretion.”144 Hobbes then added, in what is 
perhaps the most important passage: 
as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep 
them in the way.145 
This notion of “hedges” is absolutely crucial to understanding the 
premise of modern liberal thought: namely, that laws are intended to 
facilitate individuals’ quest for their self-interest, rather than impose 
upon them ideals or values. That laws are what render subjects free: laws 
are what guarantee our liberty to pursue our private ends. They function 
as rules of the game, allowing each individual then to play their own 
game and achieve their own objectives. Hobbes, in fact, helped coin the 
notion of laws as rules of the game. He explicitly compared the laws of a 
commonwealth to the “laws of gaming,” in order to underscore the idea 
that whatever the subjects of a commonwealth agree to, just as whatever 
the players of a game agree to, will necessarily be just to all players.146 
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Laws are also what ensure that the sovereign achieve its raison 
d’être—namely, to guarantee the people their “contentments of life.” Not 
just security or safety in a narrow sense, but their contentment writ large 
“which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the 
Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.” 147  What is especially 
important, and telling, is that the core of this contentment is that every 
subject be secure in his possessions. At the heart of Hobbes’ vision, 
justice consists in making sure that everyone remains in possession of 
their property—or, in Hobbes’ words, it consists “in taking from no man 
what is his.”148 Hobbes spelled this out, making clear that property and 
possession are at the very center of good laws: men must be taught, 
Hobbes declared, “not to deprive their Neighbours, by violence, or fraud, 
of any thing which by the Sovereign Authority is theirs.”149 Hobbes then 
added: 
Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to 
a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next 
degree, (in most men,) those that concern conjugall 
affection; and after them riches and means of living. 
Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain 
from violence to one anothers person, by private 
revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and 
from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of 
one anothers goods.150 
The emphasis on possessions and propriety is what led a scholar 
like C.B. Macpherson to place Hobbes at the fountainhead of a strain of 
liberal thought he called—coining the term—“possessive 
individualism.” 151  It is this idea that every subject possesses these 
things—life, limb, conjugal relations, riches and possessions—on their 
own, that they owe nothing to others, and that they have full entitlement 
to them as a result. As if man’s possessions are entirely the fruit of his 
own labor and he owes nothing to anyone else. 
More important for us here: laws are what allow subjects to 
possess what is their own, to pursue their own possessive interests, to 
maintain their possessions. Law is what prevents others from interfering, 
through force or fraud, in another man’s possessions. 
This is in effect the central thrust of laws as “hedges”—perhaps 
the single most important metaphor in modern political theory because it 
conveys perfectly the implicit assumptions undergirding the concept of 
“the rule of law.” The metaphor of a hedge conveys objectivity and 
neutrality: we agree on where we place the hedge, and it does not impose 
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values or interests on us, we do all the work—within the limits of the 
agreed upon rules. 
The metaphor resurfaces in John Locke’s Second Treatise of 
Government and becomes the central allegory for law. Laws, Locke 
wrote, as Hobbes had, are not confining or limiting of freedom, they are 
what allow us to pursue our interests, they enable us to be free. And for 
this reason, Locke emphasized, laws should not be called “confinement”: 
“that [the Law] ill deserves the Name of Confinement which hedges us in 
only from Bogs and Precipices.”152 Locke’s editor, Peter Laslett, notes in 
the margin, after observing the similarity in language with Hobbes, 
“Presumably a verbal coincidence or an unconscious re-echo, though see 
Gough, 1950, 32.”153 Concidence? Unconscious re-echo? That seems 
inconceivable because the notion of “hedges” is so central to Hobbes’s 
thought. And so central to Locke’s as well: laws are those hedges that 
make possible our pursuit of self-interest and our liberty. Locke spells 
this out as clear as day: 
For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the 
Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent 
Agent to his proper Interest […] So that, however it 
may be mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or 
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom. […] 
For Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence 
from others which cannot be, where there is no 
Law.154  
The central notion, here again, is that the legal hedges allow us to 
be free and to pursue our interests and our visions of the good life. They 
enlarge our liberty, and do not restrict it: they do not shape who we are 
or what we want, they make it possible for us to achieve our vision of 
ourselves and the good life. 
As with Hobbes, for Locke this vision of legal hedges is 
intimately tied to a conception of the propertied self: what is foremost, 
after life and safety, are man’s possessions, from a private property 
perspective. Locke emphasized: 
Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for every 
Man to do what he lists […] But a Liberty to 
dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, 
Possessions, and his whole Property, within the 
Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and 
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therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of 
another, but freely follow his own.155 
This notion of man’s independence to pursue his own will and 
interests, to dispose of his own possessions, to instantiate his own vision 
of a good life—so long as he does not do violence or fraud to another—
is at the very heart of the conception of law as hedges. 
And it reappears in various other guises in Locke’s analysis, as 
well as in that of later liberal thinkers. It appears through the image of 
the “Fence” in the Second Treatise. In discussing the right to use force 
against a robber—which, as Andrew Dilts suggests, paradoxically founds 
the ideal of liberty 156 —Locke refers to the framework of rights, 
specifically “the Right of my freedom,” as the safeguard of his own 
preservation, using the term “Fence” to describe that safeguard. 157 
Michael Walzer, in his essay on “Liberalism and the Arts of Separation,” 
added the image of the “wall,” emphasizing in his words that 
“Liberalism is a world of walls.”158 
Hedges, fences, walls: in liberal thought, laws represent these 
ostensibly neutral constructs that allow us to pursue our utopias without 
getting in each others’ way. 
III. 
Many before me have critiqued this view, but not always for the 
right reason. More often than not, the critique challenged what it 
perceived as the false image of man embedded in these liberal 
assumptions. Man was, instead, by nature more compassionate, or 
empathetic, or solidaristic. In other words, the selfish possessive 
individual of liberalism did not reflect our true species-being—to borrow 
Marx’s terminology. These critiques were useful, insofar as they exposed 
the hidden assumptions of liberalism, but they did not go far enough. 
They too went off-track, enacting new illusions about the real nature of 
subjectivity. 
Marx offered a stinging critique of liberal legalism in On the 
Jewish Question.159 The model of civil and political rights, Marx argued, 
is premised on the notion of a liberal subject that is self-interested and 
self-centered, and pursues only his private self-interest. On the basis of 
this atomistic subject, in his private space, pursuing his private interests, 
liberal theory envisages law as what protects one subject from the harm 
of another. The theory, however, assumes an atomistic subject who is not 
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tied to a community, and does not belong to a community, who depends 
in no way on others. 
Marx argued that the liberal construct of civil and political rights 
rests on a particular view of man: “the egoistic man, man as he is, as a 
member of civil society.”160 This conception of the subject is one of “an 
individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, 
wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance 
with his private caprice.”161 He pursues his own individual interests, and 
as such needs to be protected against others who are doing the same. The 
conception of law is that of “hedges” in Hobbes’s terms; and liberty is 
conceived of as that which permits the pursuit of individual interests. 
“Liberty is, therefore, the right to do everything which does not harm 
others.”162 Law—as in civil and political rights—is what serves to protect 
that: “The limits within which each individual can act without harming 
others are determined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is 
marked by a stake.”163 
What grounds this concept of law is that of the atomistic 
individual pursuing his own interests and needing to be protected from 
the pursuits of others, Marx emphasized. Political rights depend on the 
self-interested, isolated man. “The only bond between men is natural 
necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and 
their egoistic persons.”164 This is detrimental to how men view men. “It 
leads every man to see in other men, not the realization, but rather the 
limitation of his own liberty.”165 
Rights produce what Marx referred to as an “optical illusion”: an 
inversion of political or collective association and the protection of 
individual rights. They prevent us from seeing the true nature of man. 
The contrast, here, is to a vision of man as interconnected and 
interdependent. This is the notion of man as a “species-being” for Marx: 
drawing, as he does, on Rousseau, this is the notion of man as “part of 
something greater than himself, from which in a sense, he derives his life 
and his being.”166 
There is, then, an embedded conception of subjectivity hidden in 
liberal theory: there is already, baked into liberal theory, a biased view of 
the subject as a highly individual, self-centered, and self-interested, 
egotistical agent who is primarily focused on his own possessions and 
private property, and feels no solidarity or no debt to others. 
This critique of possessive individualism resurfaced throughout 
the history of political thought. Foucault, for instance leveled this 
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critique against American neoliberalism in his discussion of Gary 
Becker’s writings in The Birth of Biopolitics: it was his critique that a 
particular conception of the subject was already baked into the cake of 
human capital theory.167 Similarly, Michael Sandel argued that liberalism 
embeds a particular self-centered conception of the individual and a 
specific vision of the good life. So it does not ensure the priority of the 
right over the good, because it assumes a propertied notion of rights; it 
has embedded within it a notion of the good as being linked to private 
property and the independence of subjects. It does not have an idea of 
human emancipation as the end or goal; it has already picked a vision of 
the good tied to private property. Here too, though, Sandel embraced a 
different conception of subjectivity that is more communitarian—
embedded in the community. 
None of these critiques go far enough, though. None of them 
come to terms with their own illusions. None of them recognize the pure 
theory of illusions. The crux of the problem is not that the liberal vision 
of the subject is false or inaccurate, and that another view of human 
nature is more exact. It is not that we are actually empathetic animals or 
inherently part of the collective, rather than individualistic. It is not that 
we are in truth social animals, or political animals. The problem is not 
even with the content of the presupposition—not with the substance of 
the vision of man as individualistic. 
The problem is that all of these claims about human nature are 
entirely constructed and, when they become naturalized, they have 
political effects. They have effects of reality. 
The distinction is crucial: we will never get at human nature. The 
concept itself is deeply problematic. Hobbes was not necessarily right 
about our primordial fear of conflict and death; and Rousseau was not 
necessarily right about our empathy for each other, though he was surely 
right that assumptions about the self have subconsciously driven most 
political thought. We do not need an alternative conception of the self, 
but rather, to critically understand that all these conceptions of human 
nature are constructed, as are the political conditions that we build on top 
of them. The idea of merit is constructed. So is the idea of desert, or of 
responsibility—of what we owe each other, etc. The level of equality and 
freedom in society is constructed, and we have total control over political 
outcomes. We can decide whether humans are generous and altruistic or 
not, selfish and self-centered, by setting up society in a certain way: to be 
generous and altruistic, or not. 
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This is where Sartrian existentialism remains vibrant: we are our 
actions. We are our political decisions. It is the type of society that we 
construct that tells us who we are, not the other way around. We do not 
have inner qualities that dictate what kind of society will emerge and 
develop. We have control over the kind of society we make—with as 
much or as little equality, equity, justice, as we see fit. We are not pre-
defined, and have no human nature. We are malleable constructs, shaped 
for the most part by our prevailing beliefs and materials surroundings. 
Deeply caught in language and ways of thinking and speaking—in our 
forms of rationality. Yes, perhaps even blinded at times by our ways of 
thinking. 
IV. 
That is the crux of the problem: the naturalization of the liberal 
vision of man—the fact that this liberal vision of man is surreptitiously 
baked into the theory—produces a series of illusions that then justifies 
claims to objective truth: namely, the belief in individual responsibility 
and individual merit, that then justifies the ratcheting up of unequal 
social institutions and processes. 
Now, nothing is wrong with individual striving and ambition. But 
the idea that politics can neutrally set up rules of the game that allow 
everyone equally to pursue their goals is a fiction. It is an illusion that 
has detrimental effects, specifically that (a) facilitate particular 
individuals, well situated and well endowed, to achieve their own 
objectives and (b) allow us to impugn those individuals who are not well 
situated when, because of the ways the laws are set up, they inevitably 
fail to achieve their goals. The rules of the game are not neutral, but 
distribute opportunity. Just as the height of the basketball hoop will 
statistically favor tall players, limitless inheritance, for instance, will 
statistically favor children of wealthy parents. 
The point is, there is no neutral notion of merit. There is no way 
to objectively speak about individual responsibility. A child who grows 
up in the inner city, with poor educational and work opportunities, is 
simply not on equal footing as a child who attends the best private 
schools and has unpaid internships throughout their adolescent years. 
Those differences are the direct product of the ways in which the rules of 
the game are established—they are a direct consequence of unlimited 
rights to property, tax laws, etc. The rules of the game create these 
differences, and maintain them. As a statistical matter, as a question of 
probabilities, they reproduce the social inequalities. To be sure, there 
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will be exceptions, and some individuals will be able to transcend their 
likely outcomes—for better or for worse. Some will fall, some will rise. 
But those are the outliers. For the most part, the rules of the game will 
determine the fate of most individuals. 
The central problem, then, is not the embedded idea of individual 
ambition and self-reliance, but the way in which the accompanying 
notion of laws and legal structures hides the reproduction of wealth and 
power. How it creates a fictitious idea of individual merit and 
responsibility. How it advantages some and disadvantages others. And 
how ultimately it facilitates an increasingly unequal social condition. 
To emphasize an important point: There is nothing inherently 
wrong with individualism. In fact, Jean-Paul Sartre may indeed be right 
that « l’enfer, c’est les autres »—that hell is other people. But despite 
that, our human condition requires forms of cohabitation that demand a 
modicum of equity and equality between us all. It requires that we live in 
solidarity one with another. Our social condition and mutual 
interdependence force upon us the need for solidarity. And liberalism 
makes this difficult because it has been, historically, built on notions of 
private property that have facilitated the accumulation of wealth. Of 
course, it need not have been that way, and there were potential limits for 
instance in the Lockian notion of possession based on labor, on what can 
be used and consumed, etc.; but that is not he way in which the liberal 
tradition evolved. So that today, liberalism facilitates, rather than 
hinders, the hoarding and grabbing of property. It masks selfish 
accumulation under the guise of individual merit and responsibility. And 
more and more—as we see with the Piketty research—it is facilitating 
the grabbing of the public commons. The only restraint was world war 
and the threat of communism—the specter of Marx—that forced liberal 
democracies to redistribute; but those are (for the first, at least, 
hopefully) things of the past. Liberalism today faces no more 
competition, and as a result capital accumulation is exceeding all bounds. 
This is facilitated by the illusion of the rule of law. 
The crux of the problem today, then, is the illusion of liberal 
legalism. Let me emphasize here, though, the historically situated nature 
of my claim. This is the case for those, in the West, today, who live in 
liberal democratic regimes. There, it is the naturalization of liberalism 
that is most problematic. That is not necessarily the case in authoritarian 
regimes elsewhere. Moreover, liberalism is not the only political 
construct that produces illusions. Communism as well carries its own 
illusions: the very idea that state institutions could wither away, for 
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instance, is a myth. There will always be regulatory mechanisms, 
whether we call them the state or not. There will always be forms of 
government. To speak of the withering of the state is a dangerous 
illusion that draws our attention away from the fact that regulatory 
mechanisms will always exist and will necessarily distribute wealth, 
power, and opportunities. But in the West today, we are not facing a 
political condition in which communism is shaping us, so that particular 
illusion is not affecting us right now. By contrast, liberalism is dominant, 
hegemonic, and only increasing—and for that reason, it is the illusions of 
liberalism that are the most damaging today in the twenty-first century. 
V. 
What are these “rules of the game” that tilt the playing field, you 
may ask. In a country like the United States, they are the protection of 
limitless private property, tax rates on income and capital gains, the tax 
rules about deductions (for instance, for mortgage interest, investment 
losses, etc.), the lack of an inheritance tax, the privileging of civil and 
political rights at the expense of social and economic rights, to name a 
few. These are the intricate legal rules—the rules of the game—that 
make possible capital accumulation and growing inequalities. 
Some liberal thinkers will argue that these are not the rules of the 
game, but the outcomes, and that the rules are the higher order 
constitutional norms that determine how political decisions are made—in 
effect, that there are two (or perhaps even more) levels of laws, and that 
it is only the higher order rules that qualify as the real rules of the game: 
so, for instance, federalism, the separate powers of the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary, bicameralism, the presidential veto power, 
freedom of the press and religion, etc.168 
But those rules too are malleable and affect the tilt of the playing 
field. Redistricting following the 2020 Census will have significant 
effects on our political condition. Voter eligibility laws and felon 
disenfranchisement turned presidential and congressional elections in 
past years.169 The Electoral College can trump the popular vote. All of 
these purportedly neutral institutions and rules have political 
consequences, and to suggest that they are neutral or objective is to 
mask, once again, the political struggles that underlie our political 
condition. To be clear: redistricting in 2020 is probably the biggest 
looming political battle in the United States and should be a bloody 
battle. 
~~~ 
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In the end, the central illusion of liberal legalism—that laws are 
neutral rules of the game—favors certain political outcomes (for 
instance, capital accumulation and increased inequality) that should be 
the product of political contestation. It does this, first, by naturalizing the 
rules of the game, by convincing us that laws are neutral devices that 
promote our individual liberty. But secondly and equally importantly, it 
also favors certain political outcomes through the way in which it 
conceptualizes violence, something I will return to in Part III. 
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Chapter 8: A Pure Theory of Values  
Left liberalism and the rule of law is tempting, but of no avail. It 
does not prevent authoritarianism, but instead can be plied by it. In 
certain discrete political situations—for instance, in the power struggle 
between President Trump and former F.B.I. Director James Comey or 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller—the rule of law can be a potent weapon 
in the hands of Left liberals. But it is equally forceful in the hands of 
law-and-order conservatives, especially in the battles over Supreme 
Court nominations. In the end, the rule of law is infinitely malleable, and 
can be reshaped easily by skilled lawyers, particularly in times of crises. 
What matters, then, is not the formality of law as hedges or 
fences to keep everyone from interfering with each other, nor the rule of 
law as enforcing a neutral set of principles, but instead the values, ideals, 
and ambitions that underlie the interpretation and enforcement of legal 
norms. The Third Reich followed a strict rule of law. The problem was 
the values and ambitions of the political leaders. The formal structure of 
legal regimes is not at issue. What matters is the direction in which those 
formal structures are oriented. 
This applies as well to political economic structures. Here too, 
there is no inherent tilt to either free markets or controlled economies—
for several reasons. The first, and most important, is that there is no such 
thing as a free market. The notion of the free market is itself an 
illusion—one of the strongest. All markets are deeply regulated in 
different fashions, and those regulatory mechanisms are what distribute 
resources. As a result, second, there are no necessary correlations 
between the formal structures of market regulation—e.g. private property 
regimes versus nationalized industries—and outcomes. There is no 
necessary correlation, for instance, between a planned economy and 
equitable distributions or production. 
We cannot say, as critical theorists, that any specific type of 
political economic regime is more likely than not to produce just 
outcomes. History bears this out. The horrors associated with Stalinism 
bear this out. The gulag. The corruption of the Soviet Communist 
Party—and of other communist parties in the former Eastern Bloc. The 
millions of deaths caused by the Great Famine under Maoist China. The 
killing fields of the Communist Khmer Rouge leaders. The complete 
ineffectuality of the Socialist government of French President François 
Hollande. These are all clear evidence that state-directed political 
economies, or their derivatives, are no more likely to produce just 
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distributions than regimes built on private property. There is hardly any 
room for discussion on this. 
Here too, then, what matters is not a particular form or regime of 
political economy, it is the minutia of rules and regulations that 
determine distributions of resources, wealth, well-being, and life itself. It 
is the inevitable regulatory web and how it allocates materiality. Every 
regime is regulated, there is no deregulated space, and all that matters are 
those specific rules and regulations—not the form, not the category, not 
the type of political economy. Only the material distributions matter. 
This has dramatic consequences for a critical utopian vision. The 
critical horizon can no longer be a collectivist state, a socialist 
government, a planned economy, or the withering of the state. All of 
those forms are essentially empty. What matters, in terms of the vision of 
a future, is how an already-existing set of political economic regulations 
shape the production, distribution, and enjoyment of material wealth and 
well-being in society. What matters is how closely the resulting 
interactions approximate our political values—specifically, those of the 
tradition of the critical Left. 
In terms of a critical horizon, then, all that we can judge, as 
critical theorists, is those material effects, and we can only do that by 
assessing how closely they approximate our values. This explains why a 
pure theory of illusions must be accompanied by a pure theory of values. 
It explains why we need to be both idealist and materialist at the same 
time—entirely so. When we unveil the myths of the free market and of 
controlled economies, we are only left with an analysis of how the 
internal gears function and actually distribute. And we can only assess 
that in relation to our values. We are, in effect, face to face with values—
and only values. 
I have argued elsewhere, in “The Collapse of the Harm 
Principle,” that this is paradoxically the fate of the harm principle in 
John Stuart Mills’ hands. Although the “harm to others” principle was 
invented to serve as a neutral liberal principle—one that would prevent 
the state from imposing values on its citizens—Mill’s harm principle 
nevertheless enshrined an ideal of human self-development and 
perfection that derived from von Humbolt’s writings. This was inevitable 
because the notion of “harm” ultimately collapses onto a substantive 
notion of human flourishing or well-being. It is impossible to define 
“harm” absent a vision of human well-being. 
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There are, then, several roads that lead to the same conclusion: 
everything turns on the values that undergird the mechanisms, and not 
the abstract category of political economy. As a result, the critical 
horizon is not an institutional set-up, nor a type of economic structure, 
nor a political organization. Nor is it a particular constitutional 
arrangement. The British do not have a constitution, but that may 
actually allow them to move left.170 Hungary, by contrast, was recently 
given a constitution, but that may have facilitated a rightward turn. Nor 
is it a centrally planned economy—we’ve been through that. It can never 
be, simply, these structures, organizations, or institutions. It is and can 
only be a set of shared values. 
Those values do not come from thin air. They derive from long 
traditions, often with significant conflicts within those traditions. There 
are, for instance, within the Christian tradition, Franciscan sets of values 
that differ from Benedictine. Within the Muslim tradition as well, there 
are varying ways of interpreting the sacred text, leading to some more 
conservative, backward looking branches like Salafism, others like 
Qutbism that are more radical; there is an Islamic Left as well; there is a 
progressive Left spiritualism, as evidenced in the writings and life of Ali 
Shariati. Within native American heritage as well, there are different 
traditions. Elsewhere there are at times national values, party values, 
family specific values. There are Burkean values. And there are as well 
leftist values and traditions that have emerged from lengthy discussion 
and contestation. These are not spur of the moment, or individual, or 
simply personal preferences. This is not a matter of simple taste, but of 
lengthy discussions and conversations—and readings, and poetry, of 
Rousseau, Robespierre, Dewey, Luxembourg, Rorty, and so on. 
Richard Rorty is particularly important in this genealogy because 
he too was anti-foundationalist and ended up in a similar political 
position, though he disparaged so cuttingly what he called the 
Foucauldian Left. His polemics were extreme. “Foucauldian theoretical 
sophistication,” he wrote, “is even more useless to leftist politics than 
was Engels’ dialectical materialism.”171 Rorty wrote out of anger and 
frustration, but nevertheless contributed to this lengthy and ongoing 
conversation about the values of the Left as the party of hope and moral 
identity.172 Rorty tried to push the critical Left away from stigma and 
identity, toward greater attention to matters of wealth, economics, and 
unionization. 173  Despite his polemics and theoretical disagreements, 
Rorty ended up in a similar practical space: debating core critical Left 
values.  
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These questions of values are not simply a matter of faith—not 
even the more directly religious traditions, like the Christian or Muslim 
or Jewish values. There are texts to read, hermeneutics, generational 
discussions, debates, and even, as evidenced with Rorty, deep 
disagreements, excommunications, heresies, and departures. 
For most of its history, critical theory has drawn on a leftist 
tradition that values equity, compassion, and respect. These are closely 
tied to ideals of solidarity, although they have been at times more or less 
communalist. They tend to respect the community. They are shared by 
critical theorists—who are tied by a particular tradition of thought and 
debate. 
The critical task, then, is to pursue these values of equity, 
compassion, and respect. That is the critical utopic vision. Not a 
particular type of state or economy, but a social order that promotes 
those critical values. 
This is a necessarily situated task: we pursue these values, as 
critical theorists, in confrontation with our really-existing political 
circumstances. We have to examine how the regulatory mesh we find 
ourselves in—whether in a capitalist, socialist, or communist state—
produces our material and spiritual world, how it distributes material 
wealth and well-being. We are temporally and spatially located, and can 
only judge the political economic circumstances within which we find 
ourselves. Some of us may be in capitalist liberal democracies, others in 
socialist democracies, others in communist countries, and still others in 
authoritarian regimes. Each of us, critical theorists, may need to push 
those regimes in different directions in order to realize our values better. 
The critical work is inescapably and deeply situated. 
This is an inherently violent confrontation because we are, 
inevitably, and necessarily, in opposition and in competition with other 
people’s projects and values. Politics is a battlefield, in this sense. It is 
not a regulated game. We are inevitably in a state of competition against 
others who have different utopic sets of values. In this struggle, critical 
theorists need to be strategic in their deployment of tactics—which I will 
turn to next in Part III. Everything has to be aimed at achieving our 
shared critical values. 
In this sense, then, the pure theory of illusions calls for a pure 
theory of values: What is to be done—in the sense of what utopic vision 
critical theory should embrace—involves a situated assessment of really-
existing regulatory mechanisms and material distributions, an analysis of 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
87 
how far those are from our desired values, and a determination of the 
ways to get there.  
It is important to emphasize—although this may sound like 
anathema to many critical theorists—that critique, itself, does not have 
an inherent or necessary political valence. Critical theory, understood as 
a pure theory of illusions that endlessly unmasks the mythic structures of 
our thought and material distributions, does not have an embedded 
necessary set of values. It has, historically, been tied to a particular 
tradition of concerns and ambitions, but those values are not internal or 
inherent to critique. The unmasking of illusions is not just a theoretical 
intervention for the critical Left. Conservatives can do it as well. In fact, 
the tradition of nineteenth century critical thought—what has been often 
referred to as the hermeneutics of suspicion—included Freud and 
Nietzsche, who had different sets of values than Marx. Being suspicious 
of specters and illusions is not just a condition or technique of the Left. 
This explains why, for instance, some alt-right thinkers recently, such as 
Steve Bannon or Julia Hahn, deploy critical theoretic insights. 
There is no inherent leftist valence to critical theory. Precisely for 
that reason, a pure theory of illusions must be tied to a pure theory of 
values. 
~~~ 
We live in a world of scarce resources—of scarcity, as Sartre 
emphasized—and those scarce resources are inequitably distributed. The 
concentration and accumulation of resources in the hands of a global 
elite is unjustified and unjustifiable, and defies any possible ethical 
understanding. It is made possible by illusions: the illusions of political 
liberalism and free markets, the fantasy of individual responsibility and 
merit, the myth of upward social mobility. These illusions are what make 
our unequal world tolerable. 
Critical theory can and must unveil these myths and illusions. 
Whether it does so in the language of ideology critique and legitimation 
theory, or of power/knowledge and regimes of truth, does not matter as 
long as it does not then reify an new set of illusions or a political utopia. 
Truth is, critical theory has now wasted too much energy on internecine 
struggles between Marxists and Foucaultians, between materialists and 
interpretivists, when all along critical theorists have been making the 
same core point: that power undergirds knowledge and that we are 
surrounded by illusions and myths that construct our world in these 
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unjust ways. Critical theory needs to move forward now, first to 
recognize its shared set of values and second to praxis. 
Nietzsche spoke of the death of God, but the proliferation of his 
shadow.174 We seem to be constantly living in new shadows. It is time to 
get out from under them. You may ask how Nietzsche fits with the 
critical tradition. But here too, it is a question of interpretation. There is, 
naturally, the Nietzsche of the noble and strong predator, of the Viking 
warrior, of the prophet Zarathustra who leads a small band of chosen 
ones, of “men of knowledge.” There is this Nietzsche of the few who 
know and can see. Of the select among us who can get beyond man—of 
the Über-mensch. Recall Nietzsche saying, through the voice of the 
prophet Zarathustra, “For thus, justice speaks to me: ‘humans are not 
equal.’ And they shouldn’t become so either! What would my love for 
the overman be if I spoke otherwise?”175 But if that may feel at odds with 
the critical Left tradition, there is also the Nietzsche of §10 of the second 
essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. Of that nobleness of spirit that 
comes from a consciousness of power: the way in which we can rise 
above resentiment and petty rivalries when we are confident of 
ourselves. That Nietzsche is at the heart of this pure theory of illusions 
and values. It is, after all, Nietzsche who taught us the value of values. 
In the end, the critical theory tradition has thrown its lot on the 
side of greater equality, equity, compassion, respect, and justice in 
society. The notion of liberty is empty when citizens do not have equal 
access to education, health care, and living conditions. We must ensure 
that everyone has equal educational opportunities—a first-rate public 
education, available to all, at least through college, with graduate 
opportunities restricted, if at all, on the basis of interest. Basic health 
care should be provided to everyone in need. And everyone should have 
a basic subsistence and shelter. Most importantly, there should not be 
gross disparities in income or wealth. 
This brings us then to the next and final question. Having 
reconstructed critical theory as a pure theory of illusions and the critical 
utopia as a pure theory of values, what is the way forward, from a critical 
perspective, to achieve these shared values and a more just society? 
What is to be done, to borrow a famous turn of phrase, from a critical 
viewpoint? And beyond that, what form should critical action take? Does 
it imply revolutionary action? Or an insurgency? Or an uprising, a revolt, 
or disobedience? Civil disobedience—or is that too wedded to liberal 
legalism? Political disobedience? Speaking out or breaking silence? Or 
self-governance, as a form of Swaraj? Self-mastery or care of self? 
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Social protest, like #BlackLivesMatter or Black Youth Project 100? 
Liberation movements? Or anarchistic disruption? Hacking? Or 
occupation? Or the creation of new imagined communities, like Standing 
Rock? If there is such a thing as a critical praxis that differs from liberal 
or alt-right practices, how do we instantiate it? In the end, the burning 
question is:  What is to be done? 
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PART III: PRAXIS  — REMAKING CRITICAL PRACTICE 
In line with a pure theory of illusions and of values, it is time for 
a new understanding of critical praxis liberated from its foundational 
constraints. Critical praxis cannot be wedded to absolutes—whether they 
consist in a vanguard party or leaderlessness. A reconstructed critical 
theory must go hand-in-hand with a purely tactical approach that seeks 
not to realize a preconceived foundational praxis, but to find the best 
way to push against really-existing forms of oppression and inequity, 
cognizant of the need to constantly reexamine how power recirculates 
through our own practices. 
The central point is that critical praxis is situated. What is to be 
done, in the end, does not call for abstract categories, but requires instead 
an individually tailored, specific assessment and tactical engagement in 
each different context. There is no one size fits all, and nothing is off the 
table. There is no portability or universality to critical praxis. Praxis 
must be determined in a highly contextualized manner. We need single 
answers to the question “What is to be done here?” with unique date, 
location, and time stamps. Praxis must always be situated, decided in 
situ, responsive to the unique time and place constraints, since there is no 
identifiable end point and no single utopian foundation, but rather always 
another place where power is recirculating, often in unprecedented ways. 
In this sense, a reconstructed critical praxis calls for a pure theory of 
tactics. 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
92 
   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
93 
Chapter 9: Our Practical Dilemma 
The past few years have witnessed productive experiments with 
modalities of revolt and fruitful attempts at theorizing forms of 
resistance. The Indignados uprising, the Arab revolutions, the global 
Occupy movement, Nuit Debout, and the Movement for Black Lives 
have reimagined political protest, and led to promising theories of the 
performativity of assembly in Judith Butler’s writings, of the political 
potential of assemblies in Michael Hardt and Toni Negri’s work, and of 
renewed concepts of civil and political disobedience in the works of 
W.J.T. Mitchell and Mick Taussig, Brandon Terry, Sandra Laugier and 
Albert Ogien, Frédéric Gros, and Robin Celikates. 176  The 
#BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo movements have inspired important 
reflections on new modes of leadership and representation in the writings 
of Cathy Cohen, Barbara Ransby, Keeanga-Yamatha Taylor, Deva 
Woodly, and others.177  
But often, those very practices—of general assemblies, of 
leaderless and ideologically-agnostic occupations, of spiritually-tinged 
uprisings, of standing ground and nation-building, of hunger strikes or 
hashtags—clashed with more traditional conceptions of critical praxis 
and triggered uneasy reactions among many critical theorists. There was 
often a sense of frustration at the newer modalities of uprising. 
Leaderlessness was particularly fraught, and substantial disagreement 
emerged about the practices at Occupy Wall Street.  
At other times, the political crises gave way to low-grade 
paralysis among critical thinkers, an unexpected quiescence at least by 
contrast to the more vocal interventions of liberal dissent, such as the 
ACLU, Human Rights Watch, or the Center for Constitutional Rights in 
New York. The critical responses appeared somewhat muted. The 
critical Left, as opposed to the liberal Left, appeared disarmed. It often 
felt that critical praxis was missing in action—as opposed, that is, to 
liberal forms of protest. 
The critical Left has tended to mobilize using mostly traditional 
liberal devices, and has folded back on liberal legal institutions. In the 
United States at least, the principal forms of critical resistance to the 
Trump administration have involved, first, civil rights litigation against 
the Muslim Ban, the military transgender ban, and other executive 
orders; second, permitted protest marches, such as the Women’s March, 
or, even, the March for Science; and third, myriad on-line petitions, 
letters, and statements of protest by individuals and institutions, 
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including universities. Alongside these peaceful protests and social 
movements, anti-fascist rallies have spread, sometimes devolving into 
minor violence. For the most part, though, the resistance has taken the 
path of liberal democratic protest, even among the more critically 
oriented. The resistance to the Muslim Ban followed precisely a liberal 
civil and political rights model: civil rights lawyers and even state 
attorney generals went to court and sued President Trump, while others 
offered their expertise as area experts or translators. In effect, the critical 
resistance predominantly used liberal courts as a bulwark against the 
intolerable. 
Critical praxis, it seems, has not caught up with these critical 
times. It is precisely for this reason that we now need to rejuvenate a 
critical praxis for the twenty-first century. The question becomes: What 
could or should critical praxis look like today when the dialectical 
imagination is so fractured? What should critical action look like within 
this new reconstructed paradigm of critical theory, especially at a time 
when right-wing populist movements have cannibalized segments of the 
working class, turning old-style class warfare into anti-immigrant and 
ethno-racist conflict? What is to be done? 
Our times call for renewed praxis freed from prior foundational 
commitments. To move forward, though, we first need to understand 
clearly where we are and how we got here. 
I. 
Alongside the structural transformation of critical horizons over 
the course of the twentieth century, the field experienced as well a 
structural transformation of critical praxis. The shift from Marx to Mao 
and to later insurrectional utopias, discussed in Part II, moved critical 
theory away from the modern concept of revolution to more situated 
localized events of insurrection, revolt, and disobedience—to new 
modalities of uprising. This reflected, in part, a movement away from the 
Eurocentric model of revolution toward practices of insubordination that 
were historically shaped in the colonial wars. “In the dominated colonial 
peripheries,” Balibar explains, “there were no ‘revolutions’ but only 
‘resistances,’ ‘guerillas,’ ‘uprisings’ and ‘rebellions,’” and by contrast to 
the latter, the great revolutions of the nineteenth century “were supposed 
to be political processes typical for the center because they involved the 
participation of ‘citizens’ who exist only in the nation-states.”178 In 
effect, the mid-twentieth century insurrections were to the modern 
concept of revolution what the periphery was to the center. 
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From revolution to uprising, from Europe to its colonies: This 
captures well the shift and the resulting fragmentation of critical praxis 
during the twentieth century. It produced, by mid-century, four different 
models. There was, first, an insurgency model of uprising that could be 
traced directly to Mao’s military strategies pre-1949. This model rested 
on Mao’s tripartite division of society, and it inspired the growth of 
small, separatist cells or wider national liberation movements.179 This 
was the model of the FLN in Algeria and of other liberation movements 
throughout the global South. It was the model of insurgency that 
eventually gave rise to counterinsurgency warfare practices in Indochina, 
Algeria, Malaya, and Vietnam. 
There was, second, a model of the constant upending of 
revolutionary accomplishments, based on Mao’s Cultural Revolution 
from 1966 to 1968 (or at least to the time of the disbanding of the Red 
Guards). This model rested on the idea of the inevitable return of self-
dealing and self-interest, of elitism and complacency. It reflected Mao’s 
idea that the Chinese Communist Party had become the bourgeoisie. This 
model was one that gave rise to the call for “permanent revolution” that 
we heard in Latin and South America. 
There was, third, a model of more creative insubordination, 
especially in some of the receptions of Maoism in the West in the 1960s 
and 70s as an alternative to the Soviet archetype of communism. 
Militants in France, Italy, and elsewhere drew on Mao’s writings to 
develop alternative ways of thinking and challenging relations of power, 
some through new forms of popular justice, others through leaderless 
inquiries. A good illustration here, again, is the debate between Foucault, 
Benny Lévy, and Glucksmann in 1971. 
And then, finally, there emerged a model of Maoist-inspired 
insurrection that had elements of early insurgency theory, but was far 
more isolationist and separatist from the general population. Mao here is 
less an explicit point of reference, than a central but silent identifier. This 
model is what I would call separatist insurrectional, and it was reflected 
in the more extreme violent movements of the 1970s and 80s in Western 
Europe and the United States, such as the Baader-Meinhof Group, the 
Red Brigades in Italy, or the Weather Underground Organization. The 
model differs sharply from the modern concept of revolution. It has a 
sharply different episteme: a small-bore, tactical episteme of the guerilla 
fighter, associated with rebellion and insurrection, as opposed to the 
modern revolution. 
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These structural transformations greatly influenced practices of 
critical resistance at the turn of century. There were, naturally, a range of 
practices, but two major styles, or poles, emerged in the West in the first 
decade of the twenty-first: at one end, a set of more radical insurrectional 
movements in continuity with the historical transformations already 
discussed; and at the other end, a set of more open, prefigurative social 
movements that have evolved in part in opposition to the previous 
models—including, for instance, Occupy Wall Street, 
#BlackLivesMatter, and Standing Rock in the United States. Each of 
these styles and movements have been fruitfully theorized by 
contemporary collectives and thinkers such as the Invisible Committee 
for the first, or Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, Judith Butler, and others 
for the second. 
A.  Insurrectional Cells 
The first style of separatist insurrectional movements manifested 
around the world, from El Salvador and Peru in the 1980s to Nepal and 
Kashmir in the 1990s. These insurrectional practices took different forms 
and inspired separatist cells in Europe and elsewhere. The Invisible 
Committee, an anonymous group of anarchist activists in France, gave 
theoretical expression to this approach in a series of books, beginning 
with their first, The Coming Insurrection, published in 2007.  
The Coming Insurrection views the world through the prism of 
civil war. What lies ahead is the “emergence of a brute conflict,” the 
Committee writes. 180 It is a civil war between different visions of 
society—between “irreducible and irreconcilable ideas of happiness and 
their worlds.”181 It is useless, the Committee tells us, to get indignant, to 
get involved in citizens’ groups, to react to the news, or to wait for 
change or the revolution. “To no longer wait is, in one way or another, to 
enter into the logic of insurrection. It is to once again hear the slight but 
always present trembling of terror in the voices of our leaders. Because 
governing has never been anything other than postponing by a thousand 
subterfuges the moment when the crowd will string you up, and every 
act of government is nothing but a way of not losing control of the 
population.”182 
Rather than join citizens’ groups or assemblies, the Committee 
advocates a form of separatism, secession, and isolation. France, the 
Invisible Committee tells us, is “the land of anxiety pills,” “the Mecca of 
neurosis”183; rather than embrace the people, the insurrectional project is 
to withdraw to communes, to isolate oneself, to remove oneself from the 
people. “Far more dreadful are social milieus, with their supple texture, 
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their gossip, and their informal hierarchies,” the Invisible Committee 
writes. “Flee all milieus. Each and every milieu is orientated towards the 
neutralization of some truth.”184 Even anarchist milieus must be forsaken 
because what they do is “blunt the directness of direct action.”185 
Activists today must form communes instead of blending into the 
population. They must remove themselves from the toxicity of the 
general population. The masses are to be viewed with caution and 
suspicion, not the least of which because “we expect a surge in police 
work being done by the population itself.”186 
The Committee sets forth strategies for insurrection: 
demonstrations need to be wild and unexpected, not disclosed in advance 
to the police; they must lead the police, rather than be herded by them; 
they must take the initiative; harass and distract the police, in order to 
attack elsewhere; chose the terrain; take up arms and maintain an armed 
presence, even if this does not mean an armed struggle, using arms 
sparingly and infrequently.187 The central idea is of an uprising that 
represents “a vital impulse of youth as much as a popular wisdom.”188 
This was one important model at the turn of century, inspired clearly by 
Mao’s trajectory of insurrectional practices over the course of the 
twentieth century. 
B.  Leaderless Assemblies and Prefigurative Movements 
At the other extreme, another broad style embraced a very 
different ethic. Reacting in part against the patriarchal, “great man,” and 
top-down character of most traditional critical praxis, these movements 
aspired to leaderless—or inversely, what could be called “leaderful”—
and more egalitarian, ideologically open, democratic procedures. They 
attempted to prefigure the political processes that they aspired to, rather 
than view their militancy as a temporary necessary means to achieve the 
society they wanted to live in. 
Naturally, these movements took different forms. Some of the 
organizations within the Movement for Black Lives, for instance, were 
more centralized and hierarchical, such as the Black Youth Project 100 
(“BYP100”), but most of the others aspired to be leaderless, such as 
Occupy Wall Street, Nuit Debout, or other organizations within 
#BlackLivesMatter. Many of the movements were ideologically open, in 
the sense that there was often no policing of views, censorship of 
political ideologies, or establishment of a party line. There was rarely, in 
these new movements, a vanguard party. To the contrary, many of the 
militant movements had a unique ethical and political stance of equality 
and respect that went against the very idea of hierarchical power, the 
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latter being mostly viewed as patriarchal. They deployed new 
technologies and had a strong digital presence on social media—using 
FaceBook, Twitter, Instagram, Google+, and every other digital medium 
as a way to horizontalize authority.189 They honed their political ethos 
and strategies around notions of equality, and skillfully deployed digital 
disobedience toward that end. 
Some of these new movements were more attentive to 
membership and representation. BYP100, for instance, restricted 
membership to persons who are between 18 and 35, and it was by 
definition black and young. Beyond that, to become a member of 
BYP100, the person had to attend an orientation meeting, had to 
participate in two chapter meetings, and had to attend a public event. The 
organization was wedded to democratic principles: “Leaders are 
nominated, elected, and constantly rotated; the bulk of decisions must be 
ratified by a majority vote.”190 Other large-scale protests like Occupy 
Wall Street or Nuit Debout, were more leaderless and equally egalitarian. 
What these movements all shared, though, was that they did not endorse 
political parties or political actors. For the most part, they maintained 
themselves outside of mainstream politics. 
In their very organization, many of these movements inserted 
their principles of equality into the way they functioned and operated. 
The aspirations and values were included in the movement structures 
themselves. In this sense, they were acting out what Barbara Ransby 
called “group-centered leadership practices.” This did not mean that 
there were never recognized individuals, even some celebrities in these 
movements. What it meant, according to Ransby, was that everyone in 
the group responded to the will of its members. “The Movement for 
Black Lives is distinctive because it defers to the local wisdom of its 
members and affiliates, rather than trying to dictate from above,” Ransby 
explained. This was, in Ransby’s words, a “better model for social 
movements,” and it represented “a choice, not a deficiency.” The reason 
that it represented a better model, Ransby argued, was that it turned over 
the decision making to those people on the ground who had the best 
understanding of the problems they faced and who were in the best 
position to carry out their own solutions. “People are better prepared to 
carry out solutions they themselves created, instead of ones handed down 
by national leaders unfamiliar with realities in local communities,” 
Ransby wrote.191 
In Notes Toward A Performative Theory of Assembly (2015), 
Judith Butler explored the performative dimensions of these assembly-
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based movements, in order to expose how the physical gathering of 
bodies and the material element of assemblies precede, constitute, and 
make possible political expression. For Butler, the performative nature of 
assembly is a precondition for expression, and the materiality of 
assembly fashions the discursive realm. As Butler writes: “The assembly 
is already speaking before it utters any words, […] [B]y coming together 
it is already an enactment of a popular will. […] The “we” voiced in 
language is already enacted by the gathering of bodies, their gestures and 
movements, their vocalizations, and their ways of acting in 
concert.”192This enactment of a “we” by means of physical assembly—
both being present and being absent for those who are in prison or have 
been disappeared—is, for Butler, an essential precondition to expression 
and speech. It forms—or it performs—the medium within which claims 
for inclusion are expressed. It is the way to initiate claims to be “we the 
people” or, even more, “we are still the people.” 
Butler argues that “acting in concert can be an embodied form of 
calling into question the inchoate and powerful dimensions of reigning 
notions of the political” and this works in two ways, first, by enacting 
contestation and, second, by exposing precarity. 193  In other words, 
assemblies serve as incipient forms of popular sovereignty. They give 
rise to forms of popular will, and help shape our conception of the will of 
the people.194 The bodily nature of assemblies exposes the precarity of 
these lives. They reveal the lived existence in the shadows, but also the 
resounding claim that this condition of precarity is intolerable. “[T]he 
bodies assembled ‘say’ we are not disposable, even if they stand 
silently.”195 
Butler’s central point is that the materiality of assembly, the 
corporeal presence of people assembled in the square, has a force of its 
own, independent of what is said, and serves as the precondition for what 
gets said. Assembly, in and of itself, matters. It says and does a lot. Or, 
as Butler writes: “the basic requirements of the body are at the center of 
political mobilizations—those requirements are, in fact, publicly enacted 
prior to any set of political demands.”196 This is, for Butler, the power 
and importance of these types of assemblies. 
II. 
The historical context, though, changed once again in the first 
decades of the twenty-first century. The liberal veil was lifted off the true 
face of the right across the globe. More openly conservative and 
xenophobic parties surfaced around the world—with the rise of alt-right 
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parties in Europe, of the Tea Party and the Trump presidency in the 
United States, authoritarian leaders in Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, 
India, and elsewhere. Across a spectrum of political issues, from 
immigration to sexual orientation, the gloves came off and we faced a far 
more vocal and expressive authoritarianism and extreme right—with 
even the more traditional conservative parties revealing their ugliest 
underbellies. The lines of political demarcation became more polarized, 
violent, and confrontational. 
This presented a real challenge to critical praxis. The truth is, 
critique was always sharper when it confronted liberal ideology. The 
reason is simple: critique operates most often and most powerfully as an 
immanent form of criticism, using the aspirations and ideals of its object 
of critique to motivate a reassessment. Critique was always more cutting 
when it could show up liberal ideals—e.g., the promise of equality in the 
face of an unequal world, or the potential of freedom in an unjust 
society. It was always stronger when it could leverage the rhetoric of its 
interlocutor. But when the opposition is openly racist, sexist, 
homophobic, xenophobic, nationalistic, and supremacist, there is little to 
be gained from immanent critique. In the struggle over values, there is 
hardly any need for sophisticated critical theory. 
In the early twentieth, critique faced precisely that: political 
leaders who were openly and proudly—and vociferously—Islamophobic 
and mysogenist; or who campaigned on their willingness to kill their 
own citizens accused of drug dealing; who openly imprisoned political 
opponents in the name of democracy. While critique may function well 
in the face of liberalism, it is disarmed against these forms of 
authoritarianism. It is powerful at mapping a civil war matrix onto 
relations of power when the dominant regime is liberal; but when the 
opponent is more extreme, and there is effectively an open civil war, the 
subtleties of critique become less useful. 
It should not come as a surprise that the leading critical theorists 
in wartime have so often joined the ranks of the state apparatuses that 
they previously or ordinarily would have critiqued. After all, where was 
the Frankfurt School in wartime? At the U.S. Office of Strategic Services 
(the “OSS”), which was the forerunner to the C.I.A. Franz Neumann, 
who had just published his book on Nazi Germany Behemoth: The 
Structure and Practice of National Socialism in 1942, as well as Herbert 
Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer, author of Punishment and Social 
Structure with Georg Rusche in 1939, all worked for the OSS under its 
head, the Republican Wall Street lawyer, William Donovan. Neumann in 
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fact took charge of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS for 
Donovan. As John Herz, who worked in Neumann’s unit, quipped, “It 
was as though the left-Hegelian World Spirit had briefly descended on 
the Central European Department of the OSS.”197 Max Horkheimer was 
also reportedly part of the OSS. Meanwhile, Theodor Adorno, Herta 
Herzog, and Paul Lazarsfeld became involved in the Princeton Radio 
Project, which became later the Columbia University’s Bureau of 
Applied Research, and which served intelligence functions.198 And, to be 
honest, what else would one do, faced with a regime like the Third Reich 
and Nazi Germany—especially as a Jew in exile in the United States?  
Similarly, today, we face a new constellation. The rise of the alt-
right and extreme right parties has shifted the landscape of critical 
praxis. Critical theory no longer faces the spineless liberalism that 
merely fed mass incarceration and workfare to America. It no longer 
faces a Democratic administration that ratchets up drone strikes and 
legally justifies the first targeted assassination of an American citizen 
abroad. Rather, it faces political leaders who are openly Islamophobic, 
homophobic, xenophobic, mysogenist, and racist. 
In response, a lot of critical theorists fold back today on the 
ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, or Human Rights Watch. They 
fall back on liberal bastions—as critical theorists did at mid-century. 
And it may well be that one effective strategy today is to lock arms with 
liberals, tone down the critique, and work together until better times. But 
few critical theorists openly take that position. Instead, contemporary 
critics advocate for an array of new or reconstructed practices. It is 
possible to map out these different avenues. There are at least eight 
broad categories that critics advocate, plus a polyvalent approach that 
draws on them all. Let’s review them one at a time.  
#1.  Return to a Vanguard Party  
Some critical theorists urge a return to vanguard revolutionary 
practices. In the context of the Arab Uprisings of 2011, for instance, 
thinkers such as Tariq Ali and Perry Anderson advocated for a more 
concerted anti-imperialist strategy and vanguard revolutionary practice. 
The only way for the Arab uprisings “to become a revolution,” Anderson 
wrote in 2011, was for the region as a whole to undo the 1979 Camp 
David Accords: “The litmus test of the recovery of a democratic Arab 
dignity lies there.”199 Tariq Ali, for his part, pointed us back to Lenin as 
the proper guide to rethink the Arab uprisings—and uprisings more 
generally. 
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In his 2017 book, The Dilemmas of Lenin: Terrorism, War, 
Empire, Love, Revolution, Ali draws our attention back to Lenin’s April 
Theses, discussed earlier. Lenin pronounced his theses at meetings of 
soviets in Saint Petersburg in early April 1917 (in between the first 
revolution of February 1917 and the Bolshevik Revolution of October 
1917). The April Theses were, as Ali reminds us, a clarion call to 
vanguard action at a time when the revolutionary leadership was adrift—
a provocative, in Ali’s words “explosive,” and extremely controversial 
call for a second, truly socialist revolution to overcome the first, 
bourgeois political revolution.200 At that time, Lenin called on his party 
members to unleash in effect a second revolution—in terms that would 
have had a special resonance in Egypt in 2011: 
The specific feature of the present situation in 
Russia is that the country is passing from the first 
stage of the revolution—which, owing to the 
insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of 
the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place 
power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest 
sections of the peasants.201 
These words, Ali notes, “paved the way for the revolution in 
October 1917.”202 They laid the groundwork for a leaderful vanguard 
revolution—precisely the type of practice that was consciously avoided 
by many in Tahrir Square, and latter in Zuccotti Park and at the Place de 
la République. Ali’s message is clear: what is needed at our assemblies 
today is a second uprising, a truly vanguard revolution. That alone will 
produce lasting change, according to Ali. 
Revolutionary class struggle has and can always serve as a model 
for critical praxis. It is worth recalling, though, the dark side of vanguard 
communism:  how Leninism led to Stalinism, to the Terror-Famine in 
Ukraine in 1932-33, to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of non-aggression 
in 1939, and the Soviet Gulag; or how Maoism led to the Great Chinese 
Famine of 1959-61 and to unconscionable violence during the Cultural 
Revolution. In armed warfare, naturally, there have been successful 
models of vanguard insurgencies based on the military strategies of Mao, 
Che, and others; but those were armed insurrections led by armed 
insurgents attempting to gain independence or violently overthrow a 
government. That might still be a model for critical praxis today, but it is 
important to emphasize that it would likely be violently repressed and 
lead to wide scale incarceration and death. It should not lightly be 
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advocated by theorists who are not willing to put themselves at the 
forefront and risk their own lives. It also should remind us of the courage 
of those women and men who engage in uprisings. It reminds me of the 
words of Mina Daniel (1991-2011) who was killed in October 2011 by 
the Egyptian military in Maspero, near Tahrir Square, during a peaceful 
Coptic protest: “You are not going out to make a revolution and live; you 
are going out to make a revolution and die… for your siblings, for your 
children, for anyone, so that others can enjoy this beautiful thing.”203 
#2.  Continue with Insurrectional Practices 
Other critical thinkers strenuously advocate for insurrectional 
practices. Critical theorists, such as Giorgio Agamben and Jacques 
Rancière for instance, are often associated with the anonymous 
collective, the Invisible Committee, discussed earlier, which explicitly 
militates for insurrection in its series of books, from The Coming 
Insurrection (2007), To Our Friends (2014), and Now (2017). Some 
commentators have suggested that the writings of the Invisible 
Committee, in certain passages, bear striking resemblance to those of 
Agamben and Rancière. 
In The Coming Insurrection, the Committee explicitly calls for a 
cellular, separatist insurgency. It offers very precise prescriptions for 
action, including the following: 
Expect nothing from organizations. Beware of all 
existing social milieus, and above all, don’t become 
one (100) 
Form communes (100) 
Get organized in order to no longer have to work 
(104) 
Plunder, cultivate, fabricate (106) 
Flee visibility. Turn anonymity into an offensive 
position (115) 
Organize Self-Defense (117) 
Abolish general assemblies (125) 
Liberate territory from police occupation. If 
possible, avoid direct confrontation (130) 
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Take up arms. Do everything possible to make their 
use unnecessary. Against the army, the only victory 
is political. (133) 
Depose authorities at a local level (136) 
“Abolish general assemblies”: the Committee signals, in no 
uncertain terms, that it is writing against the recent tradition of 
occupations and general assemblies, and advocating a far more radical 
posture. The Committee goes so far as to propose a weaponized 
insurgency, although it is careful to emphasize that it does not fetishize 
armed resistance. It embraces weapons in order not to use them. The idea 
is that an a priori refusal to arm oneself or to handle weapons is 
equivalent to powerlessness. Power is achieved by having weapons but 
not using them. The idea is to get us to the point where it is no longer 
necessary to use arms through all the other strategies of unseating local 
authorities. “When power is in the gutter,” the Committee writes, “it’s 
enough to walk over it.”204 
Many of these tactics that have been deployed recently in anti-
fascist and anti-government protests that draw on these insurrectional 
writings. In protests in 2018 in Berkeley, Oakland, and Paris, for 
instance, the “black bloc” tactics were inscribed within an insurrectional 
frame. These tactics generally involve breaking windows, burning 
garbage, tires, or cars, and throwing projectiles at the police, and are 
generally carried out by black-clad protesters equipped with helmets, 
goggles, and face coverings. The tactics trace back to the squatter and 
other autonomist movements in Europe in the 1980s and to the 1999 
Seattle WTO protests. In certain locations, such as in Western Europe, 
they have become routine at protest marches. 
In France, protests were traditionally headed, in what was called 
the “cortège,” by union representatives, and were strictly policed by 
union security forces. In more recent times, though, the protest marches 
have been preceded, in what is called the “tête de cortège,” by individual 
protesters, including black bloc protesters, who defy the march permits 
and take on law enforcement agents (national police, CRS, military 
gendarmes) that are policing the march. Individual protesters now also 
regroup in smaller clusters outside the perimeter of the permitted protest 
route in order to expand the space of protest and inject the protest more 
into the public space. These tactics violate the protest permit and are 
often severely repressed by the police, resulting in large-scale 
confrontations and arrests. 
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These insurrectional practices are fraught with potential violence 
and are physically dangerous. At the 2018 May Day protests in Paris, for 
instance, a tête de cortège with hundreds of black bloc protesters 
violently encountered a police force, resulting in over 200 arrests and a 
handful of injuries. In some cases, the practices have lead to accusations 
of sabotage, conspiracy, and terrorism. This was the case of the Tarnac 
Nine—a group of nine or ten alleged anarchists living collectively in the 
French rural commune of Tarnac in the Corrèze department of France 
and purportedly associated with the Invisible Committee— who were 
accused in 2008 of obstructing power cables of the high-speed railroad in 
France. Those charges were ultimately dismissed; but the accusations 
weighed on the activists and continue to circulate.  
Like vanguard revolutionary practices, these insurrectional 
strategies involve radically militant, dangerous, potentially treasonous 
practices that expose individuals to incarceration, physical injury, and 
possibly death. In this sense, they should not lightly be advocated, 
especially not by armchair critical theorists. Nothing is off the table, but 
it is important to emphasize the risks of any strategy—and the trade offs. 
#3.  Defend Autonomous Zones 
There have also emerged non-violent, non-insurrectional 
separatist movements that seek to create communities, often through a 
squatting model that does not involve violence, but instead community, 
new forms of property, and various forms of collaboration. The ambition 
of these temporary spaces is generally to avoid formal state structures of 
control. They are often referred to as Temporary Autonomous Zones 
(“TAZs”), in part in homage to the poetic anarchist writings of Hakim 
Bey by that name. They can also aspire to be permanent autonomous 
zones, or as Bey suggested “Permanent TAZs” in article in 1994 of that 
title.  
A well-known example of a TAZ, which has attempted to 
become a permanent autonomous zone, is the autonomous zone of 
Notre-Dame-des-Landes outside of Nantes, France. This zone and others 
in France—in Rouen, Lyon, and elsewhere—are referred to as “Zones à 
defender” or “ZADs,” and have generally involved peaceful occupations 
of lands often with a significant environmental aspect. In the case of the 
Notre-Dame-des-Landes, the zone began as a protest movement against 
the building of a large new airport outside Nantes to service all of 
Western France. The physical presence of the protesters, through a form 
of squatting of agricultural lands where the airport was going to be built, 
started a long-term alliance between leftist activists, anarchists, 
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environmentalists, and local farmers. The ZAD eventually brought down 
the airport construction project after 10 years of occupation and protest. 
In the process, the activists invented new forms of non-property, which 
the French state has tried to violently repress and demolish. 
#4.  Engage in Civil and Political Disobedience 
Civil and political disobedience have also recently received 
increased attention in critical circles.205 These practices build on the 
traditional notion of civil disobedience made famous in David Thoreau’s 
On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, Mahatma Gandhi’s writings on 
Satyagraha or non-violent resistance, Martin Luther King’s Letter from 
Birmingham Jail, and Hannah Arendt’s writings on civil disobedience as 
a form of lobbying in the Crises of the Republic. It is conventionally 
defined as the act of disobeying a positive law in order to suffer legal 
punishment and thereby convince others of the injustice of the law.  
A number of contemporary critical theorists advocate a renewed 
attention to civil disobedience in democracies as a powerful tool to 
achieve social reform. Sandra Laugier and Albert Ogien in their work 
Pourquoi désobéir en démocratie ? address head-on the counter-
majoritarian difficulties typically associated with civil disobedience and 
resolve in its favour. Frédéric Gros, in a book titled Désobéir (2017), 
explores and maps out the various forms of disobedience that mirror the 
different types of expected obedience to authority in political theory. 
Others as well have enriched the conversations including especially 
Robin Celikates, Candice Delmas, Alexander Livingston, Todd May, and 
Brandon Terry.  
By contrast to civil disobedience, political disobedience can be 
defined as a form of insubordination that contests not only unjust 
positive law, but also the very political system that gives rise to those 
laws. It thus challenges the docility of civil disobedience, refusing to 
respect the punishment associated with breaking the law. It involves 
flouting rules, not to challenge their legality, but because they are simply 
intolerable. W.J.T. Mitchell, Mick Taussig, and I theorized these new 
forms of political disobedience in the Occupy context in Occupy: Three 
Inquiries in Disobedience (2013). This type of practice has become 
increasingly common along state borders, where local farmers are giving 
aid and assistance to undocumented immigrants in defiance of the law, as 
well as in sanctuary cities that openly resist the legal enforcement of 
immigration laws. The ambition here is not to suffer punishment, as a 
way to reveal the immorality of the law, but to defy laws that are 
considered immoral. It takes a different ethical position toward praxis. It 
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is much closer to what Foucault described in his 1978 lecture, “What is 
Critique?”, where he suggested that critique is not being governed “like 
this.” Not, as he had originally formulated, in being governed less or not 
at all, but in not being governed in this way.206 
#5.  Gather in Assemblies, Occupations, and Movements 
A number of critical theorists, including Judith Butler, Michael 
Hardt, Toni Negri, Barbara Ransby, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, and 
Deva Woodly, among others, rally around new practices of assembly, 
occupation, and non-violent social movements. These practices build on 
the many occupations and assemblies that proliferated in the early 
twentieth century—such as Occupy, Standing Rock, Nuit Debout—as 
well as on many ongoing social movements, such as #BlackLivesMatter, 
or more broadly the Movement for Black Lives, and #MeToo. These 
assemblies and movements offer new models of political disobedience. 
Deva Woodly emphasizes how the organizations within the 
Movement for Black Lives repoliticize the public sphere and 
demonstrate the potential of democratic experimentation. These 
movements revive the public sphere by countering the growing “politics 
of despair,” Woodly writes. 207  The different manifestations of 
#BlackLivesMatter protest, she explains, are not just “pre-political” or 
prefigurative, they are inherently political practices that allow democracy 
to correct itself. 
Judith Butler explicitly embraces these new political forms. A 
frequent speaker at the global Occupy movement, Butler sees promise in 
such non-violent strategies. In her 2017 book discussed earlier, Notes 
Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler elaborates on the 
productive ways in which already-existing assemblies shape our politics. 
Butler praises the productive performative dimensions that emanate from 
the materiality and physicality of people assembling either in public or 
virtually on digital platforms. 
Michael Hardt and Toni Negri in their book Assembly (2017) 
provide a handbook intended not just to analyze, as does Butler, but to 
stimulate, encourage, and foster assembly-style social movements. Hardt 
and Negri offer guidance on how to organize, how to assemble, how to 
revolt, how to seize power, and how to transform society. “Smash the 
state,” they write.208 “Blow the dam!”209 “Take power.”210 
Their book is a manual, a how-to guide, with both concrete 
instructions on how to seize power and also rich theorization of our 
current political condition—both in terms of our subjective existence in 
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our social milieu and in terms of our political economic condition that 
affects as well our subjectivities. Hardt and Negri locate the productivity 
of assembly as a new mode of politics within the power of the 
“multitude”—a notion that grounded their last book. Their strategies, 
such as inverted leadership and claimed entrepreneurship, are each 
individually to be viewed “as a simple operator of assembly within a 
multitude that is self-organized and cooperates in freedom and equality 
to produce wealth.”211 
At the most concrete level and faced with leaderless social 
movements like Occupy Wall Street or the Arab Uprisings, Hardt and 
Negri offer a list of concrete organizational advice, almost commands, 
for leftist revolt: Do not give up on leadership. Do not go leaderless. 
Instead, “transform the role of leadership by inverting strategy and 
tactics”: let the multitude decide on strategy, but the leaders decide on 
tactics.212 Do not give up on institutions and organizations, but instead 
build new institutions—specifically non-sovereign institutions. 213 
“Smashing the state means […] creating political and administrative 
institutions that immanently organize the collective, democratic decision-
making of the entire population.”214 
Most importantly, Hardt and Negri argue, seize power. Many of 
the current social movements focus all their attention on the movement 
itself, its general assemblies, and the insulated world of the resistance 
movement, rather than on taking power from the state. Many now create 
a hermetically sealed space of protest and militance—en vase clos—
separate and independent from ordinary politics and political power. At 
Occupy, for instance, there was a palpable and deliberate resistance to 
power, legislative politics, or party politics—to any engagement with 
conventional political representation and practices. Hardt and Negri push 
in a very different direction: Leftist movements must take power. They 
must seize the conventional instruments, institutions, and pathways of 
politics. “[W]e have little sympathy with those who want to maintain 
their purity and keep their hands clean by refusing power,” they 
proclaim. “[I]n order to change the world we need to take power.”215 
Many of these sentiments are echoed in other non-violent 
movements, such as #MeToo or #BLM. Many activists in these social 
movements seek to leverage the momentum of gatherings and non-
violent protest to push assemblies into a more direct political process. As 
Jelani Cobb documents in the New Yorker, the Movement for Black 
Lives is pushing in new directions, getting more involved in public 
policy platforms, and some activists are even jumping into the electoral 
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fray, such as DeRay McKesson who ran a mayoral campaign in 
Baltimore in 2016. 
Some critical thinkers criticize these new political formations as 
disorganized, episodic, and doomed to failure. Critics argue that they 
will gradually transform into more ordinary party politics (like Podemos 
in Spain) or worse, play into the hands of completely different actors 
(like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). Disavowing the more radical 
approaches, some argue, may appear safer, but may disarm critical 
theory. The practices may become more ad hoc and small bore. In 
certain contexts, though, this may be for the better. In any event, these 
new formations have been increasingly deployed. 
#6.  Jam the System 
Another direction is to disrupt, to cause chaos, to jam the 
system—perhaps in a less constructive way than assemblies or social 
movements. It can take many forms, but is captured well today, for 
instance, by denial of service attacks and other forms of hacking.216 This 
approach is traditionally associated with marginalized and disempowered 
populations. It has been theorized by James C. Scott (1990) under the 
umbrella of infrapolitics and ordinary acts of resistance.  
Infrapolitics is, according to Scott, the space of struggle of the 
non-elites and involves “surreptitious resistance.”217 It is, for instance, 
“poaching and squatting on a large scale that restructures the control of 
property, or peasant tax evasion, or massive desertion by serfs or 
peasant-conscripts bringing down a regime.”218 These are down-to-earth, 
low-profile stratagems designed to minimize appropriation. In the case of 
slaves, these stratagems have typically included “theft; pilfering; 
feigning ignorance; shirking or careless labor; foot-dragging; secret trade 
and production of – for sale; sabotage of crops, livestock, and 
machinery; arson; flight; etcetera.”219 We are talking about the mob and 
the riot, the moral economy of the English crowd, in E. P. Thompson’s 
terms. Scott argues that these stratagems of infrapolitics are a 
foundational form of politics. They are “the building block for the more 
elaborate institutionalized political action that could not exist without 
it.”220 They reflect the situation of being cornered, dominated, powerless 
in the face of an all-powerful state with all the tools—and lashing back 
in whatever way you can. 
On a personal note, this is the place where I have found myself 
for the past three decades as counsel for death row inmates in Alabama. 
It is a space where the opponent—the state’s chief law enforcement 
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officer, the attorney general—has all the power. Where opposing counsel 
can even, and often does, write the judicial opinions for the judges. 
Where your opponent effectively controls the judiciary, the executive, 
and the legislature, and exercises practically unfettered punitive authority 
over condemned inmates who, by contrast, are despised by all and 
viewed as pariah. What can one do, cornered in this way? Often, all you 
can do is jam the system. Yes, of course, you can try to get the 
legislature to enact reform—that will not get you far, or more likely 
backfire. You can file well-written and thoroughly researched briefs in 
state and federal courts—but that too will not get you very far. You can 
try to organize and seize power—but you are so disempowered, it is 
highly unlikely you will succeed. So, you have little alternative but to 
find ways to poke a stick in the wheel. There are few other option. 
Sometimes, all you can do is jam the system. 
And that—throwing sand in the gears—can take many form, 
including the traditional liberal legal strategies of mounting legal 
challenges, making media appearances, trying to influence public 
opinion, marching in the streets, writing editorials, and so on. It may 
mean teaming up with liberals. Working with the ACLU on challenges to 
the Muslim Ban or on finding ways to protect DACA. Or swaying a 
moderate republican not to vote down universal healthcare. It has many 
uncomfortable dimensions—uncomfortable because you feel like you’ve 
sold out or that you have become reformist, or worse, are legitimating 
the system. But the fact is, in a time like ours, conventional legal 
challenges have been successful at jamming the works. 
The resulting forms of praxis can take many shapes, from radical 
forms of political disobedience to strategic deployments of critical legal 
practice. The approach calls for an openness to different forms of 
resistance, particularly in different political contexts—at times engaging 
in disobedience or insubordination, in disruptive occupations, or 
breaking silence, at other times critically deploying legal rights, or 
disrupting the normalcy of life.221 
For the longest time, I was troubled by the fact that many of my 
own political interventions drew on conventional liberal legal methods. 
In the death penalty context, for instance, or more recently, in 
challenging President Trump’s Muslim ban, I have often been concerned 
that my own practices, relying mostly on civil and political rights, have 
been merely palliative efforts, mere reformism in effect, or worse, served 
to bolster or uphold or legitimize the legal structures that were in 
question—concerned that I was merely protecting rights and not doing 
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substantive justice, in the sense that Marx argued so powerfully in On 
the Jewish Question. I have often struggled to understand how my 
practical engagements differed from purely liberal reformism and 
approximated critical praxis. 
But from the perspective of counter-critical theory, I now see that 
deploying liberal legal weapons, even traditional civil rights, among 
other strategies, does not simply promote or protect the existing 
framework, but more fundamentally challenges the punitive state. I’ve 
spent decades using the state’s weapons to prevent the state from 
executing my clients—from exercising its full power in a situation where 
the state is at its most powerful: where the state faces down, most often, 
an impoverished and despised man or woman, who has confessed to 
murder, has no resources whatsoever, and no one to turn to. It is the 
ultimate confrontation of a Goliath state at its most mighty—in the realm 
of crime and punishment, in the unquestioned space of security and 
policing—with an entirely subjugated individual, isolated in solitary 
confinement, on a desperate path since the moment he or she was born. 
This should be quick work for the state. A swift display of power. And 
yet, the litigation takes place as a power struggle, as an ordeal, with the 
condemned prisoner using every weapon they can get their hands on—
including those from the register of liberalism. In the end, the critical 
deployment of civil rights is another form of critical praxis. 
#7. Organize Political Parties 
Another direction for critical praxis is to organize politically in a 
more conventional fashion in order to pursue critical theoretic goals. 
Along these lines, political organizing operates through political parties 
and trade unions, and it resembles the basic strategies of leftist political 
parties. This approach has become increasingly visible in the United 
States in the wake of the campaign of Bernie Sanders for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 2016. The surprise victory of Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez in the Democratic primary for the Fourteenth 
Congressional District in the Bronx, New York, for the 2018 midterms, 
gave momentum to the Democratic Socialists of America party. In 
France, Jean-Luc Mélenchon rallied leftists behind a new populist and 
social democratic party he founded in 2016, La France insoumise, which 
advocates a constitutional convention and the creation of a new republic 
that would transform the private ownership of capital. In Spain, Pablo 
Iglesias founded in 2014 a leftist populist party, Podemos, that has 
challenged European austerity measures and become one of the 
country’s largest political parties. 
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Some critical theorists rally behind even more centrist leftist 
parties, such as the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Democratic 
Party in the United States, or the French Socialist Party. In effect, the 
idea here is that the political ambitions are set by critical theory, but that 
the practical implementation follows more conventional political 
strategies of electoral politics. This approach may feel conventional, 
even non-critical, but if it is deployed in furtherance of critical 
objectives, there is no reason that it could not be considered an 
instrumental critical practice.  
#8.  Secede 
Another course involves secession. We have seen this strategy 
deployed in the Catalan recently, but also in the United States, with 
Calexit and other movements to seceded from the union. The thrust here 
is not to create a secessionist isolated cell along more insurrectional 
lines, but rather to redefine borders in order to create a community more 
compatible with one’s own values. 
Often, the secessionist approach is insular: one region, or one 
state, or one people call for secession. However, it need not be. One 
could imagine, for instance, an effort in the United States to break up the 
country into more politically homogenous and coherent units—in the 
same way in which the former Czechoslovakian Republic was broken up 
into different countries. The idea would be for different regions of the 
country to all agree to govern themselves separately—in effect to agree 
to disagree about the major political issues and policies of the day. 
The fact is, some Americans believe deeply and earnestly in 
private health care, gun ownership rights, pro-life values, the death 
penalty, and closed borders. Other Americans believe sincerely and 
profoundly in universal health care, public education, gun control, 
unions, refuge, and family choice. The cleavages between these different 
values and views of society may simply become too deep at some point, 
and citizens may decide to effectively sort themselves into two or more 
sovereign states based on popular referenda. One could imagine, for 
example, separate sovereign states in the U.S.—and this would be a 
matter of popular decision-making—such as New England, the Republic 
of Texas, the Republic of California, the Southern States, the American 
Heartland, Native Lands, among other sovereignties. 
The underlying practice would involve creating more 
homogenous units, in terms of values and ideals, in order to approximate 
more rapidly the new critical horizon. 
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#9.  Take A Polyvalent Approach  
Other critical theorists embrace polyvalent forms of resistance—
finding allies, embracing different strategies, but not dictating one 
approach on others. In the face of newly empowered alt-right movements 
and the constant attack on minorities—from Muslims, to 
#BlackLivesMatter activists, to immigrants, to trans* persons—multiple 
forms of resistance may be necessary and none, perhaps, should be off 
the table. Form assemblies and jam the system. Or be insurrectional and 
secessionist. Try to enjoin the Muslim ban, occupy and assemble, 
organize, protest, and poke a stick in the wheel. These may all be 
important weapons, and there may be no reason to exclude any. 
Talal Asad argues for more polyvalent forms of political 
engagement that contest authority at different levels or, in his words, that 
would “address numerous overlapping bodies and territories.”222 This 
would mean not always seeing conflict and aiming resistance at the same 
target—at times focusing on matters of national citizenship, at others of 
religious faith, and still at others of local governance. Asad reminds us of 
the remark Foucault made in the context of the Iranian Revolution: 
“Concerning the expression ‘Islamic government,’ why cast immediate 
suspicion on the adjective ‘Islamic’? The word ‘government’ suffices, in 
itself, to awaken vigilance.”223 It is vigilance across the board that would 
be called for—without any specific privilege to tradition, to the national, 
or to the local: multiple different strategies of resistance at various 
different levels. Here then are Tala Asad’s words: 
The idea of numerous nonhierarchical domains of 
normativity opens up the possibility of a very 
different kind of politics—and policies—that would 
always have to address numerous overlapping 
bodies and territories. Procedures to deal with 
differences and disagreements would include civil 
pressure directed against authorities, such as civil 
disobedience, to make officeholders accountable. 
But the differences would not take the form of a 
legal distinction between citizen and alien, or 
between Muslim and non-Muslim. The tradition of 
amr bi-l-ma’ruf could form an orientation of mutual 
care of the self, based on the principle of friendship 
(and therefore of responsibility to and between 
friends) not on the legal principle of citizenship. 
This sharing would be the outcome of continuous 
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work between friends or lovers, not an expression 
of accomplished cultural fact. The same tradition 
might find its way to collective acts of protest 
against excessive power (and so there have to be 
notions of power’s temporalities and bounds). There 
would be neither the power nor the technical ability 
of state apparatuses to impose a single legal 
authority or to deploy an institutionalized force. The 
risk of a military force being formed to create an 
exclusive territorial body would have to be met not 
merely by constitutional barriers but also by the 
work of tradition in the formation, maintenance, and 
repair of selves who are bonded to one another.224 
As critical theorists today, then, we face a wide array of avenues 
for critical praxis. The question becomes, how do we move forward?  
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Chapter 10: The Trouble with Violence 
In reimagining praxis, critical theory immediately confronts the 
problem of violence: Is it possible to advocate physically violent 
practices when the core values of critical theory are equity, compassion, 
and respect? If a reconstructed critical horizon arcs toward a pure theory 
of values, then how can critical praxis involve violent revolution or 
insurrection?  
In reaction to black bloc protesters who destroyed property at an 
anti-fascist demonstration in Berkeley in 2017, Judith Butler condemned 
the violence. “The turn to violence,” Butler wrote, “further destroys hope 
and augments the violence of the world, undoing the livable world.”225 
Instead of violence or insurrection, Butler embraced an ethics of love. 
Others as well have turned to King, Gandhi, and the tradition of 
nonviolent resistance in order to avoid such problems. The line of 
physical violence serves to demarcate peaceful assemblies, social 
movements, and political organizing from vanguard revolution, 
separatist insurrections, and certain forms of political disobedience. For 
many critical theorists today, especially given the demise of a Marxist 
philosophy of history, that bright line determines what is and is not 
acceptable practice.  
The trouble is that once again we face an illusion: the very 
concept of violence that we traditionally employ is a construct of liberal 
theory that embeds a particular vision of society. The ways that we 
typically think of violence—both in terms of the distinction between 
physically-violent versus physically non-violent actions, and between 
physical and property damage versus non-violent actions—are the 
product of the liberal conception of state power and liberty. As a result, 
they are loaded with particular libertarian values. 
This presents a real quagmire and is difficult to unpack. The 
future of critical praxis would be a lot simpler if critical theory could just 
ignore the problem of violence and stick with a liberal definition. But 
that would undermine the entire project of reconstructing critical theory.  
This is an area of theoretical quicksand, so I would like to caution 
readers: please be patient because the problems with violence can be 
disorienting. If they become too disorienting, please rejoin the 
conversation at Chapter 12, after I will have explored the quagmire in 
this chapter (Chapter 10) and various ways of resolving it in the next 
(Chapter 11). 
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I.    
The problem of violence actually permeates the question of 
critical praxis. Violence is not just in play in situations of armed 
resistance or insurrectional strategies. It pervades all modalities of 
resistance, even non-violent forms of organizing. Seeking change in 
society—or, for that matter, maintaining the status quo—is inherently 
violent in the sense that it necessarily entails redistributions, affects 
ownership rights, upsets educational practices, and involves political and 
economic transformation: these inevitably involve impositions of values 
on many people who do not share a critical vision of society. It will 
necessarily entail changes that will affect people’s lives, life prospects, 
and well-being. Reinstituting a robust inheritance tax in the United 
States, for instance—which is necessary—is a violent act: it is enforced 
through the penal law on threat of fines or incarceration. For the wealthy, 
it is the functional equivalent of someone taking their property; just, 
instead of having a gun at their head, they are threatened with tax 
enforcement and penal sanctions. It’s blinking reality to ignore the 
violent dimensions of social reform. From a critical theory perspective, 
the problem of violence comes up even in non-revolutionary strategies: 
transforming society (or not) necessarily entails redistributions that are 
inherently coercive. 
Liberal theory does not need to confront this problem, because it 
defines the contours of violence in limited ways and claims not to be 
imposing values on others. On the liberal view, violence is cabined 
essentially to disobeying the law, damaging private property, or 
physically harming others. The liberal concept of violence is what allows 
liberal theorists to avoid the hard questions of violence.  
I. 
Since Hobbes and Locke, the liberal tradition has narrowly 
defined violence as the illegitimate interference with the legitimate 
pursuits of other individuals. “Force or fraud,” “coercion and 
misrepresentation”: these are the exceptional circumstances that justify 
the state’s use of force against its citizens. As long as subjects are legally 
pursuing their ends, as long as they are staying within the hedges or 
fences of law, they should not be disturbed. As long as they are not 
interfering with each other in pursuit of their personal interests, subjects 
should be left alone. 
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As Max Weber reminded us, the liberal state has the monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force. A liberal government is entitled to use 
legitimate force, even physical violence, to prevent subjects from getting 
into each other’s way or harming each other. It is precisely getting in 
each other’s way, in fact, that is conventionally defined as crime—either 
a crime of violence or a property offense. State enforcement of the law, 
by contrast, even the use of lethal force or capital punishment, is not 
viewed as illegitimate violence. On the liberal view, in essence, violence 
is conceptualized as individuals getting in each other’s way, whereas 
state policing and enforcement of the laws is not considered violent. 
These are, respectively, illegitimate and legitimate forms of coercion. 
In the liberal scheme, then, the problem of violence is limited to 
interpersonal acts of aggression and property damage—on the model of 
street crime. The laws themselves never do violence to individuals, 
unless they are misapplied or violated. Economic conditions do no 
violence to people. The accumulation of capital does no violence to 
people. Violence—or, more technically, “illegitimate violence”—is 
limited to actions of subjects against each other or against the state. 
(Hobbes went somewhat further, regarding the latter, and argued that any 
and all resistance to the sovereign would amount to rebellion.226) 
This narrow definition of violence effectively masks all the 
potential violence that the state or economic conditions might administer 
onto subjects. So, for instance, the failure to maintain proper water 
utilities in Flint, Michigan, from 2014 to 2016, which resulted in the 
exposure of thousands of children and over 100,000 residents to lead 
contamination and potential brain damage, was not violent, strictly 
speaking, on the liberal view. The 2008 economic meltdown and the 
collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market, which resulted in tens 
of thousands of Americans losing their jobs, health insurance, homes, 
and retirement savings, with potentially devastating health consequences 
for many, were not violent according to the liberal view. These forms of 
harm are masked by the liberal definition of violence. None of them fall 
in the neat category of one subject using force or fraud against another or 
of a state actor illegitimately using force. The fact is, however, they are 
systemic forms of violence that may actually cause more physical harm 
overall than all property crimes combined. 
Arguably, liberal theorists could stretch the bounds and argue that 
the Flint water crisis or the 2008 financial crisis included actionable 
misrepresentations. It might even be possible, if there was malicious 
intent or extreme negligence, to imagine possible prosecutions—and 
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some commentators have argued for that. There is nothing absolutely 
preventing it. But the fact is, from the dominant or mainstream liberal 
perspective, those are not incidents that would typically be called 
“violence.” And that’s because violence is limited to the interpersonal, to 
the model of one subject interfering with another’s pursuit of their liberty 
or enjoyment of their property, or to the state ultra vires. It is imagined 
along the model of street crime. That’s just how violence is generally 
understood in liberal terms. 
Now, this liberal understanding of violence has significant effects 
on our political condition. Just as the illusion of liberalism naturalizes 
political outcomes and renders them legitimate as, for instance, the 
product of merit, the narrow definition of violence also produces its own 
illusions that naturalize political outcomes. It gives rise, for instance, to 
the impression that interpersonal physical violence is somehow far more 
serious, in kind and degree, than the harm produced by economic 
conditions—even when the latter may be quantitatively far worse in 
scope. The first calls for state intervention; the second does not. The 
liberal state focuses its police and enforcement powers on common law 
crimes, but ignores, and thereby shields and protects from criticism and 
oversight, economic harm. This means that the state focuses aggressively 
on street crime, and ignores economic exchange even when the latter 
produces detrimental health and personal outcomes. This then produces 
what has been called “neoliberal penality”: the paradox of mass 
incarceration and a strong police state on questions of common law 
crimes, but laissez faire in the area of political economy.227 
III. 
Critical theory challenged the liberal conception of violence. 
Under the rubric of a “critique of violence”—from Walter Benjamin’s 
through Derrida’s The Force of Law to Zizek’s essays on Violence—
critics have questioned the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force and the narrow liberal definition of violence. These critiques often 
begin with a critique of the state, which then, naturally, exposes the 
violence of the state. 
Benjamin began, for instance, with a clear denunciation of the 
legitimacy of state force. The liberal theoretic conception of violence 
rests on a very limited, state-centric notion of violence, Benjamin 
argued. The use of lethal force by the police is not violence on the liberal 
view, but rather the justified use of force; violence tends to be limited to 
unlawful (not falling within a legal justification, such as necessity) 
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applications of physical force, deliberately and directly applied.228 In this 
way, the liberal definition of violence excludes violent actions of the 
state that are justified: the death penalty, law enforcement, police or 
military actions, or self-defense.229 Political violence becomes either 
ultra vires action by the state or a state agent, or most of the time, 
practically all the violence of individuals. 
Benjamin and other critics of violence then expanded the 
category of violence to include more ordinary power struggles in both 
the public and personal realm: to broaden the notion of violence to 
include the effects of poverty, lack of health care, discrimination, 
domestic relations, etc. This is the idea of “objective violence,” which 
Zizek defines, by contrast to “subjective” or interpersonal physical 
violence, as the forms of systemic violence that have no identifiable 
authors, but pervade our world, hidden or masked by all the subjective 
violence that we so easily identify. It is the idea in Benjamin that 
extortion, or means-ends rationality, is itself a form of violence. The idea 
that violence pervades ordinary relations of state and citizen, as well as 
the interpersonal. It is structural. It is pervasive. It suffuses our relations 
of power. 
Foucault, notably, developed this critique using the metaphor of 
civil war. As opposed to the Hobbesian idea of a “war of all against all” 
ending with the establishment of public order, Foucault sought to 
reinstate the notion of civil war within the Hobbesian commonwealth. 
Civil war, for Foucault, is not the collapse of a political union that would 
plunge us back into a state of nature. It is not opposed to political power, 
but rather constitutes and reconstitutes it. Civil war is, in his words, “a 
matrix within which the elements of power come to play, reactivate, 
dissociate.” Political relations must be thought through the prism of war: 
“The important thing for an analysis of penality is to see that power is 
not what eliminates civil war, but what leads and continues it.” 
In an important letter dated December 1972, Foucault wrote to 
Daniel Defert that he had begun to analyze social relations on the basis 
of “the most denigrated of wars: not Hobbes, nor Clausewitz, nor class 
struggle, but civil war.”230 This notion of civil war and the related 
concepts of discipline and delinquency are keystones to his theory of 
power-knowledge. The idea of civil war, for Foucault, marked a break 
with previous analyses—notably those that deploy the concepts of 
repression, exclusion, and transgression—and a turn to the productive 
functions of civil strife. 
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The critiques of violence, then, begin to see violence everywhere. 
Benjamin, for instance, even identified violence in the legal, non-violent 
action of the striking worker. Zizek makes a similar move in the first of 
his “sideways reflections” on Violence: to expose the symbolic and 
structural forms of violence that surround us every day—not only in state 
relations, but with each other. These do not have the typical physical 
trappings of physically violent acts. Violence here is the economic 
system that imposes early death on the poor and unemployed. Violence 
is the coercive dimensions of the free market. Violence is the gender 
norms that produce domination, and the racial stereotypes that aggress 
persons of color. 
In this way, violence extends, even beyond state action, to our 
ordinary social interactions. It becomes possible to see how much 
violence it takes to maintain an ordered society. This is where Sartre, 
Benjamin, and Foucault come together. By placing existential freedom 
above everything else, and social relations as limits on our freedom, 
Sartre too imagined violence in practically all social interactions. As the 
tape recorder plays, at the bitter end of The Condemned of Altona: 
The century might have been a good one had not 
man been watched from time immemorial by the 
cruel enemy who had sworn to destroy him, that 
hairless, evil, flesh-eating beast—man himself. One 
and one make one—there’s our mystery.231 
For Sartre, in a world marked by scarcity, all actions that are 
antagonistically related to the projects of other men are violent. Along 
these lines, physical violence is no different than conceptual 
mystification or non-physical acts of protest or liberation.232 Sartre broke 
down the distinctions between public and private, between state and 
citizen, between the personal and political, in order to argue that we are 
all necessarily implicated in a violent struggle for existence and 
betterment in a world marked by scarcity. 233 
The violence that surrounds us: Marx saw it well and described it 
for us in his discussion of “Primitive Accumulation”—all the policing it 
takes to begin to accumulate capital. Weber at times as well. He 
described the grueling discipline, military and industrial, necessary to 
mold the men and women to a Protestant ethic. Foucault especially, who 
minutely detailed the timetables, grids, measured movements, and 
repetitions necessary to produce the docile body of the Industrial 
Revolution. Recall the earlier passage about the accumulation of bodies 
necessary for the accumulation of capital. In the nineteenth century, 
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Foucault reminds us, we learned not to punish less, but to punish 
better—without leaving traces on the body, without disfiguring beauty 
with brutality, without showing the violence. 
There is so much violence hidden today, veiled behind a polished 
veneer. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of the tiniest few who 
accumulate it beyond any possible imaginable use, while others roam the 
streets destitute and begging—literally sleeping on the pavement. The 
poor police their own neighborhoods and guard their brothers and sisters 
behind bars. But we do not see it. We do not want to see it. We so 
desperately do not want to see it that we tell ourselves stories about our 
own ingenuity and enterprise, about the virtues of hard work, about the 
American dream. We lavish attention on the few lucky ones who escaped 
their lot and made it to the top. We praise the sweat and tears of those 
who turned their lives around. And we refine elaborate political theories 
of liberalism that privilege individual responsibility, self-sacrifice, and 
self-interest: liberal theories that claim to be entirely neutral as to the 
good life and to set forth only procedural rights and rules that would 
allow each and every one of us to pursue our ambitions freely and 
unhindered by the other. We build an intricate politics on the foundation 
of individualism, independence, merit, and responsibility. We construct a 
line around physical violence. What an illusion! Perhaps the most 
sophisticated, politically. They go hand in hand: the illusion of liberal 
legalism and the illusion of violence. The amount of hidden violence, of 
violence we do not even see, that is necessary to maintain urban, 
suburban, or rural existence is frightening.  
But once critical theory exposes the illusions, the world becomes 
much more complicated. There is far more violence that surrounds us, to 
begin with. There is harm all around—not just in the physical violence 
that takes place domestically and on the streets, but in the economic 
structures and property relations. The Millian harm principle, that most 
intuitive of all liberal principles, is of no avail; it only served as a 
limiting principle to government action where there was harm, but now 
we notice harm almost everywhere. There isn’t a way out using the rule 
of law, since laws necessarily impose values and redistribute resources. 
Even our own actions appear violent now. They inevitably impose a 
particular vision on others. They cannot not affect others. In a society 
where relations of power are correctly mapped onto civil strife, it is 
impossible to act without confronting others. We are inevitably violent 
ourselves. 
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In part, we have become better at identifying violence. We have 
learned to talk about racial micro-aggressions. We have begun to 
document police killings. We have stopped thinking—for the most 
part—that marital rape is just part of the marital bargain. We’ve started 
to notice campus rape. We’ve begun to understand that imposing our 
values will do violence to others. It makes little sense to quantitatively 
compare the amount of violence today to that in other periods in history 
or other centuries or places234—such as, for instance, mid-twentieth 
century Europe or even the Middle Ages—since the legibility of violence 
has changed over time. (Also, more often than not, we construct those 
earlier periods in order to make ourselves look more enlightened. We 
create museums of inquisitorial torture instruments filled with fakes and 
strange imaginations from the 18th century.) No, if we honestly look 
around us today, there is no doubt we are surrounded by violence. 
As critical theorists, we now see the violence in ways that we did 
not see it before. It has become more legible at both the local and the 
global. We see the violence and brutality of disciplinary actions. This is, 
in part, the effect of Foucault’s work—perhaps the first genuine 
“Foucault effect,” before governmentality. We now see how routine 
forms of discipline displace the overtly corporal in order to control us 
better—we now recognize discipline’s violence. We see the violence that 
we inflict on our brothers and sisters trying—as we and our parents 
did—to better their lives. 
On the liberal view, so much of this is hidden by the harm 
principle and notions of physical harm—and so many of us default back 
to the physical/non-physical violence distinction, even the most critical 
among us. We so often end up privileging the physicality of harm, 
somehow. We are just wedded to it, practically unable to see past it. But 
critical theory has always resisted and tried to expose the forms of 
violence that surround us: the excessive accumulation of private property 
(and its police enforcement), residential patterns that are no more than 
racial segregation now imposed by real estate values, the evisceration of 
public education, the two fists of the state, workfare and mass 
incarceration. It takes remarkable amounts of violence, tucked away, to 
maintain this peaceful existence of ours. Critical theory has taught us that 
there is no non-violent way of proceeding—that all political 
interventions are necessarily violent, that the matrix of social relations is 
civil strife, or class struggle, or racial, or gender conflict. 
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IV.  
Things become doubly complicated when we recognize the 
potential pleasure in violence—the dark side of humanity, a touchstone 
of critical theory—as well as the possible productivity of violence. Here, 
the quicksand almost suffocates.  
It is practically always to Nietzsche that we turn when we raise 
these issues. To Nietzsche and his fellow travelers, before and after him. 
To the Marquis de Sade, to the film director, Pier Paolo Passolini, to 
writers like Georges Bataille or Jean Genet. To that disturbing literary 
strand that extolls the dark side of humanity, the human underbelly. One 
can almost hear them laughing at all this—all this discomfort with 
cruelty, all this squeamishness. What a waste of time and energy, and 
how weak, they might say. Our discomfort simply reflects a slavish 
morality, the fact of our own frailty. Nietzsche, Passolini, Bataille—they 
line up far better with civil war: expect torture, understand that it is part 
of the process, anticipate it, prepare for it, know it, and use it yourself. 
Don’t imagine a time without torture, violence, and cruelty. 
“Let us not become gloomy as soon as we hear the word 
‘torture,’” Friedrich Nietzsche advised in his meditations On the 
Genealogy of Morals in 1887; “there is plenty to offset and mitigate that 
word [torture]—even something to laugh at.”235 Nietzsche reminded us 
of the ugly truth: men often take pleasure in cruelty and torture. In fact, 
there has rarely been a time without them. To make suffer, Nietzsche 
observed, can be “in the highest degree pleasurable,” and 
“fundamentally,” he added, “this world has never since lost a certain 
odor of blood and torture.”236 Pain and suffering have always functioned 
well for us, in one way or another. “Man could never do without blood, 
torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for 
himself.”237 
Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom (1785) laid the groundwork for much 
of this—confronting us, appalling us into seeing the possibility of 
obscene pleasure in pain. Sade’s novel is, as advertised, “the most 
extreme book in the history of literature.” 238  It reads in passages, 
especially in later chapters, like a numbing laundry list of sexual torture 
scenes. One could go on endlessly, the manuscript is a parade of 
horrifying violent acts presented as jouissance. The presentation tells it 
all: “the escalating sex-crimes of four libertines who barricade 
themselves in a remote castle with both male and female victims and 
accomplices for a four-month, precipitous orgy of sodomy, coprophagia 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
124 
and rape leading inexorably towards torture and human decimation.”239 
The sexual torture in Sade’s book is the extreme—presented as the 
extreme form of pleasure. 
Coprophagia—yes, look that one up in the dictionary. Or watch 
Passolini’s 1975 film, Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom, based on Sade’s 
fantasies, to see what it might look like: one of the adult male tormentors 
at his pretend wedding force feeding stool to his young male bride. 
Passolini piles onto Sade’s already shocking narrative new layers of hell 
from Dante’s Inferno, leading us after an Ante-Inferno down, rather than 
up, to the “Circles of Manias, Shit, and Blood.” Passolini’s film ends 
with the murder of most of the male and female victims in horrifying 
ways including scalping, burning, hanging—a remnant of the auto de 
fe—under the watching gaze of the four fascist libertines. Yes, torture is 
mastery, and here, utter orgasmic joy. 
The sadistic pleasure in the film is conjoined with a drive to 
legalize the violence. It is not by coincidence that Passolini places his 
Salò in fascist Italy. It symbolizes a call for order, for command 
structures and hierarchy, for uniforms and black boots, for rules, for the 
chain-of-command—for the rule of law! And the law soon becomes 
itself another form of terror: drawing the list of approved methods, 
making clear the consequences, spelling out the inquisitorial procedures. 
The legal framework contributes and enhances the torturous methods. 
Joseph Fischel has analyzed and dissected the TV series To Catch 
a Predator, and explored, phenomenologically, the feelings we 
experience when the culprit is caught, when justice is done in the face of 
a heinous offender. Fischel writes about the high we feel, the excitement, 
when the bad guy is caught. He uses an expression: “Getting just is like 
getting off.” We are, it seems, constantly in the abyss with Nietzsche. 
We can hardly escape, on any side. We are caught in the sovereignty of 
desire, not wanting to hear it, but desiring to punish it as well. We are 
caught, as Didier Fassin expressed in his Tanner Lectures, or as William 
Connolly wrote, in a desperate “will to punish.” And the truth is, this 
sovereignty of desire that we try to escape and avoid at all times, it 
explodes in every direction. 
Fassin and Connolly remind us that there is often a pleasure to 
punishment. A desire for revenge. There is a will to punish. It is like the 
will to power. It is there. It makes little sense to deny it, or ignore it. It is 
not just a will for recognition of the other. It can also be a form of 
satisfaction, of pleasure. There is a sadistic will to punish. It is reflected 
in Donald Trump’s speech, in his oratory. “In the good old days, he’d be 
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taken out in a stretcher,” Trump said, at a rally, of a heckler. “In the good 
old days,” that is a euphemism for days of more valor and masculinity 
and bare-knuckle fighting. “Let’s stop being politically correct”: that is a 
coded way of being permissive or even enjoying the violence. 
 Nietzsche also reveals, not just our pleasure in violence, but the 
productivity of violence—all the work that it does. To deny or ignore or 
sideline all that would be dishonest. Another illusion. It has to be 
discussed and recognized, at the very least. Because it functions so 
powerfully in real life, and has functioned so often in history. History is 
just littered with the productivity of violence. How could one imagine 
escaping that history? 
As I argued in The Counterrevolution, violence and terror have 
been extremely productive, historically. They serve to terrorize the 
revolutionary insurgents, to scare them to death, and to frighten as well 
the general population in order to prevent them from joining the 
insurgent faction. The use of torture or “enhanced” interrogation 
methods, the targeted drone assassination of high-value suspects, the 
indefinite detention under inhuman conditions—these are a show of 
strength, a demonstration of who is in control, who will protect better, 
who has the resolve to win, or the barbarity to prevail. They not only 
eviscerate the enemy, they also alarm others into submission and 
obedience, into fidelity. Terrorizing is an essential and inescapable part 
of winning: Fear, trembling, terror, these constitute an essential strategy 
of the counterrevolution. The waterboard is no mere torture. It is instead 
a terrorizing technique intended to crush with deadly fear those it 
touches, and strike with terror anyone else who might even imagine 
sympathizing with the revolutionary minority. In effect, these techniques 
do much more work. They display a mastery that appeals and seduces 
the masses. They delimit and delineate what it means to be free, who is 
good and evil. They legitimize the guardian class, even the entire 
ideological system. They strike the fear of death in the hearts of the 
enemy—and one’s own people. Torture, throughout history, has always 
done far more than what is expected of it. It has always done so much 
work. One might even go so far as to say that violence is the linchpin of 
the counterrevolution. It alone, through all of its productivity, is what 
conquers the hearts and minds of the masses. 
These violent practices exude a will to mastery. If anything, they 
call to mind that “life-and-death struggle,” that “trial by death” 240 that 
Hegel identified at the heart of his phenomenology of human existence, 
and that Alexandre Kojève in the next century placed as the touchtone of 
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Hegel’s thought. Hegel recognized this will to mastery as an essential 
driving force in human development. As a foundational step, motivated 
by a deep need for recognition and a drive to conquer the other. The deep 
desire for recognition by others, on this account, is laced with violence 
and tied to this struggle to the death. 
A trial to the death that achieves mastery and functions by 
instilling the deepest fear, terror, into the heart of the other: In that 
moment of near death, the subject is gripped with a fear of death, with a 
fear “not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its 
whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear 
of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite 
unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid 
and stable has been shaken to its foundations.”241 Hegel was, here, 
speaking of the struggle to the death between master and slave, between 
lord and bondsman. He was speaking of terror, precisely—about that 
trembling feeling and the fright and the flight. As Adriana Cavarero 
reminds us, in her book Horrorism, the word “terror” traces back 
etymologically precisely to “the physical experience of fear as 
manifested in the trembling body,” “making it tremble and compelling it 
to take flight.”242 We are, with Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, at the very 
heart of terror. 
Violence manifests this will to mastery, to prevail, to dominate. 
These can be important in political struggle. They are surely important in 
warfare. “Warring,” Georges Bataille reminds us, is nothing else than 
“the unleashed desire to kill.”243 They are also important to ethics. This 
is the “Nietzschean view that life is essentially bound up with destruction 
and suffering,” in Judith Butler’s words.244 Writing in the wake of these 
traditions—from Sade to Nietzsche—Maurice Blanchot reminded us of 
the deep ethical dimensions here: that our lives are “founded on absolute 
solitude as a first given fact.”245 As Blanchot explained in Lautréamont 
et Sade, the Marquis de Sade reminded us, “over and over again in 
different ways that we are born alone, there are no links between one 
man and another.”246 The result would be a unique ethic—perhaps not 
one we would all subscribe to, but an ethic nonetheless: “The greatest 
suffering of others always counts for less than my own pleasure. What 
matter if I must purchase my most trivial satisfaction through a fantastic 
accumulation of wrongdoing? For my satisfaction gives me pleasure, it 
exists in myself, but the consequences of crime do not touch me, they are 
outside me.”247 How far off is this from self-interest, so valued in liberal 
thought since the eighteenth century, one might ask? What Nietzsche 
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ultimately revealed, alongside Sade and later Bataille and Passolini, 
more than most, is the darker side of our psyche, the unsavory dimension 
of the will to power, the desire for recognition, the ambition of mastery. 
In sum, the productivity of violence. 
This reminds me of a passage from Bataille’s personal diaries in 
about April or May 1944—that he published shortly thereafter as part of 
his Summa athéologica: Sur Nietzsche. It starts with an account of torture 
in the news pages of the Petit Parisien, April 27, 1944. “From a news 
item on torture,” he starts writing: “eyes gouged out, ears and nails torn 
off, the head cracked open through repeated butcher blows, the tongue 
cut off with pincers…”248 
“As a child,” he continues, “the very idea of torture turned my 
life into a burden…” “I do not, still today, know how I would endure 
it…” “The earth today,” Bataille goes on, “is covered by flowers—lilacs, 
wisteria, irises—and the war at the same time is buzzing and humming: 
hundreds of planes fill the nights with the sound of mosquitoes.”249 A 
few paragraphs later, Bataille jots down, “the carnage, the fire, the 
horror: this is what we can expect in the coming weeks, it seems to 
me.”250 “Seen today, from afar, the smoke of a fire in the vicinity of 
A.”251 
Next paragraph: “Meanwhile, these last few days count among 
the best of my life. So many flowers everywhere! The light is so 
beautiful and incredibly high…” 
And then, the next: “The sovereignty of desire, of anguish, is the 
hardest idea to hear.” 
Should we hear it—this sovereignty of desire? Should we listen 
to this “hardest idea to hear”? Should we allow ourselves to listen, 
especially when it is so troubling? So repulsive at times? So 
unacceptable? Bombs are falling. Warplanes are buzzing. The Final 
Solution is at its apex. And these are among “the best days of my life”? 
That, I take it, is utterly unbearable… and yet, there it is. 
And at this point, critical theory is really disarmed, it would 
seem. The critique of violence really only unmasks us, and our violence, 
and our pleasures nonetheless. It unmasks the productivity of violence—
its productivity throughout history. To ignore this would be blinking 
reality. It would be falling dupe to another illusion. The fact is, violence 
has been an extremely productive force throughout human history, since 
antiquity at least.   
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V. 
Sophocles’ tragedy, Oedipus the King, has captured our 
imagination for centuries on questions of destiny, power, and sexuality. 
But it is perhaps on the question of violence that the tragedy turns. At the 
heart of Sophocles’ Oedipus, at the pivotal moment where truth finally 
emerges for all to see and all to recognize, at the decisive passage that 
turns tragic, at the instant of the peripeteia, there is a torture scene: 
[1265] Oedipus:  So, you won’t talk willingly—then 
you’ll talk with pain. 
The guards seize the shepherd 
Shepherd:  No, dear god, don’t torture an old man! 
[…] I wish to god I’d died that day. 
Oedipus:  You’ve got your wish if you don’t tell the 
truth. 
Shepherd: The more I tell, the worse the death I’ll 
die. [1275] 
[1280] Oedipus: You’re a dead man if I have to ask 
again. […] 
Shepherd: Oh no, I’m right at the edge, the horrible 
truth—I’ve got to say it! 
Hidden in plain view, at the very heart of Sophocles’ play, there 
is the threat of torturous death that alone—at the culmination of a whole 
series of unsuccessful inquiries—produces the truth: it is torture that 
elicits the shepherd’s confession. It is violence that allows Oedipus to 
recognize his fate. But more than that, it is violence that reaffirms the 
order in Thebes, that reestablishes harmony in ancient Greece. 
The social order is restored and set aright when Oedipus finally 
recognizes this “horrible truth.” Violence produces truth in Sophocles’ 
tragedy, but more than that, it constitutes and reestablishes the social 
order of antiquity—a social order where gods rule, oracles tell truth, 
prophets divine, fateful kings govern, and slaves serve.252 The structure 
of Sophocles’ play—in parallel with the structure of the investigation 
that Oedipus leads—reflects the three-part hierarchy of ancient Greece: 
the divine realm of gods and prophets; the sovereign realm of kings and 
queens; and the ordinary realm of the people, here the messenger from 
Corinth and the slave. That social order had been upended by Oedipus 
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defying his fate—but not only Oedipus, by Jocasta as well; it is only 
through the torture of the servant that the truth of Oedipus’ crimes are 
known and the just rule of the gods reestablished. 
Torture is the productive force that reveals the truth in Oedipus. 
The prophet Tiresias had exposed Oedipus in his cryptic way, but had 
not been believed, neither by Oedipus nor by the choir—who could trust 
an angry soothsayer? Creon and Jacosta had said enough to render bare 
Oedipus’ guilt, but they too had done so in a way that was not entirely 
convincing to the choir or the king himself. It was only in the third 
iteration, with those of lowest social rank—the ordinary pleb, the 
servants and workers—that the truth would emerge. But it would only 
emerge by means of torture. As Page DuBois argues in her monograph 
on slavery and torture in Greek antiquity, Torture and Truth, the idea of 
truth we hold so dear today in Western thought is indissolubly tied to the 
practices of torture and violence. In ancient times as today, violence can 
function as the metaphorical touchstone of truth and simultaneously as 
the means to establish social hierarchy and difference.253 
Throughout history, violence has enabled and fueled political 
economic regimes and artistic progress. The medieval period was shaped 
by practices of confiscation. Confiscation threads through the entire 
history of the inquisitions. Confiscation was a central element of the 
edicts of King Peter II of Aragon in 1197, Pope Innocent III’s Vergentis 
in senium in 1199, and the various decrees of Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick II from 1220 to 1232.254 The construction of empires was built 
on these violent practices. This is reflected as well in Foucault’s analysis 
of the political economy of feudal law in Théories et institutions 
pénales.255 Foucault integrates confiscation as part of a much larger 
political economy of criminal justice that became, during the high 
middle ages, a primary space for the circulation of riches. These 
practices and effects, it seems, extend well into the present, and shape 
our political condition. The parallels between the judicial invention of 
confiscation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, on the one hand, and 
the parallel with the contemporary use of criminal fines in small 
municipalities like Ferguson, Missouri—where criminal fines represent 
the second largest municipal revenue—should not escape us. 
The point is, in all this, that the experience of violence organizes 
much of civil life, and to ignore it is to put on blinders—or worse, to 
willingly embrace an illusion. Violence is, tragically, extremely 
productive. That is a key lesson of critical theory. 
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Chapter 11: A Way Forward 
Critical theory reveals the naïve way that we so often speak about 
violence. It unveils the pervasiveness of violence that surrounds us. It 
exposes even, at times, the pleasure in violence, and the productivity of 
violence. But once we unveil and understand that our political condition 
is an endless struggle, how can we reconcile critical praxis with the core 
critical values of compassion and respect? What is the way forward for a 
renewed critical praxis? 
The logical place to turn for an answer would be to start with the 
very critiques of violence that have helped us get to where we are 
today—cognizant, that is, of all the violence that surrounds us. These 
critiques not only expose violence; they also offer justifications of 
violence. Maybe they could offer some guidance on how to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate violence. 
I.  
In the process of unveiling and redefining violence, the 
traditional critiques of violence draw distinctions and justify certain 
forms of violence. The question is whether they offer viable means to 
resolve the puzzle of violence. 
A.  Nonviolent Violence 
Walter Benjamin redefined violence in instrumental terms, as a 
practice that is used to attain an end. In the context of a worker’s strike, 
Benjamin defined a strike as “violent” when and only when it is 
deployed as a form of extortion to achieve an end, such as better wages 
or conditions—when it takes place, in his words, “in the context of a 
conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain 
circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or 
only superficially modify it.”256 In that case, the strike is “violent” 
insofar as it represents “the right to use force in attaining certain 
ends.” 257  This is the “political” strike that Benjamin discussed, as 
distinguished, originally by Sorel, from the “proletarian general strike” 
discussed next. 
By contrast, in the context of a “revolutionary general strike,” 
defined as one intended to overthrow the government, the question of 
violence became more complicated for Benjamin. This is the “proletarian 
general strike” that, as Benjamin explained, “sets itself the sole task of 
destroying state power.”258 It is viewed by the state as being violent 
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insofar as it is intended to be lawmaking—and the function of violence is 
understood to be lawmaking (or law-preserving). From the state’s 
perspective, the first strike is legal and non-violent, but this second is 
pure violence and must be repressed by violent means. 259  But for 
Benjamin, by contrast, this second proletarian strike, which falls under 
the rubric of violence and is discussed as a type of violence, is 
nevertheless “nonviolent” violence.260 Benjamin explained: 
While the first form of interruption of work is 
violent since it causes only an external modification 
of labor conditions, the second, as a pure means, is 
nonviolent. For it takes place not in readiness to 
resume work following external concessions and 
this or that modification to working conditions, but 
in the determination to resume only a wholly 
transformed work, no longer enforced by the state, 
an upheaval that this kind of strike not so much 
causes as consummates. For this reason, the first of 
these undertakings is lawmaking but the second 
anarchistic.261 
“Während die erste Form der Arbeitseinstellung Gewalt ist, da 
sie nur eine äußerliche Modifikation der Arbeitsbedingungen veranlaßt, 
so ist die zweite als ein reines Mittel gewaltlos.” In English, “While the 
first form of interruption of work is violent (Gewalt) since it causes only 
an external modification of labor conditions, the second, as pure means, 
is nonviolent (gewaltlos).”262 (291) Massimiliano Tomba refers to this as 
“nonviolent violence.”263 
Nonviolent violence: Benjamin valorized this kind of anarchistic 
strike, intended by its very action to break down the state and 
simultaneously instantiate this breakdown. It feels like pure action, or 
pure disobedience, not soiled by extortionate demands, pure in its 
intentions. It enacts a new political relation. It resembles, in many ways, 
the euphoria and enactments of the Occupy Wall Street movement:  the 
idea that the general assembly was at one and the same time both a form 
of resistance and a prefiguration of a new political relation. The 
anarchistic strike, as revolutionary movement, represents in Sorel’s 
words “a clear, simple revolt” that leaves no place for “the sociologists 
or for the elegant amateurs of social reforms or for the intellectuals who 
have made it their profession to think for the proletariat.” 264  For 
Benjamin, this is a “deep, moral, and genuinely revolutionary 
conception” that cannot be branded “violent.”265  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
133 
Benjamin characterized the “nonviolent,” following Sorel, by the 
pure revolutionary movement, by the purity of the act of resistance. 
“Sorel rejects every kind of program, of utopia—in a word, of 
lawmaking—for the revolutionary movement.” 266  Insofar as the 
anarchistic revolt seeks nothing else than the destruction of the state—
and not some kind of lawmaking—it is nonviolent. It is only “allegedly” 
violent. “[T]he violence of an action can be assessed no more from its 
effects than from its ends, but only from the law of its means,” Benjamin 
wrote. “The law of its means”: in other words, the rightness of its means. 
We must judge actions not by the justness of their ends, but from the 
rightness of their means. 
Destruction of the state—that is what Benjamin admired and 
valorized in his critique: “on the abolition of state power, a new 
historical epoch is founded.”267 Benjamin wanted to imagine an attack on 
law, believing that “revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation of 
unalloyed violence by man, is possible.”268 It is divine, destructive, 
revolutionary violence that Benjamin advocated. And so he ended: 
[A]ll mythical, lawmaking violence, which we may 
call executive, is pernicious. Pernicious, too, is the 
law-preserving, administrative violence that serves 
it. Divine violence, which is the sign and seal but 
never the means of sacred execution, may be called 
sovereign violence.269 
In this, Benjamin was close to Foucault. He was in the territory of 
relations of power modeled on matrices of civil war.270  
In sum, Benjamin favored anarchist revolutionary action that 
involves an instantiation of a self-transformative practice as opposed to a 
logic of means-and-ends. He opposed, most centrally, the state monopoly 
of violence and power, the legalistic mindset of proceduralism and 
means-ends rationality (the priority of the right over the good), as well as 
natural law oriented just ends (the priority of the good over the right). In 
this sense, he opposed the state, positive law, and natural law. He 
embraced instead forms of resistance that are law-destroying—as 
opposed to violence which he defines as lawmaking or law-preserving. 
He had in mind—he favored—a kind of “nonviolent” violence that is a 
means all to itself. Not in relation to an end, not even a just end.  
The trouble here is that we seem to be caught in time, back in the 
foundational utopian moment of critical theory. There is a tautological 
element to Benjamin’s definition of nonviolent violence: it is nonviolent 
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because it accords with his utopian vision. And insofar as we have 
overcome those foundational horizons, Benjamin’s justification of 
violence no longer functions. His notion of divine violence, that is 
destructive and not ends oriented, but aimed at the end of the state, does 
not help us if indeed we have a reconstructed critical utopia. 
Another problem is that Benjamin’s is such a cryptic 
endorsement—for the most part, few understood well what Benjamin 
really meant by “divine violence.” Even Slavoj Zizek, when he engages 
Benjamin’s critique of violence within the larger framework of his book, 
Violence, acknowledges that these pages are “dense.”271 Benjamin’s 
idea, in the end, that the type of violence that might put an end to the 
state is non-violent violence seems more mystifying, than enlightening. 
It rings of illusion. 
B.  Vanguardism 
For his part, Zizek makes a number of “sideways reflections” in 
his book on Violence. He expands the definition of violence so that it 
includes not only instances of physical violence—the type of events that 
we habitually refer to when we think of violence, such as urban riots, 
violent crime, “street crime” effectively, domestic abuse, all of which he 
refers to as “subjective violence”—but also objective and systemic 
violence. Second, he ties acts of violence to the loss of a neighbor 
relation.272 Third, he turns violence on its head to make it reveal our 
cultural selves. So the abuses at Abu Ghraib—in contrast to the brutal 
methods of the Middle Eastern interrogators—really reflect our 
American ethos more than anything else.273 
This leads to three lessons, Zizek tells us, in conclusion. First, to 
condemn violence explicitly is just ideological masking—“an ideological 
operation par excellence, a mystification which collaborates in rendering 
invisible the fundamental forms of social violence.”274 Second, it is 
harder than one thinks to be truly violent. It exhausts and takes effort to 
be truly evil.275 Third, and perhaps most puzzlingly, that the most violent 
thing to do at times is to do nothing. Voter abstention in today’s 
democracy, for instance, is really more powerful than other things, he 
claims. Those are his closing words: “If one means by violence a radical 
upheaval of the basic social relations, then, crazy and tasteless as it may 
sound, the problem with historical monsters who slaughtered millions 
was that they were not violent enough. Sometimes doing nothing is the 
most violent thing to do.”276 That final point is most puzzling, since it 
does not seem to endorse physical violence, but instead passivity as the 
most violent forms of (in)action. 
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Elsewhere, though, Zizek does seem to advocate violence. In his 
essay in the London Review of Books, “Shoplifters of the World Unite” 
from August 19, 2011, he discusses the London riots of 2011, and 
criticizes the rioters and other recent protesters (the Spanish indignados, 
the Greek protest movement, even the Arab Spring) for failing to 
articulate a program. “[T]his is the fatal weakness of recent protests,” 
Zizek writes. “They express an authentic rage which is not able to 
transform itself into a positive programme of sociopolitical change. They 
express a spirit of revolt without revolution.”277 Buried in the last line of 
the essay, Zizek calls for a vanguard party: “This is clearly not enough to 
impose a reorganization of social life. To do that, one needs a strong 
body able to reach quick decisions and to implement them with all 
necessary harshness.”278 Not so subtly, Zizek embraces his penchant for 
a Leninist vanguard party. But this too presents the same problem as 
Benjamin, then. It too is wedded to a foundational critical praxis that is 
no longer sustainable if we reconstruct critical theory.  
C. Self-transformation 
Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre explicitly advocated for 
violence. For Fanon, the violence of the wretched of the earth is a 
catharsis. Self-tranformation: that is precisely what Fanon had in mind, 
particularly when he drew on Aimé Césaire’s play, And the dogs were 
silent. In that play, the rebel is confronted by his mother, defending 
himself against the charge of barbarity for having killed his master. “I 
had dreamed of a son who would close his mother’s eyes,” his mother 
says—struck by the fate that awaits her son.279 “Spare me, I’m chocking 
from your shackles, bleeding from your wounds,” she says.280 “God in 
heaven, deliver him.”281 
The son responds: “the world does not spare me…  There is not 
in the world one single poor lynched bastard, one poor tortured man, in 
whom I am not also murdered and humiliated.”282 And then, the son goes 
on to describe the night: 
“It was a November night… 
And suddenly clamors lit up the silence, 
we had leapt, we the slaves, we the manure, we 
beasts with patient hooves. 
[…] 
The master’s bedroom was wide open. The master’s 
bedroom was brilliantly lit, and the master was 
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there, very calm…. And all of us stopped… he was 
the master…. I entered. It’s you, he said, very 
calmly…. It was me, it was indeed me, I told him, 
the good slave, the faithful slave, the slave slave, 
and suddenly my eyes were two [bugs] cockroaches 
frightened in a rainy day… I struck, the blood 
spurted: it is the only baptism that today I 
remember.”283 
That was a transformative moment of pure violence for the son, 
one that was not simply a means to some end, but in itself a pure means, 
a baptism. It was, in itself, that “cleansing force.”284 
Sartre, like Fanon, developed a dialectical understanding of 
violence as a means that would give birth to a new and better man. The 
fact that the anti-colonial rebel takes arms and is willing to die for his 
brothers and sisters means that he has overcome death and is a “dead 
man en puissance.”285 By accepting death and seizing the violent act, the 
rebel has broken the hold of scarcity, and gives his life for his fellow’s 
humanity.286 He has placed the freedom and humanity of others above 
his own existence in a Hegelian relation. And this fraternity will then 
give rise to the first institutions of peace, grounded on a praxis of 
liberation and socialist fraternity.287 
In other words, the self-transformation that attends certain violent 
acts can justify the use of violence. That, however, is hardly convincing. 
Many things may be cathartic, that does not mean they are valuable. 
What if we learned, for instance, that James Harris Jackson, the white 
Army veteran who traveled from Baltimore to New York City to kill an 
African-American, also experienced a baptismal (delusional) moment of 
rebirth when he plunged a knife into 66-year-old Timothy Caughman on 
March 20, 2017, in Chelsea, New York?288 “Since he was a boy,” we are 
told, “he has hated black men. A bitter hatred of black men that boiled in 
his mind and consumed him.”289 “Mr. Jackson was particularly offended 
by black men who were with white women,” the prosecutor tells us.290 
According to a law enforcement official, “He told the cops, ‘I’ve hated 
black men since I was a kid. I’ve had these feelings since I was a young 
person. I hate black men.’”291 So what if it was a baptismal moment in 
his mind? Would that matter?  
Should I be allowed to discuss, in the same breath, the violent 
history of colonialism and the delusional beliefs of a mentally unstable 
White Supremacist? No. But on the other hand, if what we are trying to 
identify is when violence is legitimate, must we not ask the difficult 
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question? “I struck, the blood spurted: it is the only baptism that today I 
remember.”292 Surely context matters. It must be the case that not all 
violence for Fanon—even baptismal violence as a pure end—would 
serve the liberatory aspirations envisioned by Fanon or Benjamin. So the 
criteria would have to include self-transformative and the correct 
politics. But that then justifies any violence that is properly politically 
motivated. At that point, the justification is merely instrumental.  
The traditional critiques of violence, it turns out, hardly offer a 
convincing way forward. To be sure, they do reveal that the workers, or 
the colonized, or the young protesters in the banlieu that deploy violent 
means of resistance—torching cars or breaking windows—are 
themselves immersed in a violent world and subject to the violence of 
the state, the police, and social workers. That their whole milieu is 
violent. They highlight, as Fanon does, the grossly violent operations of 
the colonial system—and unearth its pervasive violence. 
But by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms 
of violence, in a world pervaded by violence—in a world where relations 
of power are defined as civil war—these critiques of violence set up 
criteria that are either too foundational, too instrumental, or too hard to 
follow, or simply break down. At other times, they simply fail to offer 
any comprehensible criteria at all. And this then makes it difficult to 
critique “illegitimate” violence. 
Benjamin’s litmus test—namely, avoiding means-end rationality 
or instrumental reason—and his embrace of an anarchist anti-state ethos 
seems noble but misguided, unhelpful for praxis today. It also is far too 
foundational or dogmatic—as if the withering of the state was an 
orthodoxy. Zizek, for his part is at times too cryptic and merely 
provocative, at other times too rigidly Leninist—as if a vanguard party 
was the solution to everything. And Fanon’s criteria are no more 
convincing. 
The problems with Fanon abound. First off, it has to be the case 
that the political context of the violence would matter. One can only 
imagine that, contra Benjamin, the ends would cast a shadow on the 
legitimacy of the means.293 Second, as Arendt reminded us, the exigency 
of death and feelings of solidarity—the self-transformation—can be very 
short lived. They are not necessarily permanent self-transformations: 
It is true that the strong fraternal sentiments 
collective violence engenders have misled many 
good people into the hope that a new community 
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together with a “new man” will arise out of it. The 
hope is an illusion for the simple reason that no 
human relationship is more transitory than this kind 
of brotherhood, which can be actualized only under 
the conditions of immediate danger to life and 
limb.294 
Finally, how can critical theorists like Benjamin or Zizek tell 
others to engage in violent revolution when they themselves are not 
putting their lives at stake? How can you only theorize violence? How 
can you glorify divine violence or nonviolent violence if you are not 
yourself engaged in struggle? 
The classic critiques of violence relativize the use of violence to 
shield certain privileged or foundational modalities of resistance. That 
can’t be right. Moreover, the fact that these critiques are apologia of 
violence ultimately undercuts their effectiveness as critiques of state 
violence. In the end, they create criteria of violence that do not withstand 
scrutiny—and some offer no criteria at all.  
II. 
How then do we resolve the different critical insights—namely, 
that our political condition involves endless struggle, that we imagine a 
future of equity, compassion, and mutual respect, and that political 
praxis is necessarily violent? 
Taking a purely instrumental route feels like a cop out—another 
grand illusion. The idea that we could bracket our values and violently 
impose a just society, in which violence would then disappear, is not 
only unrealistic, it defies everything reconstructed critical theory stands 
for. It’s pure mystification—and dangerous at that, since it is likely, 
actually, to push us onto the path of authoritarianism. Anyone who 
would be so vicious as to champion a state of exception—even a 
temporary use of what would have to be overpowering violence, to 
quickly get the job done—would likely to be the kind of person who 
would abuse that license. In effect, we are right back where we started: 
facing illusions. How do we move forward? 
This section will set aside three possible avenues that have been 
advocated by critical theorists, before proposing a more promising path 
forward in the next and final section. 
A. Interpreting Violence Away 
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You will recall that the pure theory of illusions rests on the 
infiniteness of interpretation, on the lack of any originary source. It rests 
on the lack of any foundation. What if we returned to this insight to 
simply interpret violence away? Let me explain. 
If we live in a world characterized by the infinite regress of 
interpretations, going vertically all the way down, then might it not be 
the case that the entire construct that “relations of power are violence”—
the entire critique of violence—is itself an interpretation, and in that 
sense a fabrication foisted upon us through a struggle for power or for 
intellectual dominance? What if this interpretation is itself an imposition 
of a will to power? 
What might that mean, you may ask? What would it mean if we 
extended endless interpretation to the question of praxis? Would it then 
be possible to rethink violence entirely? To reconstruct categories in 
such a way as to wash away the problems of violence? Nietzsche 
famously spoke of the “invention” rather than the origin of 
knowledge.295 What would it mean to take that insight seriously—
particularly in the most tangible space of all, in the realm of violence? 
What would it mean, in the context of critical praxis, to take seriously 
the idea that all knowledge is “invention”? 
What it might mean is that the claims that have been circulating 
throughout this book—namely that violence functions in such and such a 
way, that critical praxis is inevitably violent, that it may be justified if 
self-transformative, etc.—that all those myriad claims are, well, 
invented. We invent our relation to violence. This does not, in any way, 
deny its facticity. A punch in the face is still a punch in the face, and it is 
committed without consent. Those facts do not change. The victims did 
not ask for it, they are not to be blamed. Again, that does not change. But 
it is what we claim to know about these facts that is invented. What they 
tell us about when violence is justified, when it is legitimate—all these 
things are, well, invented. All that is made up. It tells us more about who 
we are and what we want to believe that anything reliable about reality. 
And, in the process of these inventions, we shape our own subjectivity, 
we shape who we are. That is one of the most important consequences, at 
least for Foucault reading Nietzsche: “it’s not God that disappears but 
the subject in its unity and its sovereignty.”296 
The invention of knowledge, rather than its origin: this surely 
destabilizes our interpretations. It highlights the creativity of 
interpretation—and asks us to question what is motivating the invention. 
Our critique of violence may have multiple meanings and functions, all 
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of which do a lot of work. But what we say about violence and praxis, in 
the end, is our imposition, our interpretation, our reading, our will. 
Ultimately, our stories of violence tell us more about our history than 
they do anything about violence per se. 
But where would this leave us? Well, understanding that the 
liberal conception of violence advances a project that privileges private 
property and individual liberty. And that the critique of violence 
advances a will to equity, compassion and respect. In other words, that 
the interpretations are political. But we knew that from the beginning. 
We’ve known—this was the whole point of Part II—that the critical 
tradition is motivated by values. This does not help us resolve the 
quagmire of critical praxis. It does not get us out of the interpretive 
realm and into a space of materiality. Instead it brings us back to square 
one: how do we reconcile our values with our praxis?  
B.  Doing Violence to Violence 
A second path forward might be to turn the critique back on 
itself: Perhaps we should, as Simone de Beauvoir suggested of Sade, 
burn our own justifications of violence. Violently turn against our own 
critiques and apologias of violence. 
“Faut-il bruler Sade?” Beauvoir asked. Well, should we burn 
our own justifications of violence? Burn our theories at the stake, as the 
Inquisition would have? Recall that Sade’s son burned the ten volumes 
of his final work, Les Journées de Florbelle. Should we place Sade’s and 
Nietzsche’s works on a black list? Should we destroy Bataille’s works as 
well? And Passolini’s films? Should we simply extinguish the apologias 
of violence—Benjamin as well, and Zizek and Fanon—and be done with 
violence once and for all? Could we? 
Now, remarkably, Beauvoir answered her own question in the 
negative. As Judith Butler remarked later, “By posing the question in this 
way and at that time, Beauvoir makes it clear that feminism and 
philosophy ought not to participate in anti-intellectual trends, that it 
ought to distance itself from inquisitorial practices, and that its 
intellectual task is to remain open to the difficulty and range of the 
human condition.”297 Beauvoir read into Sade an ethic—misguided in 
certain respects, but an ethic nonetheless, related centrally to freedom. 
Butler similarly tried to “find there something of importance for a 
feminist philosophy of freedom, including a philosophy of sexual 
freedom?”298 Butler writes: 
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Although one may well conclude that Sade has little 
in common with feminism, it is important to note 
that he defended sexual freedom and the expressive 
impulses of individuals. Moreover, Sade did not 
believe that sexuality was meant only to satisfy the 
requirements of procreation.299 
Both for Beauvoir and Butler, the task was to seek “neither to 
romanticize nor to vilify Sade,” but rather “to understand the ethical 
significance of Sade.”300 And of course, there is always some redeeming 
ethical feature to discover in Sade or Passolini. For Passolini, for 
instance, it was his political conviction and queer sexuality. His 
opposition to the fascist nature of the state and the authoritarian nature of 
the Church. For Sade, it was his philosophical tendency—as a 
philosopher of the boudoir or de la boue, to be sure, but a philosopher 
nonetheless who questioned man’s true nature at a time when man was 
becoming almost divine. 
In locating his torture chamber in fascist Italy, immediately post-
Mussolini (July 1943), Passolini targets fascism itself in Salò—the 
Italian bourgeoisie, the desire for fascistic power, the submission to 
order, the following of orders. In his film, Passolini sides with Albert 
Camus who, as Butler reminds us, saw in Sade the precursor to the 
fascisms and totalitarianisms of the twentieth century. As Camus noted 
of Sade, “Two centuries in advance and on a reduced scale, Sade exalted 
the totalitarian society in the name of a frenzied liberty that rebellion 
does not in fact demand. With him the history and tragedy of our times 
really begin.”301 Passolini’s Sade “belongs to the inaugural moments of 
modern fascism.”302 And Passolini’s deployment of those three circles of 
hell, with their allusion to Dante’s Inferno, challenged more forcefully 
than most other works the Catholic Church—one of Passolini’s most 
impassioned and frequent political targets. 
The Marquis de Sade, for his part, targeted the sexual repression 
of his own aristocratic peers in a purportedly pedagogic or perhaps 
didactic manner, as evidenced by his Philosophy in the Boudoir. This is 
the ethical dimension, something about a way of living one’s life in his 
work—at least, Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler seem to suggest. 
“He argues, in effect, that under conditions of bourgeois morality, where 
the interchangeability and indifference of individuals reign, sexual 
cruelty is a way to reestablish individuality and passion,” Butler notes, 
with Beauvoir.303 Sade is exposing the unrestrainable truth of nature, of 
our warped nature. By contrast to the newfound faith and Enlightenment 
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belief in the compassion of man, in the goodness of natural man, in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s concept of man in his natural condition—as 
Dominique Lecourt emphasizes on his reading304—Sade demonstrated in 
his writings the twisted timber of humanity. If you want to follow nature 
and natural man as the Enlightenment thinkers did, Sade tells us, then 
look at this! “This book,” Georges Bataille writes of 120 Days of Sodom, 
“is the only one in which the mind of man is shown as it really is. The 
language of 120 Days of Sodom is finally that of a universe which 
degrades gradually and systematically, which tortures and destroys the 
totality of the beings which it represents.”305 Imprisoned in the Bastille, 
having encouraged the revolutionaries from his prison window, it is said, 
liberated and liberating others, Sade embodied, despite it all, an element 
of liberation sexology—a revolution for the libertines. Sade’s writings 
also betray a unique morality that, as Maurice Blanchot and Georges 
Bataille reminded us, rests on our own solitude as humans—“absolute 
solitude as a first given fact.”306 These are important ethical and political 
questions. There is, then, there must be some value along political and 
moral dimensions to Sade’s interventions, and Passolini’s. 
Plus, both Sade and Passolini were themselves the objects of the 
punitive arm of the state—of the will to punish, of the sovereignty of 
desire. Sade: eleven years in Vincennes and the Bastille on what appear 
to have been a familial lettre de cachet, another thirteen years in the 
Charenton asylum, for a total of thirty-two years of his life in closed 
institutions. Passolini: tried by the Italian government for offense to the 
Italian state and religion, in 1963, many years even before Salò. Did they 
not suffer enough for their sins—or for their courage? Perhaps. And, 
perhaps, we as a society should not condemn Sade or Passolini, or 
Nietzsche—no more than we, as former colonizers should not condemn 
Frantz Fannon when he advocates violence against the children of the 
colonizers, the same violence of the colonizers. 
No, it seems that violently sacrificing our own critiques and 
apologias of violence reflects an anti-intellectualism or anti-theoretical 
sentiment that is far too simplistic. It solves nothing—and it does us all 
an injustice. It would be like embracing an illusion. 
We must not burn Nietzsche or Sade, we must not self-censor our 
critiques of violence, because there is always resistance embedded, 
something ethical in there that we need to search for, rather than 
extinguish. To collectively condemn, in other words, is too easy—and so 
false. It does nothing. We need to do more somehow. Even at the 
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extreme, even at the limit, even here with violence. We need to 
understand it—dark side and all. And then resolve the puzzle of praxis. 
The point is that collective condemnation is, just that, too simple, 
too easy. And the dream of a world without violence is, again, just that, a 
dream, an illusion. We need to plumb the complexity of the human soul, 
with all its dark sides, and simultaneously reimagine the place of excess 
and violence. And, perhaps, to take it upon ourselves to condemn. But 
only as ethical beings, not as a society. 
C.  Radical Non-Violence 
A third path is to radically eschew violence, force, and 
compulsion, along the model of Mahatma Gandhi: to turn all the 
suffering onto oneself and completely avoid compelling others to 
change, so as to inspire others instead to self-transform. This was the 
model of Satyagraha that Gandhi developed and lived. It rests, I would 
argue, on recognition of the critique of violence: recognition that 
everything we do outwardly is a form of aggression against others, and 
therefore that everything we do should be oriented inwardly.307 
The neologism satyagraha that Gandhi coined—the literal 
meaning of which is “to hold on to truth” or “to cling to truth” or “a 
tenacity in the pursuit of truth”308—refers to a personal ethic and self-
transformation through which an individual remains true to his or her 
ideals of justice, and seeks to convince or convert others by working on 
him or herself and taking on the burden of the sufferings of injustice. The 
term is often simplified, in translation, to mean “non-violent resistance,” 
and at a practical level it is narrowly associated with the imperative of 
non-violence. But the concept has to be understood through the larger 
framework of an ethic or a faith that gives someone the strength to turn 
the suffering of injustice onto themselves. The resulting non-violence is 
not so much a practical maxim or a political strategy—although it is 
always political and strategic—so much as it is the necessary product of 
steadfastly staying true to one’s ethical or spiritual beliefs and the ethical 
imperative not to hurt others. 
The concept of satyagraha recognizes the pervasiveness of 
violence in social interaction, and tries to contain it. It does so by means 
of three core elements: truth, self-care, and suffering. The first is true 
belief or faith—holding onto a personal truth—that empowers and lends 
force to satyagraha. Gandhi defined satyagraha as “Truth-force” (satya 
means “truth”)—though in other places he also referred to “Soul-force” 
or “Love-force.”309 It is only when the believer is entirely committed to 
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“the truth of his cause,” Gandhi emphasized, that he or she will have the 
force to succeed in non-violence.310 It is that faith in the truth of one’s 
cause that ensures that the reformer will not lash out at an opponent, but 
instead work harder on him or herself, and be prepared to sacrifice him 
or herself. In this sense, satyagraha does not give rise to an instrumental 
form of non-violence, but instead to an unconditional, entirely 
committed faith, like a spiritual belief or a moral commitment. 
The second component is work on the self, rather than on others: 
Non-violent resistance requires self-transformation. It involves work by 
and on the individual him or herself. It cannot be achieved from outside 
the person. It is deeply subjective. Gandhi explained this in discussing 
the case of protest at temples, where he opposed for instance blocking 
the way of those who refused to admit the untouchable. “The movement 
for the removal of untouchability is one of self-purification,” Gandhi 
wrote. “No man can be purified against his will.”311 Gandhi explained 
that any and all steps, even in drastic situations, “have to be taken against 
ourselves.”312 These are, as Mantena explains, “practices of ascetic self-
mastery.”313 As Gandhi wrote, “Satyagraha presupposes self-discipline, 
self-control, self-purification.”314 Notice the omnipresence of the self. It 
is care of self that comes first. As Gandhi explained: “the doctrine came 
to mean vindication of truth not by infliction of suffering on the 
opponent but on one’s self.”315 
The third and perhaps most important element is self-suffering:  
The willingness to bear the suffering of injustice, to take that suffering 
onto oneself, is at the very heart of remaining true to oneself and 
converting one’s opponents. It is by suffering that one truly demonstrates 
the sincerity of one’s beliefs and the stakes of justice. It is also the most 
powerful way to convince others to change themselves. It shows that the 
satyagrahi is not there to hurt, but rather to impress upon others the 
justice of their position. 
Self-suffering—or the broader concept for Gandhi of “the law of 
suffering”—is what converts others, on Gandhi’s view. Conversion is the 
operative term: “I have deliberately used the word conversion,” Gandhi 
wrote. “For my ambition is no less than to convert the British people 
through non-violence, and thus make them see the wrong they have done 
to India.”316 And it operates through the emotions and affect of the 
opponent. The goal is to “draw out and exhibit the force of the soul 
within us for a period long enough to appeal to the sympathetic chord in 
the governors or the law-makers.”317 
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For Gandhi, non-violence had to extend to thought as well as 
action. It meant avoiding anger, it excluded even swearing and 
cursing.318 It implied, in the anti-colonial context, scrupulously avoiding 
“intentional injury in thought, word or deed to the person of a single 
Englishman.”319 It even involved being courteous and polite toward the 
police that are arresting you and the prison officials who are detaining 
you.320 Gandhi wrote: 
It is a breach of Satyagraha to wish ill to an 
opponent or to say a harsh word to him or of him 
with the intention of harming him. And often the 
evil thought or the evil word may, in terms of 
Satyagraha, be more dangerous than actual violence 
used in the heat of the moment and perhaps 
repented and forgotten the next moment. Satyagraha 
is gentle, it never wounds. It must not be the result 
of anger or malice. It is never fussy, never 
impatient, never vociferous. It is the direct opposite 
of compulsion. It was conceived as a complete 
substitute for violence.321 
Gandhi’s practices of fasting represent the kind of work on the 
self and the suffering that characterizes and defines satyagraha.322 
Gandhi’s views on direct action were extremely nuanced and contextual. 
Civil disobedience was not always appropriate and had to be judged 
based, for instance, on whether individuals were doing it because they 
expect some personal gain.323 Fasting, as well, could be used for good or 
ill depending on the context.  “Even fasts may take the form of 
coercion,” Gandhi wrote, “there is nothing in the world that in human 
hands does not lend itself to abuse.”324 
There is a pragmatic dimension to satyagraha that should not be 
ignored. In fact, Gandhi justified violence under certain extremely 
limited circumstances of domination and weakness—in cases of extreme 
self-defense or helplessness—not as a form of satyagraha but as a form 
of vulnerable self-defense. “I do believe that where there is only a choice 
between cowardice and violence I would advise violence,” he wrote, and 
added, “I took part in the Boer War, the so-called Zulu rebellion and the 
late War.”325 The illustration he gives is of a time when he was almost 
fatally assaulted, and would have wanted his son to defend him, even 
using violence. He even adds, “I would rather have India resort to arms 
in order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner 
become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonor.” 326  In 
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situations of helplessness, of utter weakness, violence may be 
appropriate.327 But he then added that “I do not believe India to be 
helpless. I do not believe myself to be a helpless creature.”328 
The problem with this third path, though, is that it is, honestly, 
too demanding and also too absolute. Gandhi’s writings are of 
unparalleled exigency: one must take the burdens of injustice on oneself, 
turn suffering onto oneself, purify oneself as an exemplar to others, fast 
and engage in civil disobedience when appropriate, at sacrificial cost, 
bear no anger or resentment against one’s oppressors, even remain 
celibate or, if married, chaste. The full measure of Gandhian satyagraha 
is arduous. And regardless of the criticisms of Gandhi’s actual practices 
and weaknesses—Gandhi has been criticized for hypocrisy, for 
misogyny, even for racism and casteism—Gandhi’s writings, taken on 
their face, demand a level of commitment and persistence that is 
practically unparalleled in other political traditions and impossible to 
achieve. They call for the kind of existence exemplified—as Gandhi 
himself suggested—by Buddha and Christ. One can hardly imagine a 
more demanding and exigent standard. 
Non-violence of this sort is too demanding and does not offer a 
viable answer for critical praxis. It is, first, practically impossible to 
instantiate except in a watered down and instrumental version. The idea, 
for instance, that one must not love one’s children more than others is far 
too demanding. Remaining celibate or chaste. Again, too demanding. 
Avoiding evil thoughts towards one’s oppressor. Not realistic, possibly 
counterproductive. Assuming all the suffering, taking it all on oneself in 
order to convert others. At the end of the day, that does not ethically 
seem right. 
Moreover, it is far too dangerous. In many situations, it would 
mean leading sheep to slaughter. Gandhi’s writings about Jewish 
resistance in 1936 and 1938, where he espoused satyagraha, is a case in 
point. As Uday Mehta notes, “Gandhi’s words provoked shock, 
controversy and considerable condemnation.”329 Rightfully so, even if 
they were pronounced before many knew the worst of it. Non-violence 
may be appropriate in some limited conditions, but not in all. In part, this 
reflects again the problem with foundational thought—with the 
inappropriate generalization of one particular form of praxis. It would be 
misguided to resolve the problem of violence in the search for critical 
praxis by adopting wholesale Gandhi’s notion of satyagraha. 
Satyagraha did function in 1920s and 30s in India, in a country 
of hundreds of millions of inhabitants that was governed in contrast by a 
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hand-full of British civil servants and soldiers. It had political effects in 
the context of a military occupation and a vast disproportion of 
population. In a situation where the occupying force—as is so often 
true—lacked legitimacy and moral authority. These factors conspired to 
make satyagraha so potent then. But satyagraha is not the answer to the 
broader problems of violence in critical praxis. It does not resolve the 
critique of violence. 
III. 
There is, however, a more promising path forward: to understand 
violence as a necessary part of human existence, of social interaction, 
and of our political condition, but not to valorize or embolden it. 
Violence on this view is integral to human experience—from 
nightmares, to death and loss, and separation, and natural catastrophes. 
Violence, fear, and terror are part of becoming fully human. They are an 
inevitable element of human development. But they are one among a set 
of forces that shape the human experience. The task of critical praxis is 
to curate that balance and, in the process, to reduce and devalue the role 
of violence. 
The famous passage on the master-slave dialectic in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit might offer a path forward. 330  Alexandre 
Kojève’s reading of Hegel before the war—especially his lectures from 
1934 to 1939 at the École pratique des hautes études—put the dialectic 
of master and slave at the center of our contemporary reading of the 
Phenomenology. It is really Kojève who drew our attention to a reading 
of Hegel according to which the gradual achievement of the highest form 
of knowledge and recognition happens through a series of dialectics that 
are almost all modeled on that of master and slave. It would lead to some 
excesses of interpretation.331 But it also provides insight to resolve our 
problems of violence. 
What drives the confrontation between the master and slave, on 
Hegel’s account, are three driving forces. The first is the desire for 
recognition—the desire to be recognized as a fully human person.332 
Hegel writes, early in his analysis of this encounter between master and 
slave, that “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the 
fact that, it exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged.”333 The struggle between those who will become master 
and slave begins, in fact, because of the quest for recognition. Each of 
the actors engage in this life and death struggle to be certain of 
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themselves—barring which, as Hegel writes, “he has not attained to the 
truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.”334 
Kojève explains that in this struggle, “The Master is the man who 
went all the way in a Fight for prestige, who risked his life in order to be 
recognized in his absolute superiority by another man.”335 In doing so, 
the master has overcome nature, in the sense that he has shown that he is 
not governed by natural fear or self-preservation, but that the recognition 
by another human is more important than death. He has also expressed 
the desire for an idea of recognition, overcoming here mere biological 
function. It is in this sense that Hegel writes that “Death certainly shows 
that each staked his life and held it of no account.”336 
The master thus achieves recognition by making the slave work 
for him. The former now leads a life of pleasure, while the slave toils for 
another. But this has the potential—the paradoxical or dialectical 
potential—of undermining the master’s recognition, since he is now no 
longer recognized by a full human, but rather only by a slave: “What 
now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a 
dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth 
of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality an unessential 
consciousness and its unessential action.” 337  “The outcome,” Hegel 
writes, “is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal.”338 
Recognition remains, though, a motor of history for Hegel—
which explains in part the role of recognition in the later writings of Axel 
Honneth, or Jay Bernstein, or other contemporary descendants of the 
Frankfurt School.339 It is the universality of the desire for recognition 
that drives this fight to the death, and (at least on the reading of Kojève) 
feeds the historical account. As Kojève says, “human, historical, self-
concious existence is possible only where there are, or—at least—where 
there have been, bloody fights, wars for prestige.”340 This is the desire to 
master, to defeat the other, without which there would no battle, no 
conflict. But it is self-defeating, in the end. From the perspective of 
recognition—that first driving element of the conflict—as Kojève said, 
“Mastery is an existential impasse.”341 
The second motivating force of the dialectic between master and 
slave—and the one that interests me most here—is the encounter with 
nothingness, with le néant (and right here, incidentally, one sees well the 
influence of Kojève on Sartre). It is the encounter with nothingness that 
forces the slave to face his death, his own mortality, and to overcome his 
own human condition. 
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It is here that Hegel uses the language of violence and terror—
terror, which, recall, in its etymological origins, traces to the act of 
trembling, of the physical experience of fear and the manifestation of a 
trembling body.342 To terror as fear, dread, trembling, shaking to one’s 
foundations. It is by means of fear, terror, trembling that the slave, 
according to Hegel, “he rids himself of his attachment to natural 
existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it.”343 
Hegel writes in The Phenomenology of Spirit, regarding the slave in his 
encounter with the master: 
[T]his consciousness has been fearful, not of this or 
that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its 
whole being has been seized with dread; for it has 
experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In 
that experience it has been quite unmanned, has 
trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything 
solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. 
But this pure universal movement, the absolute 
melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, 
essential nature of self-consciousness […]344 
It is important to underscore here that it is terror—the terror of 
the battle to the death with the master, this struggle of life and death—
that forces the slave to face up to nothingness, to his mortality. The terror 
was necessary. It was a necessary step in the development. Kojève 
explains : “Through animal fear of death (Angst) the Slave experienced 
the dread or the Terror (Furcht) of Nothingness, of his nothingness. He 
caught a glimpse of himself as nothingness, he understood that his whole 
existence was but a ‘surpassed,’ ‘overcome’ (aufgehoben) death—a 
Nothingness maintained in Being.”345 
The important point for us—and this is truly crucial—is that 
terror plays a central motivating force in the struggle for recognition and 
human development. It would not be possible to achieve forms of self-
recognition without it. 
The third and final motivating force is of course the relation to 
labor. For Hegel, it is by means of his toil that the slave overcomes his 
own nature, realizes a conceptual end that makes possible 
comprehension, science, techniques, arts, etc.346 It is only “Through his 
service,” Hegel writes, that the slave “rids himself of his attachment to 
natural existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on 
it.”347 Or, to be more blunt: “Through work, however, the bondsman 
becomes conscious of what he truly is.”348 It is by means of his work that 
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the slave recognizes that he too can overcome and dominate nature—just 
as the master had in the struggle by pursuing his own desire to be 
recognized, above and beyond his biological existence—and thus the 
slave recognizes his freedom and autonomy.349 Hegel writes that “Work, 
on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in 
other words, work forms and shapes the thing.”350 
For all this to happen, Hegel suggests, there need to be the two 
formative moments of fear and service.351 And not just any fear, but 
absolute terror—utmost dread. It is only then that labor can produce its 
effects. The slave, Hegel maintains, “realizes that it is precisely in his 
work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he 
acquires a mind of his own.”352 
To sum up, the three motivating forces are recognition, terror, 
and labor. Does that mean that we “need” torture and cruelty? Of course 
not, if we think with Hegel that we are part of a human spirit that 
recognizes and learns not only or exclusively by acting, but by a process 
of communal consciousness, shared, intellectual progress. And if we 
realize that we do face our own mortality, our nothingness, all the time—
in our youth, in our nightmares, with the loss of our parents—we are all 
facing the terror of death. So there need be no valorization of terror or 
violence, nor a justification. 
Instead, we need to understand Hegel’s argument as allegory, and 
take a few steps back.353 As history, or even as phenomenology, Hegel’s 
account is no doubt lacking.354 But as metaphor, the Hegelian narrative 
shows, brilliantly, the place of violence in the formation of one’s identity 
and consciousness. It would be practically impossible to imagine human 
self-development without it—and without, as well, the desire for 
recognition and the work of labor. These are all integral to our human 
experience. The question, then, is to balance them properly—not 
eliminate any one of them. To calibrate properly. Not to be governed too 
much by it. That is, incidentally, the challenge that Ockham raised for us. 
The path, then, is to contain or limit violence. The classic 
critiques of violence end up justifying violence. That can’t be right. 
Instead, we need to recalibrate human experience to deemphasize terror 
and violence, to the benefit of the other modes of human interaction. 
Since it is impossible to exorcise, we should devalue violence instead—
again, within a pure theory of values.  
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Chapter 12: A Pure Theory of Tactics 
Our political condition is violent. There is no way around that. 
Seeking a change in society—or even just maintaining the status quo—is 
necessarily violent in the sense that it imposes values on others who may 
not share the same ideals. It necessarily entails redistributions. It will 
affect ownership rights and possession. It often involves educational, 
societal, and personal transformations: these are all violent effects if we 
properly understand violence and are honest with ourselves. Revolutions, 
of course, are inevitably violent. Uprisings well. But social 
transformation more generally is violent. Even Gandhian satyagraha is 
violent, when we realize what it would entail for our children, families, 
and loved ones. Some practices are not physically violent—like Occupy 
Wall Street—but they are equally violent in trying to transform 
distributions of wealth and well-being. 
There is, however, no reason or need to valorize the violence. No 
reason to create justifications that embolden violence. No reason to seek 
out or accentuate the violence. To the contrary, there is every reason to 
try to minimize and devalue violence, and to do our best to distribute it 
equitably so that no one group or individual suffers the brunt of societal 
change. 
In the end, it makes no sense to draw a line at physical violence, 
first, because the enforcement of any kind of distributional rules will 
require the threat or application of force (as it does now, through for 
instance the criminal enforcement of trespass laws), and second, because 
it is a liberal illusion that masks the structural violence that pervades 
social relations. Naturally, physicality is a powerful signifier. There is no 
doubt. The sight of German shepherds attacking the peaceful civil rights 
protesters galvanized the public. The sight of police officers pepper 
spraying peaceful Occupiers, or of the militarized SWAT teams 
aggressing peaceful police protesters—all of those images galvanize 
political opinion. Peaceful protest, as opposed to violent protest, will 
have effects of reality. But instead of drawing overly simplistic lines, the 
path forward should seek to devalorize violence and distribute it 
equitably. 
No one individual or group should bear the burden of violence; 
the weight of social change should fall on all equitably. It should not be 
concentrated. Perhaps ultimately this is an ethical question—the most 
important ethical question. Critical praxis should be conducted carefully 
and hesitantly—with respect, care, thoughtfulness. Not with glee or 
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delight, but instead always conscious of the harm it distributes, vigilant 
and watchful of not exceeding what is strictly necessary. Praxis should 
not be targeted on particular individuals or groups, but equitably 
distributed across society and classes. As an ethical matter, we should 
avoid strategies that concentrate rather than distribute the burdens of 
politics. 
It would be nice to imagine that violence would ultimately 
recede—or that, in a more equitable society, there would be less need for 
social transformation and redistribution, and thus less need for violence. 
It would be lovely to imagine a society where there is greater equality 
and opportunity for all, and therefore less interpersonal struggle. To 
imagine a society where equality itself limits the extent of violence. In a 
world where the wealth disparities are not so sharp, where there is good 
public education and health care, might there be less social competition? 
If we achieved such a world, wouldn’t there be less violent struggles 
between individuals? 
Yes, it would be nice to imagine. But this is just another illusion, 
a dangerous one that might justify more violence today to achieve a less 
violent society in the future. That’s usually how illusions work. We must 
let it go too. We are left, then, with one promising path forward to 
resolve the problems of violence: namely, to devalue violence and 
distribute it as equitably as possible. To recalibrate human experience so 
that we enhance mutual recognition and labor, and contain and manage 
violence as much as possible. 
What this entails for critical praxis is a contextual, case-by-case 
analysis of our political struggles that responds to the exact situation and 
the really-existing political economic regimes. There can be no 
generalized theory of the vanguard, nor of leaderlessness, nor of non-
violence and self-sacrifice—every critical practice has to be perfectly 
designed for the specific time and space. Here too, we need to resist 
foundational constraints that may be entirely inapplicable in different 
geopolitical contexts. 
In effect, all praxis must be deeply situated. A fast would not 
work in 1936 Germany—and Gandhi’s writings were simply off the 
mark in that regard. The idea of portability makes no sense in this 
context. The idea of generalizing from one situated political context to 
another is dangerous. An armed vanguard revolutionary movement in the 
United States today would get crushed. The disproportionality in 
weaponry and technology, in the face of American military power, is 
simply insurmountable. This may not have been the case in Russia in 
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1917, nor in China in 1948, but in the United States today, the 
asymmetries and imbalances are far too significant to expect any type of 
armed uprising to succeed. That is why the alt-right has engaged in a 
protracted cultural and populist revolution, rather than an armed revolt 
(for the most part). 
It is important to recognize that all social movements and tactics 
are inevitably situated. Political disobedience of the type manifested in 
Occupy Wall Street—which many of us, myself included, had perhaps 
erroneously interpreted as apolitical or outside politics—was deeply 
ensconced within the political-historical moment of a centrist 
Democratic administration. Occupy was effectively pushing, or trying to 
push, President Obama to the left—a model that may be totally 
inappropriate under a Trump regime. The Occupy movement made sense 
and was tactically sophisticated under the Obama administration, but 
would make no sense under a Trump presidency. The model of the 
Groupe d’information sur les prisons was effective, insofar as it was, 
under a repressive Gaullist regime. But again, one can hardly imagine it 
being effective in times of so open and blatant punitiveness and 
vilification. 
What is to be done—in the narrow sense of how to bring about 
our values and which specific strategies and tactics to deploy—will 
require specific, situated, contextual assessments. The answer requires a 
unique political tract for each situation. It should not come as a surprise 
that Lenin’s “What Is To Be Done?” is precisely such a specific and 
detailed tract. It is not ageless. It is not portable. It is today a historical 
artifact. That is what our critical praxis should aspire to: winning a 
struggle and then becoming a historical artifact that may not be 
replicable. The answer to the question “What is to be done?” must be 
GPS and time and date stamped. 
I. 
In Assembly, Michael Hardt and Toni Negri drew a distinction 
between strategies and tactics: strategies, in other words the broad goals 
of the movement, they argued, should be decided by the assembled 
multitude, by the people; by contrast, shorter-term and more localized 
tactics should be designed by the movement leaders. In this way, Hardt 
and Negri tried to accommodate the newfound desire for leaderlessness 
with the reality, or at least their idea of the reality of social movements. 
They propose an illuminating distinction, even if it may need to be 
reformulated here. 
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On a pure theory of illusions and values, the line would be drawn 
slightly differently: the critical Left should determine the overarching 
and long-lasting values, but the critical practices need to be 
contextualized, situated, and designed for the immediate moment and 
place. 
The first imperative, then, is to avoid the tendency to universalize 
or generalize. Actions have to be analyzed en situation. Desperate times 
may call for desperate acts, but different times will call for different 
praxis. 
Physical violence might well be called for in a colonial setting, as 
Fanon did. But it may not be fitting in a liberal democracy, for a number 
of reasons. First, physical violence tends to backfire in a democratic 
setting. In the civil rights context, it was the dogs and fire hoses that 
galvanized opinion against segregation. In the Occupy context, it was the 
pepper straying of peaceful protesters that outraged so many. Physical 
violence against peaceful protest in a liberal democracy, against people 
acting peacefully, mostly boomerangs. The same is true for violent 
protest. Second, physical violence has long-term traumatic effects. It 
causes stress disorders in people and later generations, tending to fuel 
vengeance cycles that last. Third, in a liberal democracy, physical 
violence rarely gives you the moral high ground. 
There is a deep contextual element to praxis: Our critical 
interventions are situated in time and place. In fact, I am not sure I would 
be writing or publishing these thoughts in an even more authoritarian 
state. All of my own interventions—from the illusion of order to the 
illusion of free markets—were situated; and I could very well imagine a 
different political situation where I would have called for order or 
markets. That is the essence of critical thought. It is not universalizing. It 
is not absolute in this sense. It is non-Kantian. There can be no 
universalization of our maxims. 
The second imperative is to avoid collapsing things, or being too 
reductionist. Despite the pervasiveness of violence, and the continuity 
between physical and systemic violence, critical theorists must remain 
careful about the exercise of power and the distributional effects of their 
praxis. Just because political action is inherently violent, that does not 
mean we should turn a blind eye to the harm or rush to cause needless 
harm, or enjoy it. It means we need to be careful about what we are 
doing. We need to minimize and devalue the violence—not value it, and 
certainly not inflate it. 
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I ended The Counterrevolution hand-in-hand with William of 
Ockham, in the Inquisition, drawing inspiration from his own struggles 
against despotic power. That was not an accident. Ockham understood 
well the imperative to limit things to what was absolutely necessary. 
That was the essence of Ockham’s razor: not to engage in the 
unnecessary, not to compound beyond necessity. But at the same time, 
Ockham recognized acutely the need to resist, to struggle, through the 
ages. Our political condition is not only dangerous and serious; it is 
constant, consuming, and unending. There is no equilibrium, recall. 
There is no end of history. There is just a constant struggle over 
distributions in society. I ended with Ockham to emphasize that our task 
will not end, that we are part of a relentless struggle—but that we should 
be careful not to exceed what is strictly necessary. 
The paradigm for critical praxis, then, is not to embrace a 
particular form or style of action—e.g. an occupation, insurgency, 
hunger strike, etc.—but rather to discover, in each unique context and en 
situation, the best method to counter the forces that push us toward 
servitude and inequality. The key concept is the counter-, once again, but 
the goal must be to get past its reactivity, so as to produce a constant 
autonomous countermove as practice. And, equally importantly, to limit 
critical practice within the bounds of necessity. 
II.  
The choice of a critical praxis will inevitably have its own effects 
of reality. Particular critical practices will shape material reality and 
social relations differently. So, for instance, a boycott and divestment 
campaign will affect perceptions of injustice, and possibly configure 
social outcomes, differently than an armed insurgency.  
In terms of method, then, it would be important to ask ourselves 
how different forms of political engagement will reconfigure our social 
reality and shape our beliefs. There is much to be learned here from prior 
campaigns and interventions. Let’s look at three examples. 
A.  Foucault and the GIP 
In the early 1970s, Michel Foucault took part in a prison 
resistance movement and helped organize, along with others, the Groupe 
d’information sur les prisons (Prisons Information Group, the “GIP”). 
What is particularly interesting about Foucault’s participation in the GIP 
is how it drew on his critical theory. The form of his political action was 
guided by his theoretical work—and as a result, the reality that he sought 
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to shape was informed by his philosophical insights. At the same time, 
the political practice associated with the GIP would fundamentally 
reshape his theoretical work. The influence of theory on practice, and of 
practice on theory, was utterly remarkable—and extremely instructive 
for our own political practices and theorizing. 
Specifically, the form, structure, and practices of the GIP were a 
deliberate effort to instantiate the turn to discourse analysis that Foucault 
had inaugurated in the 1960s. The principal intervention of the GIP was 
to create a space for the voices of prisoners to be heard. This was in 
direct continuity with Foucault’s philosophical and methodological 
tenets. Some historical background will help. 
Following the student and worker uprisings of May 1968, the 
French government cracked down on non-parliamentary political 
organizations. What followed was the massive arrest of several hundred 
Maoists militants and their detention in French prisons. The Maoist 
political organization, La Gauche prolétarienne, demanded at first that 
the prisoners receive political prisoner status. Danièle Rancière and 
Daniel Defert asked Foucault to conduct a popular tribunal to air these 
grievances—on the model of the popular tribunal that Jean-Paul Sartre 
had just conducted in northern France against mining magnates. Foucault 
threw himself into the movement with full force, but in a slightly 
different way, preferring a more horizontal model to that of a popular 
tribunal. After much discussion among a number of intellectuals, the GIP 
emerged on the model of a discursive intervention: it would be a vehicle 
to allow certain discourses to be heard, a way to allow prisoners, whose 
voice was still illegible, to become legible. The GIP was in direct 
continuity with Foucault’s theoretical work in his Archeology of 
Knowledge and Order of Discourse. To see this, one need only examine 
the following three dimensions of the GIP. 
First, by contrast to alternative forms of engagement, such as a 
popular tribunal (originally proposed and extensively debated with other 
Maoists355) or a formal commission of inquiry, the GIP was organized so 
as to allow the incarcerated persons to be heard—rather than be spoken 
for. This principal theme involved a number of sub-elements, including: 
(a) The (relative) anonymity of the organizers. Rather than have a 
named and appointed spokesperson, along the model of Sartre as 
prosecutor and judge of a popular tribunal, the effort was to diffuse 
authority and avoid designated speakers. Still today, few of the central 
figures are known—Danièle Rancière, Christine Martineau, Jacques 
Donzelot, Jean-Claude Passeron would all be participants, working on 
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the original survey, but their names remained somewhat anonymous.356 
Domenach, Foucault, and Vidal-Naquet signed the original manifesto, 
but practically all of the other communiqués were unnamed, signed 
generically by the GIP. 
(b) The leaderlessness of the organization. Insofar as the 
objective was to make it possible to hear those incarcerated and their 
families, rather than to speak on their behalf, there was a concerted effort 
not to identify or allow leadership positions within the GIP. 
(c) The choice not to say what to do, but to allow the voices of the 
prisoners to be heard. As the GIP manifesto declared, “It is not for us to 
suggest reform. We merely wish to know the reality. And to make it 
known almost immediately, almost overnight, because time is short.”357 
You hear this throughout the tracts of the GIP, like this one from March 
15, 1971: 
It is about letting speak those who have an 
experience of prison. It is not that they need help in 
“becoming conscious”: the consciousness of the 
oppression is absolutely clear, and well aware of 
who the enemy is. But the current system denies 
them the means of formulating things, of organizing 
themselves.” 358 
Second, by contrast to the original impetus of the Gauche 
prolétarienne, the GIP challenged the distinction between political and 
common law prisoner. Whereas at first the Maoist militants attempted to 
obtain political prisoner status for their colleagues,359 the GIP took the 
position that all prisoners were political prisoners: that the prison and the 
penal system were political institution. This too was in direct continuity 
with Foucault’s critical theory of penal law. It followed directly from his 
1972 lectures, Théories et institutions pénales, where Foucault had 
developed a political theory of criminal justice. One can see this 
translated directly into the GIP, from the initial manifesto onward, where 
it is clear that the object of the political intervention is the prison tout 
court, not the detention of militants only or political prisoners.360 
Finally, the GIP intervention “ended” at the moment of the 
creation of an autonomous—actually the first—organization of and for 
prisoners, the CAP (Comité d’action des prisonniers). The central 
mission of the GIP, namely hearings the voice of the incarcerated, was 
essentially achieved when the prisoners formed their own association—
thereby triggering, with elegance, the dissolution of the GIP. 
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In this sense, the unique praxis of the GIP emerged seamlessly 
from the theoretical work on discourse analysis, more specifically from 
Foucault’s writings from the History of Madness to the Archaeology of 
Knowledge and the Order of Discourse. As Foucault himself confided to 
Daniel Defert, his involvement in the GIP was, in his words, “dans le 
droit fil de l’Histoire de la folie” (“in a straight line emanating from The 
History of Madness”).361 
Foucault’s investment in prison abolition fit within a line of 
inquiry that Foucault set for himself in his yearly lectures at the Collège 
de France. From the outset, Foucault explored at the Collège the ways in 
which societies used legal forms to produce truth. In his lectures, 
Foucault explored, reading Homer’s Iliad, how the ancient Greeks used 
agonistic competition between heroes to reestablish the social order; how 
early Germanic law used compensation to resolve the blood feud; how 
medieval jurists employed various ordeals or social status to render 
justice; and how we had graduated, in the West, to processes of 
examination and expertise to find and justify the truth in contested legal 
disputes—to tell justice, to engage in what he called “jurisdiction.” On 
December 9, 1970, Foucault indicated, at the moment of his very first 
lesson at the Collège, that his research seminar (distinct from his main 
lectures) would focus on the production of truth in the context of 19th 
century penality.362 Only a few weeks later, Foucault combined those 
intellectual interests with the declaration, on February 8, 1971, of the 
GIP manifesto. 
There was, then, an intimate link between Foucault’s archaeology 
of knowledge and mode of discourse analysis (circa 1970) and his 
political engagement with the GIP. The conceptual architecture of the 
GIP related directly to the structure of his analyses, but also, remarkably, 
his political praxis pushed his theoretical reflections toward both the idea 
of a “political economy of the body” and also the need to supplement the 
archaeological approach with a more genealogical analysis of power. In 
effect, Foucault’s theoretical work in the early 1970s informed his 
political engagement and, reciprocally, his political praxis reshaped his 
theoretical writings. This is well documented in Daniel Defert’s oral 
history of the period, Une Vie politique363, published in 2014, as well as 
in a range of recently published research on the GIP364 and documentary 
film work.365 
The praxis, in effect, leveraged the theory. This is important: if 
you believe in discourse theory, then it matters how you say things, who 
says them, and what is said. You cannot just instrumentally use any 
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device to realize your ambition. Instead, you need to engage in practices 
that will instantiate and cohere with your understanding of politics.  
It is revealing and important, as well, that the influence worked in 
the other direction as well. Foucault’s practical engagements shaped his 
thinking and significantly influenced the writing of his book on prisons, 
Discipline and Punish (1975)—which Foucault himself explicitly 
recognized in the work itself.  You will recall the passage in Discipline 
and Punish where Foucault writes: « Que les punitions en général et que 
la prison relèvent d’une technologie politique du corps, c’est peut-être 
moins l’histoire qui me l’a enseigné que le présent. Au cours de ces 
dernières années, des révoltes de prison se sont produites un peu partout 
dans le monde366. » 
The influence of praxis on theory operated at a number of levels. 
First, Foucault’s practical engagements helped focus his theoretical 
analysis on the materiality and the bodies of the prisoners—the bodies 
that form both the locus of punishment, but also the source of resistance.  
What Discipline and Punish succeeds in doing is to augment the 
traditional Marxist political economy with what Foucault referred to 
expressly as “a political economy of the body.” 
Second, the GIP engagement also helped focus his analysis of the 
relationship between juridical forms and truth—which was the very 
project he set for himself at the Collège—on the juridical form of 
imprisonment that is tied inextricably to the form of examination. 
Third, it revealed to Foucault that his archeological approach was 
not entirely sufficient to the task he had set himself, and that a 
genealogical method was necessary. The first-hand experience of the 
prison and witnessing of the routinized, homogenous uniformity of 
isolated confinement, intolerable prison conditions, and the day-in-and-
day-out repetitiveness and recurrence of prison life manifested to 
Foucault the difference from the ideals of the prison reformers of the 
eighteenth century, thereby revealing to him that an archaeological 
approach alone was not sufficient, and that a genealogical method was 
necessary. Archeology would have entailed the derivation of the prison 
from the theories of the 18th and 19th century reformers. Foucault 
discovered that was impossible, and instead he had to seek its 
development in a genealogy of morals. You can hear this first in 1973 in 
his lectures on The punitive society—where you get a clear turn to the 
penitential; and of course we received the full articulation in 1975. 
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Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the GIP engagements 
turned Foucault’s attention to the productive aspects of penality. Right 
after he visited Attica prison in New York State in April 1972—his first 
direct access to a prison, an experience which he describes as 
“overwhelming”367—Foucault shifted the focus of his analysis. Upset 
and “undermined” by this visit, Foucault began an analytical transition 
towards the “positive functions” of the penal system:  “the question that I 
ask myself now is the reverse,” he explained at the time.  “The problem 
is, then, to find out what role capitalist society has its penal system play, 
what is the aim that is sought, and what effects are produced by all these 
procedures for punishment and exclusion. What is their place in the 
economic process, what is their importance in the maintenance and 
exercise of power? What is their role in the class struggle?”368 
Fifth, Foucault’s involvement in the GIP also produced a keen 
awareness of the seriousness of these struggles—something that would 
behoove us. Foucault’s turn to the notion of “civil war” as the basic 
matrix to understand social order was a direct outgrowth of this period. It 
loomed largest in 1972 and 1973, right during and after the peak of the 
prison riots in France—the revolt in the Ney prison of Toul in December 
1971, the Charles-III jail of Nancy 15 January 1972, and the prisons of 
Nîmes, Amiens, Loos, Fleury-Mérogis among others.369   After the revolt 
at Toul, on 5 January 1972, in a joint press conference of the G.I.P. and 
the Comité Vérité Toul, Foucault declared that “what took place at Toul 
is the start of a new process:  the first phase of a political struggle 
directed against the entire penitentiary system by the social strata that is 
its primary victim.”370  Civil war comes to fore just at this time in his 
lectures at the Collège de France. 
Foucault’s praxis sharpened his awareness of the stakes of the 
battle. Foucault’s lectures at the time were peppered with indignation, 
almost anger, against those who misjudge the seriousness of the political 
struggle: 
We are forever in the habit of speaking of the 
“stupidity” of the bourgeoisie. I wonder whether the 
theme of the stupid bourgeois is not a theme for 
intellectuals: those who imagine that merchants are 
narrow-minded, people with money are mulish, and 
those with power are blind. Safe from this belief, 
moreover, the bourgeoisie is remarkably intelligent. 
The lucidity and intelligence of this class, which has 
conquered and kept power under conditions we 
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know, produce many effects of stupidity and 
blindness, but where, if not precisely in the stratum 
of intellectuals?  We may define intellectuals as 
those on whom the intelligence of the bourgeoisie 
produces an effect of blindness and stupidity.371 
And Foucault added, in the margin of his manuscript:  “Those 
who deny this are public entertainers.  They fail to recognize the 
seriousness of the struggle.”372 
It may be possible to summarize all this by saying that the 1973 
lectures on The Punitive Society, the book Discipline and Punish, and the 
militancy of the GIP together formed a philosophical act, what Gilles 
Deleuze referred to as “a theoretical revolution,”373 that was aimed to 
deconstruct the distinction between political and common law prisoners, 
actualize a civil war matrix, and build alliances in society between 
critical theorists, political militants, and criminal justice practitioners. As 
he famously said of the book he was writing, Discipline and Punish: 
“The little volume I would like to write about the disciplinary systems, I 
would want it to be useful for an educator, a guard, a magistrate, a 
conscientious objector. I don’t write for a public, I write for users, not for 
readers.”374 
There were other important elements to the GIP engagement that 
involved dimensions of frank speech, of a mode of life, and of an 
aesthetics of existence. These are themes and concepts that flourish in 
Foucault’s later lectures, and yet they are clearly reflected in the way in 
which the members of the GIP were proceeding. They relate closely to 
Foucault’s discussion of the Cynics and of the Cynics’ mode of life and 
their critique of their surroundings, all of which are developed in great 
depth in his last set of lectures in 1984 on The Courage of Truth. 
Critical theory as a way of living, as a mode of life: this is, as 
Foucault explored in The Courage of Truth, the characteristic life of the 
Cynics—of those philosophers in the tradition of Antisthenes and 
Diogenes of Sinope who, from the fifth century BCE to the fifth century 
CE, espoused a simple mode of life that challenged most of the 
conventions of society. There are certain key concepts associated with 
the Cynics, at least on Foucault’s reading: An aesthetics of existence, 
frank talk, and life as a work of art.375 Cynic practice is all about a 
particular mode of life. And on Foucault’s reading, this mode of life is 
inextricably linked to a certain form of truth-telling, a particular ethical 
form of parrhesia. Truth-telling is, as we know, by no means limited to 
the Cynics, but the Cynics are in part defined by their truth-telling. “The 
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Cynic is constantly characterized as the man of parrhesia, the man of 
truth-telling,” Foucault tells us. 376  If anything, it is the kind of 
parrhesiastic truth-telling that is characterized by “insolence”: this is a 
term that Foucault began to deploy in relation to the frank speech of the 
Cynics. 
In helping the prisoners to be heard, and in paving the way for 
them to create their own prisoners’ action organization, the CAP, 
Foucault’s praxis had at its center a mode of life geared toward 
independence, simplicity, and autarky. This resonates distinctly with the 
Cynics, who Foucault would study and approximate in his final years. 
Praxis and theory came together perfectly. 
B.  Political Disobedience: Occupy 
I have written extensively about the praxis of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement, and placed it under the rubric of what I call “political 
disobedience.”377 Political, rather than civil disobedience, because, in my 
view, the Occupiers did not accept in any way the legitimacy of the 
existing legal regime. By contrast to Rev. Martin Luther King or 
Mahatma Gandhi, the Occupiers were not breaking the law in order to be 
punished and to expose the injustice of the law. They were not accepting 
the constitutional structure or the very notion of the rule of law, but 
instead challenging the existing political system. Their disobedience was 
political in nature, not civil. 
It would be useful here to return to those discussions to explore 
how the theoretical world vision of the Occupiers shaped their praxis. 
There too, praxis and theory came together perfectly. The Occupiers 
instantiated a form of political disobedience that prefigured participatory, 
egalitarian democracy, that tried to be leaderless, non-hierarchical, and 
not means-ends driven or merely instrumental, and that tried to avoid 
being coopted by the dominant hegemonic system of party politics. 
Their praxis implemented their world view, their values, and 
their ambitions—their critical utopias. The leaderlessness reflected their 
embrace of equality and respect. The general assemblies represented an 
open mode of discourse and prefigured the kind of democratic processes 
they envisioned. The resistance to formulating policies translated into 
praxis their skepticism with easy answers and technocratic solutions. The 
experience, overall, had a transformative element for many of the 
Occupiers that was connected to their emphasis on self-care, self-
government, and the creation of new subjectivities. 
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Others might return to this experiment to explore how the praxis 
and theoretical outlook of the Occupiers overlapped and cohered—I 
personally have written too much about it already. What is clear is that 
the interaction was mobilizing for many people. 
C.  #BlackLivesMatter and BYP100 
The #BlackLivesMatter hashtag was born of a Facebook post by 
Alicia Garza that went viral in July 2013, right after George 
Zimmerman’s acquittal at his trial in Florida for the homicide of Trayvon 
Martin.378 Garza’s partner, Patrisse Cullors, took a snippet from that 
post, added the hashtag, and thereby created one of the most important 
political memes of the twety-first century: #BlackLivesMatter. Another 
acquaintance, Opal Tometi in Brooklyn, developed a social media 
platform to deploy the term and connect the emerging networks of 
activists. 
It was at about that time that the United States exploded with 
incident after incident of video-taped police shootings or killings of 
unarmed black men and women. Eric Garner died of asphyxiation from a 
chokehold under the weight of several NYPD officers on the streets of 
Staten Island, New York, on July 17, 2014. A month later, August 9, 
2014, an unarmed eighteen-year-old young man, Michael Brown, was 
shot dead in Ferguson, Missouri, by police officer Darren Wilson. Two 
months later, on October 20, 2014, on the Southwest Side of Chicago, 
police officer Jason Van Dyke unloaded sixteen rounds of his 9mm 
semiautomatic service weapon into seventeen-year-old Laquan 
McDonald. The wave of police killings continued on and off camera, 
around the country, with the police shooting deaths of twenty-eight-year-
old Akai Gurley in a Brooklyn stairwell on November 20, 2014; of 
twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in a Cleveland park on November 22, 2014; 
of fifty-year-old Walter Scott, shot in the back five times on April 4, 
2015 in North Charleston, South Carolina; of thirty-two-year-old 
Philando Castile, pulled over in a suburb of Saint Paul, Minnesota, and 
shot seven times on July 6, 2016 while peacefully trying to explain his 
situation; of thirty-year-old Charleena Lyles, shot in front of her four 
children in Seattle, Washington, after calling the police on an attempted 
burglary on June 18, 2017; and of the deaths in police custody of thirty-
seven-year-old Tanisha Anderson in Cleveland, slammed on the 
pavement while being arrested, and of twenty-eight-year-old Sandra 
Bland found hanging in her jail cell in Waller County, Texas, on July 13, 
2015—all African American men and women. 
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It was during the protests in Ferguson and throughout the country 
in response to these events that the #BlackLivesMatter movement was 
born.379 The movement consisted of a range of activism, extending from 
individual acts of resistance to local collectives to national organizations 
all self-identifying as part of a broader movement for Black lives, anti-
racism, and racial justice. The key element was self identification. There 
was no authoritative policing, no institutional judge of who could 
legitimately claim to be part of the movement, and perhaps as a result, 
the edges and boundaries of the movement were fluid. 
There was, on the one hand, the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter itself 
that still is a unique phenomenon and does an enormous amount of work 
on its own. It might be worth stopping here for a moment—on the 
hashtag itself—to explore how this phenomenon represents a new form 
of uprising and how it challenges the very notion of a movement. The 
hashtag is a radical new form of politics, in large part because anyone 
can deploy it. The hashtag resists appropriation. It can spread on its own, 
and has a certain malleability, so that it can be redeployed in different 
and new contexts of anti-racist protest. As a result, it can be seen 
pervasively and has resilience. It does not allow for the identification of 
leaders. And it resists the organizational form, since the hashtag, almost 
in its identity, resists appropriation. In this, the hashtag is brilliantly 
responsive to the problems that have plagued social movements to date. 
There were, on the other hand, a number of local organizations 
(in Chicago, for instance, Assata’s Daughters, We Charge Genocide, 
Black Lives Matter–Chicago, and Peoples Response Team) and national 
organizations like the Black Lives Matter Global Network (that traces 
back to Garza, Cullors, and Tometi) or BYP100, as well as over 30 
chapters of #BlackLivesMatter across the country, that coalesced into a 
larger national Movement for Black Lives with specific policy platforms. 
These groups varied somewhat in their organization and 
leadership. But one thing that still seems to united them all is a 
commitment to avoiding the model of the single heroic male leader that 
is so common to prior movements and revolutions—from Robespierre 
and Danton, to George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, to Marx and 
Lenin, to Mao, Gandhi, and Che Guevara, to Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Malcolm X. There is hardly a modern revolution or revolutionary project 
that is not associated with a great man. (Not surprisingly, all of the major 
counterrevolutions today as well are headed by charismatic male 
figures). 
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The thread that ties together all of the different facets of the 
movement for Black lives is the direct challenge to that history. And in 
this, as Barbara Ransby underscores, we can see the strong influence that 
black feminist and LGBTQ theorists and practitioners have had on many 
of the leaders of the Movement for Black Lives.380 As the website of the 
Black Lives Matter Global Network recounts, in its herstory: 
Black liberation movements in this country have 
created room, space, and leadership mostly for 
Black heterosexual, cisgender men—leaving 
women, queer and transgender people, and others 
either out of the movement or in the background to 
move the work forward with little or no recognition. 
As a network, we have always recognized the need 
to center the leadership of women and queer and 
trans people. To maximize our movement muscle, 
and to be intentional about not replicating harmful 
practices that excluded so many in past movements 
for liberation, we made a commitment to placing 
those at the margins closer to the center.381 
As noted earlier, these movements are also developing, on these 
bases, now forms of “group-centered leadership practices,” in Ransby’s 
words. These authorize decision making by those on the ground who 
have better understandings of the community’s problems and how to 
carry out solutions. 
The movement for Black lives is now “a movement of 
movements.” The term captures perfectly the diversity of groups, 
projects, alliances, and organizations that make up the larger movement 
for Black lives and that is represented by the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. 
The expression has been used, recently, in other contexts, including for 
instance with regard to the movements challenging neoliberal 
globalization,382 or with regard to the New Left more generally.383 And 
the term has been deployed more recently in various debates, pro and 
con—suggesting that it may indeed have negative potential if it is 
associated with a desire to control or rein in other movements, or to 
privilege one organization or set of actors of another.384 But if we think 
of the singular in “a movement of movements” not as an identifiable 
organization or set of actors or even single actor, but rather as the larger 
whole that is greater than the parts of all the different organizations for 
Black lives—from BYP100 to the Black Lives Matter Global Network, 
to the chapters of #BlackLivesMatter, to all the different groups that 
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militate side-by-side, like Assata’s Daughters, We Charge Genocide, or 
the Peoples Response Team—then the term seems to capture perfectly 
what is going on today. 
If we speak of the larger phenomenon that is associated with the 
hashtag and made up of all the organizations and groups, then we have 
what could be called a “movement of movements,” one that does indeed 
seem to resist appropriation or cooptation. That is perhaps, ultimately, 
the theoretical genius of the hashtag and the larger movement: it cannot 
be coopted because it cannot be pinned down or associated with any one 
particular group or person. It makes the movement ultimately larger than 
any of its constituent parts, broader than any of the specific 
organizations, and longer-lasting than the present constellation. 
One of its strengths, theoretically, is that it rejects a politics of 
respectability. But it has many others. The fact that is contains 
organizations that are so well organized, using these new and innovative 
table structures (i.e. tables for communications, policy, law, healing 
justice, electoral justice, etc.) to reach policy proposals, as Shanelle 
Matthews demonstrated.385 The fact that there is a deep engagement with 
the state and with policy, but no ambition to be the state. The resonance 
with the Foucaultian idea of critique as the desire not to be governed 
thusly. The way in which the organizations repoliticize the public sphere, 
as Deva Woodly emphasizes—and the potential for democratic 
experimentation that these movements express.386 
As Deva Woodly suggests, the movement for Black lives revives 
and repoliticizes the public sphere by countering a growing “politics of 
despair.” The different manifestations of #BlackLivesMatter protest, 
then, should not be understood as “pre-political.” They themselves are 
inherently political and they may be what allows a democracy to correct 
itself—since, as Woodly correctly noted, the institutions alone certainly 
do not seem capable of correcting themselves. 
A rich debate has emerged between the strands of Black joy and 
dandyism in the movement—in effect, over the desire not be reduced to 
victimhood and death—versus the elements of Afro-pessimism and the 
dark truth that the movement itself was born from fatal encounters of 
young black women and men with the police. Kendall Thomas 
ultimately argues for recognition of the foundational element of 
mourning and Black death in the movement to fight against injustice 
itself and as a motivating force. “I am pessimistic. I am pessimistic,” 
Thomas declares in a powerful intervention. “We fought for and won this 
new legal order… and yet have prisons which are filled with black and 
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brown citizens in complete compliance with the law…. I think there is 
something to the claim by the Afro-pessimist Frank Wilderson. The 
notion of black citizenship in the US is an oxymoron…. At the same 
time, the #BlackLivesMatter movement has given us joy and it gives me 
hope. But the challenge is to hold on to both ends of the chain at once: 
the pessimism, which provokes the passion to rage against injustice, and 
at the same time that joy that gives us a vision of the future that allows us 
to imagine that another world is possible.” 
To imagine how this other world is possible, it may be useful to 
investigate, specifically, how black youth movements crystalized in 
response to the shooting death of Laquan McDonald in Chicago and to 
the fact that the state’s attorney, Anita Alvarez, waited almost 400 days 
to indict police officer Jason Van Dyke in the fatal shooting of Laquan 
McDonald.  
A Case Study: #BLM Activism in Chicago 
“Two down, one to go!” The chant started quietly, and then 
caught on, resonating across the victory ballroom at the Downtown 
Holiday Inn in Chicago. The Democratic state’s attorney candidate, Kim 
Foxx, had just unseated Anita Alvarez in the March 2016 primaries. 
Alvarez, the sitting county prosecutor, had infamously waited almost 400 
days to indict police officer Jason Van Dyke in the fatal shooting of 
Laquan McDonald. At the time of the indictment four months earlier in 
November 2015, Alvarez and Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel were 
hounded by another chant—“16 shots and a cover-up!”—but now, the 
movement had a new slogan, “Two down, one to Go!” along with its 
new hashtag “#Bye Anita,” two catchy memes that it was chanting and 
posting all over social media.387 
The first down, of course, was former Chicago police 
superintendent Garry McCarthy, who was quickly sacrificed by mayor 
Emanuel as soon as the cover-up began to get exposed and the political 
heat turned on—fired on December 1, 2015. Anita Alvarez was the 
second, with Foxx taking 58 percent of the primary vote, against 
Alvarez’s 29 percent, and now headed to a likely election in the generals 
in the fall of 2016.388 
This group of young activists, mobilized by the Laquan 
McDonald cover-up, rallied against the sitting state’s attorney, Alvarez. 
With T-shirts bearing “Adios Anita” and a flurry of social media 
carrying the hashtag #ByeAnita, these young activists are probably 
responsible for taking down the prosecutor. Alvarez had been leading her 
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challengers in the polls well into February 2016;389 but the concerted 
efforts of these activists, on the streets and on the Internet, seem to have 
shifted the tide. 
According to newspaper reports, the young activists who buoyed 
Foxx’s campaign were predominantly young African-American 
organizers in movements such as the Black Youth Project 100, Assata’s 
Daughters, and We Charge Genocide.390 These are a new set of popular, 
bottom-up, militant organizations, often interlinked, with an interesting 
new political character and a strong digital presence on social media. The 
presentation of the People’s Response Team on their Facebook page is 
characteristic: 
The People’s Response Team is a team of 
concerned community members committed to 
supporting efforts to end police violence in 
Chicago. We do not collaborate with law 
enforcement. We aim to respond to, document, and 
investigate fatal police shootings in Chicago and 
connect family members and loved ones with 
emotional, social, and legal support. Many of us are 
members of We Charge Genocide, Chicago 
Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression 
(CAARPR), Black Lives Matter – Chicago, and 
other grassroots organizations challenging police 
violence.391 
What is interesting is that these movements did not explicitly 
endorse the other candidate, Foxx. They mobilized against Alvarez, and 
succeeded in getting her out of office; but they did not actively campaign 
for Foxx. As Kampf-Lassin reports, “While none of these groups 
explicitly endorsed Foxx, they did work diligently to make sure 
Chicagoans did not vote for Alvarez. Brenna Champion, an organizer 
with BYP100, said that the group canvassed, knocked on doors 
throughout the city with their anti-Alvarez message and reached out to 
2,500 voters who planned to vote for Foxx, focusing on African-
American voters, largely on college campuses.”392 
In fact, not only did they not endorse Foxx, some of the groups 
made it clear that they too had their eye on her. @AssataDuaghters stated 
this explicitly in their “collective victory” statement they posted on-line: 
Chicago Black youth kicked Anita Alvarez out of 
office. Just a month ago, Anita Alvarez was 
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winning in the polls. Communities who refuse to be 
killed and jailed and abused without any chance at 
justice refused to allow that to happen. We did this 
for Rekia. We did this for Laquan. We won’t stop 
until we’re free and Kim Foxx should know that 
well.393 
“Kim Foxx should know that well”:  An ominous statement to the 
candidate who unseated Alvarez—reflecting the particular strategy of 
these young activists. 
And of course, both in Chicago and at the national level, they 
have confronted and challenged—and intensified—relations to older, 
more established civil rights figures, such as Jesse Jackson, Sr., and the 
Democratic establishment, both Hillary and Bill Clinton. Some of this is 
not unusual and can be chalked to generational shifts and more radical 
politics. The organization BYP100, for instance—an outgrowth of Cathy 
Cohen’s Black Youth Project at the University of Chicago—advocates in 
the long term for the “outright abolition of the police department and the 
prison system,” as well as “reparations, universal childcare, a higher 
minimum wage, the decriminalization of marijuana,” and more.394 But 
there is also a different political sensibility at play, especially in relation 
to the political establishment. 
There is a rapport, though, to Occupy. So, for instance, BYP100 
flips the famous Occupy slogan about the bottom 99% and the top 1%: in 
their self-presentation, they associate themselves more closely with the 
bottom 1%, which can only be understood in relation to Occupy. As they 
write on their webpage: “We envision a more economically just society 
that values the lives and well-being of ALL Black people, including 
women, queer, and transgender folks, the incarcerated and formerly 
incarcerated as well as those who languish in the bottom 1% of the 
economic hierarchy.”395 
BYP100 specifically positions itself against a politics of 
respectability, claiming to speak on behalf of “ALL black people” 
including the most marginalized LGBTQ folks.396 Their agenda, they 
writes, is “not meant to advance politics of respectability—we want ALL 
Black people to be able to live in their dignity.”397 With a strong national 
coordinator, Charlene A. Carruthers, they do not present as leaderless or 
starry-eyed. They set out their positions and their demands clearly, 
backed up with research and community sentiment, in a 24-page 
“Agenda To Keep Us Safe,” that includes lengthy “References and 
Additional Resources.”398 
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Here too, then, we can identify numerous ways in which the 
praxis and critical theory come together and leverage each other. This is 
undoubtedly the greatest strength of the movement for Black lives. 
III. 
In terms of method, then, theory and praxis need to work 
together—as Foucault did in harmonizing discourse theory and the GIP, 
as Occupy did in prefiguring new forms of democracy, as the Movement 
for Black Lives has done in rejecting a politics of respectability. That is, 
after all, the point of infinitely testing and revaluing our beliefs and 
material conditions: to ensure that we are not deluding ourselves again, 
to test our praxis against our theoria, with the blows of a hammer.  
In the end, our praxis should be guided by the following core 
principles: 
1. There are no universals. Action has to be judged in 
context, en situation. Nothing is off the table: in a colonial 
setting, in a brutal authoritarian setting, violent armed resistance 
seems entirely appropriate. In a liberal democracy, physical 
violence may be counterproductive, and other forms of praxis 
may be necessary instead. 
2. As between different tactics—e.g. occupation, hunger 
strike, mobilization, litigation, etc.—there are, again, no 
universals. Different forms will function in different contexts. 
Occupy Wall Street may have functioned in the setting of the 
Obama administration, but would not under the Trump 
presidency. There is a need for situated interventions. 
3. That being said, what is called for is constant 
insubordination: the struggle is unending, and has to be 
considered as a permanent pushback against the forces of tyranny 
and inequity. The paradigm should be “constant countering,” 
where the counter-move ends up achieving autonomy so that it is 
no longer merely reacting to the opponent. It must become an 
autonomous political form: A constant countering that overcomes 
its own reactivity to become a force of its own  
In all this, we need to resist foundational thinking and adamantly 
overcome the hegemonic ideas we oppose.  
The deceit of hegemonic ideas is that we begin to believe them 
and internalize them. That’s true of the neoliberal ideas of market 
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efficiency. It is equally true of counterinsurgency governmentality. We 
begin to think that the masses are passive, and can be swayed one way or 
the other. Or that there is only a small minority that is prepared to 
actively resist—and a small guardian class that is maintaining an 
oppressive system. Part of what makes these ideas so powerful is that we 
begin to absorb them, to internalize them in our own thinking about how 
to resist, we begin to believe them or stop asking questions.  
But the truth is, they are just illusions: The myth of natural 
orderliness in economics that has come down to us from the divine order 
of the first economists. The delusion of an economic sphere that is 
somehow self-regulated. The illusion of an insurrection, of a small active 
minority ready to sway the passive masses. The “passive masses”: 
Nothing could be further from the truth. That counterrevolutionary vision 
of society—of a tripartite division of society, with the passive masses in 
the middle—is pure fiction. It is far too simplistic and misleading. The 
masses have never been passive. And they are not passive today. They 
know what they want, and they know what they are doing. Today, the 
vast majority of Americans are content: with their digital pleasures and 
their on-line shopping, they are enjoying life. And that’s what many 
want, to simply enjoy life. For many of us, as long as we have a 
modicum of pleasure, we are content. It is what allows us to go on with 
our lives even when someone like Donald Trump is elected president and 
makes a mockery of our democracy. It’s only when there is a direct 
affront to our way of life, when for instance our retirements were 
threatened by the Great Recession of 2008, that people—at least a 
number of people—take to the streets. The election of Trump did not 
cause a constitutional crisis or a political revolt because most people did 
not believe he would fundamentally destabilize their way of life. That is 
not passivity, it is deliberate. It is intentional. 
The masses are not passive. When they are quiet, they tolerate. 
They might tolerate because they are scared, or because they think the 
alternative would be worse, or because they have been taught to tolerate. 
But it is not because they are inherently passive. Whether in an 
authoritarian or democratic regime, the political system always depends 
on the authorization and legitimacy of the people. What Gandhi made 
clear through his inspiring acts of non-violent resistance (satyagraha) is 
that a regime, even an oppressive regime that wields all the military 
force, cannot survive if it does not have the backing or support of the 
citizens. That was the lesson of Gandhi’s resistance. 
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PART IV: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?  
September 1, 2018. New York, New York, United States.  
In the wake of decades of neoliberal government policies since 
the 1970s and the fallout of a global war on terror since 9/11, the United 
States has entered a new historical epoch: the American 
Counterrevolution. It is characterized by a new style of governing abroad 
and at home modeled on a counterinsurgency paradigm of warfare. It is 
accompanied at the domestic and international level by growing 
inequalities and a global grab for the commons. 
Our current crises were precipitated by a number of illusions, 
three in particular: first, the belief in the efficiency and superiority of 
“free markets”; second, and increasingly, the creation out of whole cloth 
of a phantom internal enemy composed of Muslim-Americans, 
Mexicans-Americans, African-American protesters, undocumented 
persons, and other minorities; and third, the faith in the neutrality of the 
rule of law that has allowed our leaders to legalize intolerable practices 
in the global war on terror.  
The current political situation calls for short, medium, and long-
term praxis tailored specifically to the critical times. First and 
immediately, President Trump must be stopped in his tracks, through a 
combination of litigating his executive orders, supporting swing-district 
candidates in the 2018 midterms, exposing Trumps’ political corruption, 
and delaying his Supreme Court nominations. Second, a Left 
groundswell movement for the 2020 presidential elections needs to be 
nurtured and supported, with the most deference to the younger 
generations and the disenfranchised. Third, we need to seize the upper 
hand in cultural, social, and political interpretations. For the long-term, 
the critical Left must better instill and reinforce its core values of equity, 
compassion, and respect among all generations, especially the youngest. 
This part will articulate the critical praxis we need in the United States 
on September 1, 2018. 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
174 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
175 
Chapter 13: Crisis – New York, September 1, 2018 
The United States has entered a new historical epoch. Since 9/11 
and the War in Iraq, and especially now under President Donald J. 
Trump, the country has embraced a new way of governing abroad and at 
home modeled on counterinsurgency warfare. At its heart is the 
deliberate construction of internal enemies on domestic soil—a central 
tactic of counterinsurgency warfare—as a way to centralize and unleash 
unbounded executive power. We are now living through a new period 
that can only be properly described as the American Counterrevolution. 
Few grasp the magnitude of this historical shift. 
The seeds were planted at the birth of the Republic, when Black 
slaves and Indigenous peoples became the country’s first internal 
enemies. The gestational period extended over decades, or rather 
centuries—from the Trail of Tears to the demise of Reconstruction, 
through Jim Crow and the era of lynching, through the Asian Exclusion 
Act and quotas on Arabs, Italians, and Jews, to the Japanese internment 
camps and the Vietnam War. 
But it was at that time specifically—in the 1960’s—that this new 
mode of governing took shape: Counterinsurgency warfare emerged as a 
new way of pacifying populations abroad and citizens at home. 
Counterinsurgency strategies were honed during the brutal Western 
colonial wars in Indochina, Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam, and rapidly 
brought home to the United States to surveil and repress minorities. With 
the F.B.I.’s COINTELPRO, its targeting of civil rights leaders, and the 
brutal repression of the Black Panther movement, counterinsurgency 
methods were domesticated. 
Since 9/11 and the War in Iraq, this warfare paradigm of 
government has been perfected, expanded, and turned into an art form. In 
a three-step movement of world historical proportion, America’s 
political leadership has brought home and now governs through the logic 
of counterinsurgency warfare.  
It started abroad, in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the 
United States military retooled those counterinsurgency tactics from the 
colonial wars and embraced those very strategies—waterboarding and 
stress positions, indefinite detention, targeted assassinations—this time 
on Muslims in the war zone and at “black sites” and secret prisons 
around the world. 
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The United States government then extended those 
counterinsurgency strategies more widely throughout its foreign policy 
in international affairs, using targeted drone strikes outside of war zones, 
rendition of suspects for torture to complicitous countries around the 
world, and total information awareness on all foreigners. 
American leaders then brought those techniques home to roost. 
Covert operatives began infiltrating mosques and college student groups, 
and surveilling Muslim businesses—without individualized suspicion. 
The NSA turned its total surveillance apparatus on ordinary Americans, 
bulk-collecting all their telephony metadata, social media, and digital 
traces. Local police forces became hyper-militarized, with excess 
counterinsurgency equipment and techniques—military-grade assault 
weapons, armored vehicles, tanks, night scopes, grenade launchers, and 
more. 
The surprise Electoral College victory of Donald Trump, and the 
right-wing populist wave that ensued, has crystalized this new mode of 
governing and propelled it to its ultimate and final stage: a perfected 
model of domestic government through a counterinsurgency warfare 
paradigm despite the absence of an active insurgency at home. A 
counterrevolutionary method of governing without a revolution. A 
counterinsurgency without an insurgency, through the creation out of 
whole cloth of internal enemies—by transforming religious and ethnic 
minorities into dangerous threats. 
And the United States Supreme Court just placed its 
constitutional seal on this new and radical way of governing. The 
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Muslim Ban constitutionally 
whitewashed President Trump’s explicit and open discriminatory 
animus. It placed the highest court’s constitutional imprimatur on the 
historical transformation in how Americans govern themselves abroad 
and at home: America’s political leaders now can, and our President now 
does, rule through the willful demonization of minorities, through the 
deliberate construction of internal enemies and, more broadly, through a 
counterinsurgency warfare paradigm of government. By failing to 
censure the President’s hate-filled rhetoric, or to pierce his 
administration’s pretext and smokescreen, the Supreme Court pushed the 
country further down this extremely dangerous path. Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s retirement and imminent replacement will only make matters 
worse. A solid decades-long conservative majority at the Supreme Court 
will entrench the immunity that the court just bestowed on our political 
leaders. 
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Behind this new and radical way of governing, a populist wave of 
social reforms are waiting in the wings: restrictions on women’s 
reproductive choice, limits on health care regulation, expanded religious 
exemptions, the elimination of affirmative action in education, 
exclusionary policies against sexual minorities, and virulent law and 
order policies that will further target and destroy minority communities. 
We are now living the American Counterrevolution. The 
evidence is all around us. First, practices of terror integral to 
counterinsurgency strategy—torture, indefinite detention, summary 
drone strikes—have become normalized. So much so that President 
Trump could appoint to head the C.I.A. a woman who herself personally 
oversaw a black-site prison in Thailand during the heyday of the Bush 
torture program. We Americans now prize rather than revile the brutal 
excesses of the “war on terror.” We reward, rather than penalize, those 
who carried them out. 
Second, indefinite detention, which President Barack Obama had 
pledged to end, has now become entrenched. President Trump has left 
vacant the position at the Department of Defense that approves any 
transfers out of the Guantánamo Bay camp. As a result, even those men 
who were approved for transfer before his inauguration are still 
indefinitely imprisoned. 
Third, targeted drone assassinations have become so routine that 
Americans no longer pay attention to them—despite significant increases 
under the Trump administration. There has been a dramatic decrease in 
public information about drone strikes, and less and less news reporting 
about civilian drone casualties. Soon we will no longer even recognize or 
acknowledge the summary executions and the innocent casualties. 
Fourth, total information awareness—the cornerstone of 
counterinsurgency theory—is now achieved on all of the American 
population. The groundwork was laid in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 
with the bulk collection of all telephony metadata of American citizens 
through programs such as Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
the myriad NSA tools exposed by Edward Snowden. Those programs 
remain virtually unchanged since then. 
Fifth, counterinsurgency tactics and logics now pervade policing 
and law enforcement across the United States. With the NYPD 
surveillance of mosques and Muslim businesses, the DOJ targeting of 
Muslims for suspicionless interrogations, the FBI crack-down on 
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Pakistani neighborhoods in New York City, and hyper-militarized police 
forces, we now live the Counterrevolution on Main Street USA. 
Sixth, President Donald Trump has successfully and deliberately 
constructed phantom internal enemies on domestic soil—another core 
tactic of counterinsurgency warfare. With his campaign pledge for “a 
total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” his 
unambiguous Islamophobic propaganda, and his crystal-clear innuendos 
about “political correctness,” Trump methodically turned Muslim-
Americans and Muslims into internal enemies who need to be contained 
and eliminated. 
The Muslim Ban was the centerpiece of that strategy. “Islam 
hates us,” Trump declared, “we can’t allow people coming into this 
country who have this hatred of the United States . . . [a]nd of people that 
are not Muslim.” With his call for a database or even worse, for the 
registration of Muslims and for the renewed infiltration of mosques, 
Trump demonized Muslim-Americans and turned them into a dangerous 
insurgency. Other groups as well. The F.B.I.’s designation of “Black 
Identity Extremists” converted ordinary African-American and 
#BlackLivesMatter protesters into dangerous internal threats. Trump’s 
derogatory remarks about Mexicans and Hispanics, and his persistent 
effort to build a wall on our Southern border, turned Latinos into 
criminal social enemies. 
The evidence is indeed overwhelming: Since 9/11, but especially 
under the presidency of Donald Trump, governing through 
counterinsurgency has become entirely normalized. Our political 
leadership has embraced a counterinsurgency model of governing at 
home that operates through total information awareness, creating and 
targeting phantom internal enemies, and pacifying the general 
population—the three core strategies of unconventional warfare. We 
have brought home the mentalities and logics, the techniques and tactics, 
and all the equipment from the War in Iraq and Afghanistan. And by 
failing to censure these discriminatory tactics or even to acknowledge his 
religious animus in words and language, or to cut through the pretextual 
charade that Trump himself mocked (“We all know what that means!” in 
Trump’s words)—the Supreme Court constitutionally immunized this 
new way of governing. 
With that new and radical form of governing, a populist wave of 
social conservatism is blanketing the country—fueled by Donald 
Trump’s unilateral interventions and knack for social media. 
Immediately upon inauguration, Trump seized unbounded executive 
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power through a series of unconscionable executive orders 
discriminating not only against Muslims, but against all immigrants, 
Latinos, LGBTQ communities, and other minorities. Trump immediately 
began overseeing the dismantling of social structures and institutions—
from the national parks, national service programs, and refugee 
resettlement to net neutrality and health care—in order to facilitate an 
even more aggressive grab on the public commons, forcing all 
Americans to financially contribute to his real estate empire from Mar-a-
Lago to the Trump National Golf Club in Bedminster, New Jersey, 
where Donald Trump spent an average of one third of his time as 
president in his first three months.399 Trump immediately began to 
govern the United States through a reality-TV Apprentice-like “you’re 
fired” management style, Tweeting impulsive and dramatic policy 
changes without even consulting his own cabinet. During the first 
months, Trump led a putsch of political norms—a coup d’état, not of the 
rule of law, which itself has always been infinitely malleable, but rather a 
coup of norms. From small things to large. The fact that President Trump 
did not disclose his federal taxes, or that he so willingly flouted the 
norms surrounding conflicts of interest—ditching Camp David for Mar-
a-Lago—or that he effectively enthroned a royal family and a storm of 
palace intrigues, these all reflect a style of regal hierarchy and 
differentiation that resonate with his wealth accumulation and inequality. 
Trump and the richest Americans have become, somehow, above the 
rest—a class to themselves, as evidenced by Trump touting an 
unprecedented right to extend the presidential pardon to himself. From 
the moment he entered the White House, Trump has converted, in a 
strange alchemy, wealth inequality into power, inching the country more 
and more toward an authoritarian and unbounded executive reign. 
There is, in effect, a revolution happening around us—one that is 
making significant inroads. Donald Trump has captured the GOP and 
Republican voters, who overwhelmingly support him now, with approval 
ratings at 90%. Trump has just turned the Supreme Court conservative 
for decades to come. And if the Republicans maintain a majority in the 
House and Senate through the 2018 midterms, the entire government 
would be Donald Trump’s. 
Alongside these developments, and fueling them, have been 
decades of economic neoliberalism that have had long-term economic 
effects of wealth concentration and elite consolidation. As Thomas 
Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Anthony Atkinson, and their colleagues 
demonstrate, the United States has experienced a steady concentration of 
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wealth by the wealthiest beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the 
present—as evidenced in Figure 1. 
  
Source:  Figure I.1 from Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century: “Income Inequality in the United States, 1910-2010.” 
The result is disparities and inequalities that are unimaginable. 
Today, the three richest Americans hold more wealth than the combined 
wealth of 50% of Americans: three men, Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, and 
Warren Buffet, have more wealth than half the population of the United 
States.400 The 100 richest Americans hold about as much wealth as all of 
the country’s 42 million African American residents; the 186 richest hold 
as much wealth as all of the country’s 55 million Latinos.401 America’s 
400 wealthiest individuals hold more wealth than about two-thirds (or 
64%) of Americans.402 
Whereas most Americans, for instance, believe that the 
compensation ratio for a CEO compared to a low-skilled factory worker 
should approximate about 6.7:1, and while most Americans estimate that 
it is probably more like 30:1, the actual ratio of CEO compensation to 
unskilled workers today hovers around 354:1.403 Back in 1965, it stood at 
20:1.404 Since then, the disparity has increased almost 18-fold. 
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Source: Institute for Policy Studies’s report, Billionaire Bonanza: 
The Forbes 400 and the Rest of Us (2017) 
Meanwhile, in the United States, we have implemented a carceral 
state that parallels the slavery of the past. We incarcerate at rates that 
would be considered inhuman most anywhere else, and that distribute 
life consequences along racial and ethnic lines.  The life changes of a 
young Black man between the ages of adolescence and young adulthood 
of being incarcerated are one in three. Prisons and jails are filled with 
young men and women of color. 
We know that the carceral state was the product of deliberate 
political choices. What Piketty and his colleagues have convincingly 
shown is that the economic transformations as well were not the product 
of inherent laws of capital, autonomous forces of economics, or natural 
historical developments—but are instead the product of deliberate human 
choice: the product of our actions and politics.405 In this sense, Karl 
Marx was wrong to think that there were inherent processes of capital 
accumulation; twentieth-century economists, such as Simon Kuznets, 
were wrong to suggest that primitive or mature capitalism have specific 
tendencies toward accumulation or not.406 The differing trends are the 
product, instead, of political and legal choices. The sharp increases in 
inheritance taxes in the United States in the early twentieth century, and 
the later elimination of such inheritance taxes in the late twentieth 
century, are political choices with significant economic impact. 
Choices we made and continue to make. So, for instance, the 
famous Beveridge Plan in 1942 promised social welfare benefits to 
soldiers in exchange for their willingness to put their lives at risk: this 
pact founded the welfare state in England during the war at mid-century, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
182 
and it had significant redistributive effects. Similarly, the elimination of 
inheritance taxes in the United States under President George W. Bush at 
the turn of the twenty-first century had significant distributive effects. 
All of these political choices shape the equality curves—and all of them 
are the product of our individual actions and inactions. Not of economic 
laws or political determinism. They are the outcome of political actions 
and choices of ordinary women and men. And they have frightening 
consequences, insofar as these wealth accumulations may explain in part 
the rise of extreme right-wing populist movements and the alt-right in 
the United States and Europe in the early twenty-first century. 
We live today, in the United States and more broadly in the 
West—but also seemingly more and more in countries like China, 
Russia, Eastern Europe, and certain areas of the global South—in a 
political space dominated by the political ideals of neoliberalism. 
Dominated by a purported faith in the mechanisms of the market, as if 
they were autonomous or semi-autonomous from the governmental 
regulation that creates and maintains markets. This new neoliberal 
hegemony coincides with the increased wealth inequality. And not 
without reason. The threat of communism has dissipated, the Cold War 
was won, and liberal democratic regimes no longer experience the 
pressure that communalism placed on them. They no longer feel the need 
to equalize in the face of a more egalitarian society—or at least a regime 
that presented itself as ensuring greater equality. The threat of 
communism is what pushed liberal regimes like the United States toward 
higher taxation of inheritance and income at mid-century, and to 
embrace civil rights for minorities. But with that pressure gone now, 
there is nothing to break the growing income inequalities and wealth 
accumulation. 
Beyond our own borders, we are witnessing a global grab for the 
global commons—or whatever is left of it—with the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union and the precipitous privatization of industry, utilities, and 
finance in the former Eastern Bloc, the capitalization of the Chinese 
economy, the deregulation of the British and Western European 
economies, the devastating impact of the IMF’s fiscal policies across 
Africa and Latin America. Mainstream economists document the 
plummeting percentage of property held in public trust in China, Japan, 
and across Europe, not only in the United States—with several of these 
countries having effectively placed their commons in hock. In other 
words, the amount of commons has shrunk.407 Piketty, Saez and their 
colleagues document the plummeting percentage of property held in 
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public trust in China, Japan, Europe, and the United States—as 
evidenced by Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: The gradual transfer of public wealth into private 
wealth, showing negative net public wealth in the US, Japan, and the 
UK, and only slightly positive in Germany and France. 
Source: Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, 
Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, “Global Inequality Dynamics: 
New Findings from WID.WORLD,” NBER Working Paper 23119 
(February 2017), figure 2b. 
At the global level, the inequalities are even more obscene. As 
Sam Moyn tells us, “a mere eight men controlled more wealth than half 
the inhabitants of the planet—several billion people.” 408  We have 
witnessed, in effect, the decomposition of a post-war period of social 
reconstruction—after World War II and the wars of colonial 
independence—with markedly increasing inequality throughout the 
globe: 409  a hegemonic form of economic neoliberalism no longer 
contained by the threat or even existence of communism; an oppressive 
globalized and financialized political economy run from the corporate 
headquarters of finance, oil, data, and commercial multinational giants 
and G-7 through -20 government leaders; a run on the global commons, 
extending even to our shared planet, the earth. Since the last third of the 
twentieth century, in effect, we have witnessed a structural 
transformation of the human condition—one that is about to accelerate 
with the explosive growth of artificial intelligence and the expected 
diminution, by half, of global employment. 
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In the wake of the recent elections of strong-men leaders around 
the globe—not just Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, but also Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, 
Nearendra Modi in India, Victor Orbán in Hungary—the skidmarks are 
increasingly global. 
It is not clear how much longer these mounting inequalities can 
grow before triggering a political meltdown or uprising against the 
current political condition in this country. The dawn of the twenty-first 
century has already witnessed a number of uprisings in the United States, 
from the Tea Party challenge to a perceived consolidation of Democratic 
Party power in Washington, to the Occupy Wall Street movement on 
behalf of the 99%, to the #BlackLivesMatter and broader movement 
against the lived—and the fatal—inequalities of African Americans and 
persons of color, to the rise of an alt-right that believes that it itself is the 
victim of the increasing inequality in American society. “The political 
revolution is just beginning,” Bernie Sanders states in his Guide to 
Political Revolution published in 2017 after the election of Donald 
Trump. “The economy, health care, education, the environment, social 
justice, immigration: What role will YOU play?” Sanders asks.410 With 
graphics showing the real average income of the top 0.01%, 1%, and 
bottom 90%, the CEO pay disparities, starvation wages, and mass 
incarceration; with chapters on health care, higher education, climate 
change, and policing—Sanders calls for radical grassroots 
mobilization.411 “This is your country. Help us take it back,” Sanders 
writes. “Join the Political Revolution.”412 
Sanders’s use of the term “revolution,” the Occupy movement’s 
appropriation of the notion of an “occupation,” the alt-right’s adoption of 
fascist and white supremacist imagery—these are fighting words and 
images. They represent a call to arms. They reflect the high stakes and 
the seriousness with which people today view their political condition. 
And they signal, possibly, the coming of stormier political 
circumstances. They make clear that we face today important political 
choices: Whether to combat, ignore, or defend and accentuate wealth 
inequalities in society? –Whether to seize the political moment or retreat 
to personal pursuits and cede it to others? –Whether to give in to the 
seemingly invincible structures of political power that now privilege 
PACs and the accumulated wealth of political contributions? –What to 
do in the face of such unbalanced and skewed politics? These are critical 
political choices we must make. 
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Chapter 14: Critique – New York, September 1, 2018 
In a set of recent writings, I have attempted to expose both the 
ideological forces and the strategic factors that have shaped our perilous 
political condition in the United States today. I am embarrassed by the 
self-reference, but a lot of the groundwork has already been done.  
In The Illusion of Free Markets (2011), I traced the rise to 
dominance of neoliberal ideas—from divine notions of orderliness tied 
to natural law in the work of the first economists in the eighteenth 
century, through the more secular ideas of self-interest, expertise, and 
informational advantage reflected in more conventional nineteenth-
century laissez-faire ideologies, to cybernetic notions of spontaneous 
order elaborated by Friedrich Hayek in the mid-twentieth century, and 
ultimately to the more scientific and technical economic theories of the 
Chicago School concerning the efficiency of competitive markets. 
I demonstrated that the myth of the free market was born hand-
in-hand with a punitive state—that the illusion of natural order was from 
its inception joined at the hip, and remains today tied to the need for the 
strict policing and punishment of those who are viewed as “disorderly.” I 
exposed the fundamental paradox of neoliberal politics—what I and 
others refer to as “neoliberal penality”: in the country that has done the 
most to promote the idea of a hands-off government, we run the single 
largest prison complex in the entire world.  
I revealed how these illusory beliefs in free markets have had 
devastating effects on our contemporary politics, by hiding wealth 
distributions, by making them seem natural, and thereby by reducing our 
willingness to critically examine our political condition. By obscuring 
the rules and making the outcomes seem natural and deserved, neoliberal 
politics make it easier for certain market players to reorganize economic 
exchange in such a way as to maximize their take, which ultimately 
augments social inequality. Increased social inequality, in turn, has its 
own dynamics that tend to demand heightened punitive repression to 
maintain that social order. It facilitates the police state and mass 
incarceration by making it easier to resist government intervention in the 
economic sphere but to embrace aggressive forms of policing and 
punishing that result in even greater inequality and mass incarceration. 
In Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (2015), I 
analyzed how the digital age has transformed the circulation of power in 
society. In particular, I showed how our own desires render us 
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transparent to social media, corporations, and the intelligence services of 
the government—and the new ways in which the government and 
commerce know us and shape us. The important point here is that we 
live in a new digital era that has profound affects on how politics 
function and on how power circulates in society. I call it an “expository 
society,” since it is our own expositions and exhibitions that are 
disarming us. But the central implication is that relations of power are 
changing dramatically as a result of technological innovation and 
centralizing knowledge in the hands of a digital elite. It has created a 
space of total information awareness. 
In The Counterrevolution: How Our Government Went to War 
Against Its Own Citizens (2018), I then exposed our contemporary, 
dominant paradigm of governing: the counterinsurgency method, which 
we have embraced in the United States and now turned against our own 
citizens. I showed how we govern today, at home as well as abroad, by a 
mode of political engagement infused with counterinsurgency theory. It 
is a strategy of governance that creates, out of whole cloth, a fictitious 
internal enemy—Muslims, Mexicans, police protesters, “radical Black 
extremists,” and other minorities—and then puts in place tactics of total 
information awareness, elimination, and pacification, in an effort to win 
the hearts and minds of the ordinary and passive American masses, and 
control our political condition. When, as today, there really is no 
domestic insurgency or insurrection, the counterinsurgency mode of 
governing becomes the American Counterrevolution: a counterrevolution 
without a revolution, a counterinsurgency without an insurgency. This 
Counterrevolution has, today, successfully concentrated political power 
in the hands of a small minority of guardians—of counterrevolutionary 
elites—composed of cabinet members and national security advisors, 
congressional leaders, high-tech chairmen, and captains of industry. 
These elites control the flow of digital data, the direction of drones and 
special operations, the repression of internal protest, and make possible 
an unprecedented concentration of wealth. 
Those prior writings serve to clear the ground of different 
illusions that operate to render tolerable today’s inequalities and attacks 
on minorities and immigrants. Other ground clearing—on the liberal rule 
of law and problems of violence—has been directly addressed in earlier 
chapters. They set the stage for the most pressing issue: Where shall we 
turn? What kind of politics do we need? 
Any contemporary answer—even the beginning of an answer—
must take into account the inexorable fact that, today, both the far right 
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and the Republican party have embraced a conservative vision that rests 
on ideals of natural hierarchy and, in large part, white supremacy—a 
vision that not only eschews equality, but even abandons basic notions of 
sufficiency: one that does not even aspire to universal health care, 
subsistence benefits for the unemployed, or other basic welfare 
safeguards. As a result, it is patently clear that right and conservative 
ideologies will not advance the cause of equity. They will not only not 
promote equality, they would not even provide for basic needs for 
everyone. 
By the same token, most centrists and center Democrats have 
embraced a style of neoliberalism that also essentially has given up on 
robust equality. That was true of President Obama, who explicitly and 
openly endorsed Chicago School notions of free market. As a result, it is 
only on the critical Left more generally that issues of equality can come 
to the fore. 
In other words, one must look to the critical Left, and the critical 
Left alone, to find answers for a more equitable and just society. To be 
sure, at a theoretical or philosophical level, there may be fruitful 
coalitions with centrists who espouse for instance a capabilities 
approach, like Amartya Sen; or those who argue for a “maxi-min” 
principle, by which fairness is determined by whether it will maximize 
those who have the least; or philosophical egalitarians; or even those, 
like Parfitt, who are prioritarian on sufficiency, but believe that the 
priority of a sufficient life for all will lead to greater equality. It is even 
conceivable that some of these philosophical approaches may be as 
productive as more leftist philosophical stances. It is possible that if one 
digs deep, Marx was not exclusively concerned with equality; and Stalin, 
at least according to Sam Moyn, thought that equality was a hobgoblin—
not worth worrying about, something that would come about eventually. 
And there may even be times when there can be coalitions on particular 
issues—such as criminal justice reform and the Right on Crime 
movement, which includes people like the Koch brothers—that reach 
across the political spectrum at times on certain discrete issues. 
But our concern here is not to with philosophical arguments or 
temporary coalitions. The goal is not simply to make the argument for a 
more equal society. Nor is it to rehash the merits of the sufficiency 
versus equality debates, or bridge differences. The type of inequality that 
we face today, in the United States and around the globe, is simply 
intolerable and there is no point arguing about the merits of 
redistribution. Redistribution would only improve the lives of the have-
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nots—we are past those debates. Moreover, the marginal utility of 
wealth, past a certain number of millions of dollars, diminishes, and even 
those who argue for self-interest as the only way to “increase the pie” for 
everyone must concede that above a certain level of accumulation, there 
is little benefit to be gained from continued accumulation for the system 
as a whole. These are all theoretical or academic questions—and we are 
past those. On the question of political engagement, then, the only place 
to look today is on the critical Left. 
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Chapter 15: Praxis – New York, September 1, 2018 
Critical theory cannot content itself with diagnosing crises, 
unveiling illusions, and revealing our present political situation. Critical 
theory cannot retreat into critique as its sole form of praxis. It must also 
chart out critical practices specific to time and place. Today, in the 
United States, there is one immediate priority, two medium-term 
objectives, and one long-term project. 
I. 
The immediate priority is to stop Donald Trump in his tracks, 
now. This entails a combined effort of (1) using the courts to block 
Trump’s policies as much as possible, whether it is his executive order 
on the Muslim ban or the decision to include a citizenship question on 
the U.S. Census 2020; (2) campaigning to elect a leftist Congress in the 
mid-terms 2018; (3) investigating and exposing Trump’s corruption; and 
(4) challenging his Supreme Court nominations. 
In terms of litigation, the ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 
Center for Constitutional Rights, EJI, and other public-interest law 
centers, are in the best position to quarterback these efforts and to 
coordinate the attorneys who are prepared to conduct the litigation. The 
most important task here is, for non-lawyers, to financially support these 
organizations, and for attorneys, to work with them on our litigation 
efforts. 
Our litigation efforts need to be coordinated. The history of 
effective litigation campaigns—from desegregation to near abolition of 
the death penalty to same-sex marriage—makes clear the central role of 
coordination. Plaintiffs have to be picked carefully, jurisdictions have to 
be selected, timing has to be coordinated. Nothing should be left to 
chance. There needs to be direct communication, and it needs to be 
centralized and coordinated by the leading public-interest law centers. 
In every legal challenge I have brought since January 2017—
against the Muslim Ban with Tom Durkin in Amer Al Homssi’s case in 
January-February 2017, against discriminatory delays in Musab Zeiton’s 
case in August 2017, against the lethal injection of Doyle Hamm 
throughout 2017 and 2018—I have consulted closely with these 
organizations and I cannot underscore more the importance and value of 
doing so.  
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In terms of the 2018 midterms, Nate Silver’s Five-Thirty Eight, 
the Cook Political Report, and other statisticians have identified the 
swing districts. These are the ones that will require financial support and 
bodies. All of our resources should be poured into these swing districts. 
The New York Times has an exhaustive and geocoded list of the 27 toss-
up congressional districts, the 9 most competitive that are leaning 
Democrat, and the 26 most competitive leaning Republican, easily 
accessible right here: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/us/elections/house-race-
ratings.html. There are additional stories and updates at that link with 
further information.     The Cook Political Report has a detailed list of all 
the competitive congressional election races here: 
https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings. Naturally, 
these are the districts that will require the greatest influx of bodies and 
resources. 
The Democratic Party’s new Maoist approach to the 2018 mid-
terms—its new “hundred flowers” campaign—is the right way to 
proceed. There is far too wide an ideological spectrum right now within 
the Democratic Party for anyone to impose a party line. What is needed 
is a voting block in Congress that can stop Trump—a wide coalition. The 
best way forward is precisely to let local candidates represent fully their 
constituencies. As Mao famously said in 1956, “The policy of letting a 
hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is 
designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and the progress of 
science.” The same can be said now about the flourishing of an 
opposition coalition. 
In terms of exposing Trump’s corruption, that is the task for 
special counsel and prosecutors. Not everyone is well qualified for this, 
so those who have the positions of authority, skills, and ambition will 
need to take the lead. 
Finally, in terms of the Supreme Court, the Democratic Senators 
need to challenge as vigorously as possible Trump’s nominations until 
they have the Senate majority. That should be done on principle in light 
of the hold placed on President Obama’s nomination under even more 
tenuous circumstances; it should also be done in response to the 
withholding of documents pertaining to nominees and the slapdash 
confirmation processes.  
The next priority is to make room, support, nourish, and 
empower a leftist groundswell movement in order to win the 2020 
presidential elections. Instead of dictating who the establishment 
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believes is the winnable Left candidate, we need to embrace the same 
type of “hundred flowers” approach for 2020. It is far too early to close 
ranks and it would be counterproductive. So the task here, now, is to 
create spaces for people to speak and be heard, and to support and 
encourage those who seem most promising.  
It is crucial in this context to encourage greater political 
engagement from the disengaged and first-time voters; to build coalitions 
on the ground with them and with those providing support and services 
to those who are disengaged and disenfranchised; and most importantly 
to follow their lead. To find ways to allow their discourse to be heard so 
that they can orient our agenda—in the same way in which the GIP 
served to allow the voices of prisoners to be heard. We need to create 
space for the next generations to speak and give us direction. We need to 
help create the space for a groundswell to emerge. We need to nourish it 
and support it.  
The strategy should be to use the 2020 presidential campaign, 
which is about to start after the midterms, as a way to galvanize a Left 
groundswell movement so that the candidate who emerges can serve as a 
mobilizing force. I think we should avoid using labels from the past that 
carry unnecessary luggage—whether it is Democratic or Socialist—and 
instead focus on the values of equity, compassion, and respect that we 
embrace. 
Third, we need to reinterpret better and more. I argued earlier that 
the Nietzschian hermeneutic should guide us in our political battles and 
in these struggles that are brewing, this political storm. Thanks precisely 
to our interpretive training, critical thinkers have always known the vital 
importance of interpretation and how to lend meaning to things. We 
should be able to seize the upper hand now, because we’ve been doing 
this and knowing this for so long. We should never give up in the face of 
brilliant interpreters and meaning makers like Donald Trump or Steve 
Bannon, but instead, do what we do best: offer a better interpretation, 
change the meaning, propose a reading. 
We knew that first. Donald Trump has become a master at it. 
Notice how Trump and his meaning-makers were able so rapidly to take 
the idea of “fake news” that the Democrats had seized on. Especially 
after Pizzagate, Trump took that meaning and turned it around, so that it 
is, today, the New York Times and all the liberal media that are 
associated with the concept of “fake news.” Trump is a brilliant 
interpreter. That is how he got elected. “Jail Hilary. “Clinton for Prison.” 
Those were brilliant—and yes despicable, but brilliant interpretations. 
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He is a meaning-maker like few others. But remember, interpretation is 
our skill, our techne, what we grew up on. And it is now, more than ever, 
the time to refine it and redeploy it. We’ve begun to do that. 
“Nasty woman.” “You can grab them by the pussy,” Trump said. 
Well, the opposition made a lot of pink pussyhats and marched. That was 
precisely reclaiming the meaning, giving another interpretation. And I 
believe it had the potential to start a pink revolution. A revolution that 
included “The power of the handmade.” The “power of individuality 
within large groups.” The “power of pink.” 
We need to challenge Trumps interpretations and impose ours. 
We can do so in millions of ways – ways that will allow us to regain the 
executive pen, that pen that can do so much damage. We need to return, 
with Nietzsche, to the promise of tomorrow’s Daybreak: 
There are no scientific methods which alone lead to 
knowledge! We have to tackle things 
experimentally, now angry with them and now kind, 
and be successively just, passionate and cold with 
them. One person addresses things as a policeman, a 
second as a father confessor, a third as an 
inquisitive wanderer. Something can be wrung from 
them now with sympathy, now with force; 
reverence for their secrets will take one person 
forwards, indiscretion and roguishness in revealing 
their secrets will do the same for another. We 
investigators are, like all conquerors, discoverers, 
seafarers, adventurers, of an audacious morality 
and must reconcile ourselves to being considered 
on the whole evil.413 
II. 
Regarding the long-term project: we must inculcate the values of 
equity, compassion, and respect in ourselves and our neighbors and the 
next generations. For me, that means teaching just societies, promoting 
just societies, and recruiting a corps of students and activists dedicated to 
justice, critique, and praxis. It means creating the social networks among 
critical theorists that reinforce leftist values and build alliances. 
The future lies in the long view of history—not a determinist 
vision of history, rather the long, laborious view of history. In this, I 
draw as well, paradoxically, on conservative thinkers and bend their 
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theories toward a critical future. I have in mind, in particular, the 
moralist tradition of Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, and the 
historical tradition of the Annales School. 
Edward Banfield and his disciple, James Q. Wilson, were 
offensive thinkers, to be honest. Political scientists, urbanists in 
particular, you will recall their central thesis—that moral backwardness 
is characterized by present-orientedness, whereas, by contrast, moral 
superiority is marked by future-orientedness. You may recall that 
Banfield infamously published a book about Southern Italian society 
under the title “The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.” He had spent 
the summer in Southern Italy with his wife, who spoke a little Italian—
he did not—and interviewed some of the residents of the small town of 
Chiaromonte, in the region of Basilicata, in 1955. Since Banfield didn’t 
speak Italian, his wife served as translator. And what he argued, in the 
book he published three years later in 1958, was that the short-
sightedness of the Southern Italian people, who purportedly acted only 
on the short-term immediate interests of their families, was the source of 
their “moral backwardness” and plight. In later work, and in that of his 
disciple, James Q. Wilson, they argued that the problem with inner-city 
residents in the United States, and minorities more generally, was 
similarly their present-orientedness—by contrast to the future-
orientedness of the upper class. Together, Banfield and Wilson helped 
carve out, for the future, the temporal dimension of conservative thought 
that historically had always looked back. 
The Annales School of historiography could also serve here. 
Their concept of “la longue durée,” the long view of history—coined by 
Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, the two historians who founded the 
journal in 1929 Annales d'histoire économique et sociale—focused on 
the deeper structures that influence, but do not determine, history. These 
historians, in their own words, preferred to “neglect[] surface 
disturbances” and instead “to observe the long and medium-term 
evolution of economy, society and civilization.”414 In effect, to unearth 
the deeper long-term forces that shape, but do not dictate, our future.  
Rather than reject these schools of thought as reactionary, I have 
come to see in them something important for critical praxis. Much of the 
attention among critical practitioners is focused on the here and now. 
The assemblies are prefigurative models of democracy that we 
instantiate here and now. Tariq Ali’s call for a second revolution at 
Tahrir Square, similarly, was temporally immediate. The Invisible 
Committee’s latest intervention, their 2017 book Maintenant (Now), 
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captures well this temporal dimension. And similarly, if you look at most 
of the interventions by the liberal left over the past decades, for instance 
in the former East since the fall of the Berlin Wall, they have revolved 
around implementing new constitutions and civil institutions, or 
reinforcing institutions, that were intended to serve as a bulwark against 
authoritarianism. A focus on the present, again. 
What was lacking there was attention to the future: to the deeper 
structures and forces that shape us, our desires, our ambitions. As a 
result, those new institutions, and constitutions, easily became the tools 
and weapons of ambitious new authoritarians, as we are seeing in 
Hungary and Poland today. The immediate institutions do not themselves 
forestall the illiberal or totalitarian tendencies, they become instead the 
new battleground for civil war. The effort of the Polish government to 
retire older oppositional judges—placing a 65-year age limit on judges, 
though granting discretionary exceptions—is precisely the kind of 
manipulation that presentist solutions enable. 
So instead, I place my faith in future-orientedness. Not on moral 
grounds, but on political grounds. To till the fields, laboriously, for 
rewards that we might reap in the future. To create institutions of a 
different vein, like the Federalist Society on the right for instance—not 
rights bulwarks, but slow social network labor that reinforces certain 
values and builds reputations. There is no reason to believe that 
explicitly calling for revolution advances the cause of social change. The 
slow time-consuming labor of shaping ideas and desires may be far more 
important. It is precisely how conservative organizations were built over 
decades and have now come to dominate. Popular dissatisfaction and the 
desire “not to be governed in this way” are what bring about social 
uprisings, perhaps; but those are shaped by decades-long struggles. 
The most pressing need, then, is long-term investment in 
networks, ideas, institutions, and organizations that promote human 
values of compassion and equity. I do not believe there is the 
groundwork or foundation for an egalitarian revolution in this country 
yet. Far more work needs to be done. Trying to start a revolution now 
could be counter-productive. Separatist cellular insurrections may be 
equally pointless. But conventional party politics are just not enough. 
What we need is long-term concerted groundwork to promote critical 
thought that pierces through illusions and, at the same time, nurtures the 
values of equity, compassion, and respect. This is hard, ungrateful work, 
not satisfying in the short-term, thankless. It involves a time horizon that 
is hard to bear. 
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In the midst of the last major crises—after the events of May ’68, 
the repressions, and the rethinking of power that took place—Foucault 
reminded us of the stakes of the political struggle.415 He emphasized how 
serious the political struggle was. I cannot stress enough how right he 
was—even if we need to replace his notion of civil war, which is too 
binary and time-bound, with the concept of endless battles. The political 
situation today is critical. Not only that, but the neoliberal consumerist 
horizon is so terribly seductive. Consumption is so frighteningly 
powerful, and the digital age, so awfully distracting. In the face of that, 
now more than ever, critical theorists need to reorient critical praxis for 
the twenty-first century. We now need to do the long hard work of 
reinforcing existing institutions, alliances, and networks, and creating 
new ones that will instill the values of equity and compassion, especially 
among the generations to come. 
III. 
We are today, in the United States, far down a dangerous path. 
Few realize the magnitude of the historical shift, even though so many of 
us have heard the alarm bells. But unless and until we begin to recognize 
the truly epochal transformation that crystalized counterinsurgency 
warfare strategies into a new mode of governing post 9/11 and, 
especially under President Trump and this new Supreme Court, into a 
new constitutional counterrevolutionary form of government—unless we 
realize we are now living the American Counterrevolution—it will be 
impossible to properly resist it. 
The priority now—as the priority would have been in 1932 
Germany—is to defeat Trump. He has a political charisma and stamina 
that few others have. This will require first and immediate attention to 
the 2018 midterms; alongside that, we need to support and nourish a 
leftist groundswell movement that promotes the values of equity, 
compassion, and respect. Most importantly, we need to create space for 
the young, those who are disengaged, and first-time voters, to be heard 
and to lead.  
For myself, I will place my greatest energies in building critical 
community with a long view of history—the long labor of promoting the 
values of the critical tradition. I will build critical spaces that are oriented 
to praxis and not just contemplation. I will foster social networks among 
critical theorists that reinforce leftist values and build lasting alliances. 
In the end, politics is a constant endless battle. We must never 
forget our political condition, but instead struggle as intelligently as 
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possible. That is the only way to win this coming battle in order to 
continue fighting what is, in effect, an endless struggle. 
Bernard E. Harcourt 
New York City 
September 1, 2018  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244764 
Critique & Praxis 
197 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, there isn’t one generalizable answer to the question 
“What is to be done?” There are, instead, situated answers that bear 
unique GPS codes and date and time stamps. The desire for a single 
answer is misleading, and reconstructed critical theory must avoid it.  
Critical theory instead must offer unique answers en situation. 
This is a radical departure from the tradition of critical theory, a tradition 
that was historically so much more foundational. Class struggle, it turns 
out, does not operate everywhere. The state is not always the enemy. A 
vanguard party is not necessarily appropriate. Leaderful—or for that 
matter, leaderless—is not always the right answer. Nor is non-violence. 
What is called for today are specific answers to the question “What is to 
be done?” in every location around the world. And each answer must 
bear its seal of time and space. 
We live in what many consider to be a post-revolutionary age—
post-revolutionary, in the sense that the time of grand revolutions and 
national liberations is behind us. But this idea that we are past revolution 
is myopic. The notion that the modern concept of revolution is behind us, 
or that the revolutionary ideal is too exigent, is deeply misleading. The 
fact is, revolutions are occurring all around us. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the capitalization of Russia are revolutionary. The current 
neoliberal turn in China is revolutionary. The Brexit break and rise of an 
alt-right movement in Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and 
elsewhere in Europe is revolutionary. The consolidation of executive 
power in Turkey is revolutionary. The rise of a right-wing, neoliberal, 
and Christian-conservative populist movement in the United States is 
revolutionary. The problem is that we never see the revolutions coming, 
we hardly feel them when they are taking shape, we tend to identify them 
only in the rearview mirror. But revolutions are everywhere around us. 
A revolution—or rather counterrevolution—is happening right 
now, under our eyes, in America. It is tearing down an embattled and 
wounded social welfare state and replacing it by a greedy state that 
functions predominantly by redistributing government largesse to a 
defense and national security constituency; eviscerating public education 
and replacing it with charter and private schools; Christianizing our way 
of life—constraining women’s reproductive choices, reestablishing 
patriarchy, reinforcing extreme and capital punishments; silencing and 
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punishing dissenting voices, multiculturalism, and racial, ethnic, sexual, 
and political difference. 
Entangled in the snare of the present, blinded by the seeming 
necessity of our existing institutions and political arrangements, few can 
even imagine the extraordinary political transformations that lie ahead. 
But they undoubtedly will be great—some even unimaginable today, just 
as democratic elections must have appeared unimaginable in feudal 
times or in the ancient régime. It is today practically impossible to 
imagine, in North America, something different than a liberal 
democracy, but surely that time will come. 
Fearing the unknown, many of us cling to the modicum of 
political stability we have, trying not to challenge or rock things too 
much—even when the status quo is so appalling and intolerable. Many 
hardly believe in the possibility of a radically different future. This is not 
new. Few foresaw the French Revolution. Practically no political 
scientist predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. No one forecast the Arab Spring. Most of us were surprised by 
the Brexit vote, and stunned by the election of President Donald J. 
Trump. 
These upheavals—upheavals so unexpected, they were not even 
predicted by the experts—are precisely the product of the endless and 
relentless political struggles that mark our political condition. And they 
have dramatic effects on the prospect, for each and every one of us, of 
realizing our ideals and values. They severely affect the human 
condition, liberty, equality, solidarity, our well being, our welfare, even 
our lives. 
And everything we do—every choice we make, every action we 
do—affects these struggles and upheavals. This is the unbearable and 
daunting truth. Unbearable, indeed. Agonizing and excruciating. The 
burden is almost too much to bear—which is why so much of the history 
of political thought has been consumed with futile efforts to derive 
principles or schemes or structures that would lighten the load. That 
would allow us to go on with our lives. How futile, though. How 
counter-productive! As if institutional arrangements or legal regimes 
could solve our problems, when it all instead comes back to who we are 
and what we do—each and every one of us. No, the challenge is 
daunting. Almost overwhelming. But we have no choice.  
A reconstructed critical theory must confront our political 
condition and challenge the intolerable in these critical times. Faced with 
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the utter singularity of the battles, it must respond coherently and en 
situation. Through contextualized critical praxis, it must lay the 
groundwork for equity, compassion, and respect.  
Theory and tactics: A pure theory of illusions entails a pure 
theory of values that demands a pure theory of tactics. This is critical 
theory and praxis for the twenty-first century. 
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CRITIQUE & PRAXIS 
__________ 
 
We are going through an unprecedented period of political instability. With the 
rise of the alt-right and of xenophobic sentiment, and the fallout of neoliberal government 
policies, our political future is at stake. These times call for the type of critical thought 
that gave rise to the Frankfurt School in the 1920s and post-structuralism in the 1960s. 
Yet, in the face of our crises today, contemporary critical theory feels disarmed. 
Critical theory is in disarray because of a wave of anti-foundational challenges in 
the 1970s that shattered the epistemological foundations of the Frankfurt School, which 
were positivist and built on the Marxist foundations of class struggle and proletarian 
revolution. The anti-foundational critiques fractured critical theory, but did not rebuild it. 
The result is that critical theory has since been mired in internecine battles of influence. 
Critique & Praxis is a corrective. Its ambition is four-fold. First, the book 
reconstructs critical theory by proposing a pure theory of illusions. The heart of critique 
is the unveiling of belief systems that mask the distribution of wealth, resources, and 
welfare in society; but as we unveil, we create new illusions that then themselves need to 
be unmasked. A reconstructed critical theory offers an infinite loop of critique, constantly 
reexamining how our own belief systems and material conditions reorder society.  
Second, the book offers a new critical horizon for the future. It challenges the 
hidden work that is performed by traditional critical utopias such as socialism, 
communism, or the withering of the state. Rather than posit a particular political 
economic regime, a reconstructed critical utopia must assess how really-existing regimes 
(capitalist, socialist, or communist) approximate the core values of the critical Left, 
namely equity, compassion, and respect. It calls for a pure theory of values. 
Third, the book reconstructs critical praxis. Once critique and utopia are liberated 
of their foundational constraints, critical theory must call for entirely situated practices 
that push really-existing regimes Left. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy, and nothing 
is off the table. Critical theory cannot endorse in the abstract a vanguard party, any more 
than it can espouse non-violence. Every unique political context will call for specific 
tactics that are GPS-, date-, and time-stamped—for a pure theory of tactics.  
Fourth, the book proposes a situated and time-stamped response to the question 
“What is to be done?” We need to stop Donald Trump in his tracks by litigating his 
executive orders, supporting swing-district candidates in 2018, exposing his corruption, 
and delaying his Supreme Court appointment. We need to support a Left populist 
movement for the 2020 presidential elections, form alliances, and empower those who are 
disengaged now; and generate better interpretations than Trump. Finally, we need to do 
the long-term labor of promoting and instilling Left critical values throughout society.  
Critique & Praxis performs these tasks through a history of theory and praxis 
from the 19th to the 21st century, a reconstruction of critique, utopia, and praxis, and an 
answer to the question “What is to be done? New York, September 1, 2018.” This is a 
first draft, but the issues are too pressing to wait. Comments and reactions are welcome.  
— Bernard E. Harcourt, New York, September 1, 2018 
